Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070228-namRevision 1.1
For Public Release 2007 February 28 16:00 UTC (GMT)
Cisco Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series that have a
Network Analysis Module installed are vulnerable to an attack, which could
allow an attacker to gain complete control of the system. Only Cisco Catalyst
systems that have a NAM on them are affected. This vulnerability affects
systems that run Internetwork Operating System (IOS) or Catalyst Operating
System (CatOS).
Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers.
This advisory is posted at
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20070228-nam.
Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series that have a NAM
installed in them are affected. A system that has a NAM can be identified by
the show module command. A NAM will be seen as
WS-SVC-NAM-1, WS-SVC-NAM-2 or WS-X6380-NAM in this output.
This vulnerability affects systems that run IOS or CatOS.
A sample output for a system that has a NAM-2 on it is provided
below:
Cat6k#show module
Mod Ports Card Type Model Serial No.
--- ----- -------------------------------------- ------------------ -----------
1 2 Catalyst 6000 supervisor 2 (Active) WS-X6K-SUP2-2GE SAL06417E23
3 48 48 port 10/100 mb RJ-45 ethernet WS-X6248-RJ-45 SAD050108R4
5 8 8 port 1000mb ethernet WS-X6408-GBIC SAD041300CL
6 8 Network Analysis Module WS-SVC-NAM-2 SAD093002AM
No other Cisco products are known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
NAMs are deployed in Catalyst 6000, 6500 series and Cisco 7600 series
to monitor and analyze network traffic by using Remote Monitoring (RMON),
RMON2, and other MIBs. More information about NAMs can be found at the
following URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps708/products_module_configuration_guide_chapter09186a0080394e09.html
NAMs communicate with the Catalyst system by using the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP). By spoofing the SNMP communication between the
Catalyst system and the NAM an attacker may obtain complete control of the
Catalyst system.
Devices running both Cisco IOS and Cisco CatOS are affected by this
vulnerability. This vulnerability is introduced in CatOS at 7.6(15) and 8.5(1).
Older CatOS images are not vulnerable.
This issue is documented in bug IDs
CSCsd75273
(
registered customers only)
,
CSCse52951
(
registered customers only)
for IOS and
CSCse39848
(
registered customers only)
for CatOS.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Cisco will provide a
base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to
assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal. Customers are
encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the environmental
impact of a particular vulnerability.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
By successfully exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker may gain
complete control of the device.
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade
solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and
software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new
release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for
assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release
train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given
release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain
the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability
for each are listed in the "Rebuild" and "Maintenance" columns. A device
running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a
specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable.
The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later
version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label).
For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance," consult
the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html.
|
Major Release
|
Availability of Repaired Releases
|
|
Affected 12.1-Based Release
|
Rebuild
|
Maintenance
|
|
12.1E
|
12.1(26)E8
|
|
|
12.1(27b)E1
|
|
|
12.1EX
|
12.1(12c)EX
|
12.1(13)EX
|
|
Affected 12.2-Based Release
|
Rebuild
|
Maintenance
|
|
12.2EU
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(25)EWA7 or later
|
|
12.2EW
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(25)EWA7 or later
|
|
12.2EWA
|
|
12.2(25)EWA7
|
|
12.2IXA
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)IXB2 or later
|
|
12.2IXB
|
12.2(18)IXB2
|
|
|
12.2S
|
12.2(14)S3
|
|
|
12.2(18)S5
|
12.2(20)S
|
|
12.2SG
|
12.2(25)SG1
|
|
|
12.2SGA
|
12.2(31)SGA1
|
|
|
12.2SRA
|
12.2(33)SRA2
|
|
|
12.2SX
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or later
|
|
12.2SXA
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or later
|
|
12.2SXB
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or later
|
|
12.2SXD
|
12.2(18)SXD7a
|
|
|
12.2SXE
|
12.2(18)SXE6a
|
|
|
12.2SXF
|
12.2(18)SXF5
|
|
|
12.2SY
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or later
|
|
12.2ZA
|
Vulnerable; migrate to 12.2(18)SXD7a or later
|
|
12.2ZU
|
12.2(18)ZU1
|
|
|
CatOS Release
|
Availability of Fixed Releases
|
|
Interim
|
Maintenance
|
|
5.x
|
Not vulnerable
|
|
6.x
|
Not vulnerable
|
|
7.6(1) through 7.6(14)
|
Not vulnerable
|
|
7.6(15) through 7.6(19)
|
7.6(19.2)
|
7.6(20) Available 2007-Mar-21
|
|
8.5(1) through 8.5(5)
|
8.5(5.3)
|
8.5(6)
|
|
8.6(x)
|
Not vulnerable
|
No workarounds exist for this vulnerability.
This vulnerability requires an attacker to spoof SNMP packets from the
IP address of the NAM. Filtering SNMP traffic to an affected device can be used
as a mitigation. Filtering SNMP traffic needs to be done on systems that are
deployed in front of an affected device, since it is ineffective to filter
against such spoofed packets on the device itself.
Anti-spoofing measures and infrastructure access-lists can also be
deployed at your network edge as a potential mitigation technique. Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/iacl.html
for examples on how to apply ACLs on Cisco routers for infrastructure
protection.
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the
network are available in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin companion document for
this advisory:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20070228-nam
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software becomes
available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their
maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and
known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such
software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software
license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be
obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com.
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco
Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that
support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of
action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior,
and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and
releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support
organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate
for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get
their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC
contacts are as follows.
-
+1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North
America)
-
+1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the
world)
-
e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for
non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone
numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various
languages.
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was found internally.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20070228-nam
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail
and Usenet news recipients.
-
cust-security-announce@cisco.com
-
first-teams@first.org
-
bugtraq@securityfocus.com
-
vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
-
cisco@spot.colorado.edu
-
cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
-
full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
-
comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or
newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the
above URL for any updates.
|
Revision 1.1
|
2007-March-15
|
Updated the availability date of CatOS release
7.6(20)
|
|
Revision 1.0
|
2007-February-28
|
Initial public release.
|
|
