Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20121031-dcnm
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20121031-dcnm
Revision 2.0
Last Updated 2013 May 8 16:00 UTC (GMT)
For Public Release 2012 October 31 16:00 UTC (GMT)
Contents
Summary
Affected Products
Details
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Impact
Software Versions and Fixes
Workarounds
Obtaining Fixed Software
Exploitation and Public Announcements
Status of This Notice: Final
Distribution
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
Summary
Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager (DCNM) contains a remote command execution vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the computer that is running the Cisco Prime DCNM application.Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability.
This advisory is available at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20121031-dcnm
Note: After this advisory was initially published, it was found that in addition to the DCNM SAN server component that is part of the DCNM solution, the DCNM LAN server is also affected by the same vulnerability. This advisory has been updated to revision 2.0 to indicate that the DCNM LAN server component is also vulnerable, to provide the Cisco bug ID that tracks the vulnerability in the DCNM LAN server component, and to update fixed software information.
Affected Products
Vulnerable Products
All Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager (DCNM) releases prior to release 6.1(2), for both the Microsoft Windows and Linux platforms, are affected by this vulnerability. Both the Cisco DCNM-LAN Server and Cisco DCNM-SAN Server, which are part of the Cisco Prime DCNM solution, are affected by this vulnerability.
Note: Cisco DCNM-LAN Server and Cisco DCNM-SAN Server were different products until release 6.1(1), when both products converged into a single Cisco Prime DCNM product. All releases of Cisco DCNM-LAN Server and Cisco DCNM-SAN are affected by this vulnerability.
To determine the Cisco Prime DCNM release that is running, administrators can connect to the computer that runs the Cisco Prime DCNM software using a web browser and HTTPS; the release number will be displayed in the login page, before logging in. The following example shows a device running version 6.1(1a):
Note: Cisco DCNM-LAN Server and Cisco DCNM-SAN Server were different products until release 6.1(1), when both products converged into a single Cisco Prime DCNM product. All releases of Cisco DCNM-LAN Server and Cisco DCNM-SAN are affected by this vulnerability.
To determine the Cisco Prime DCNM release that is running, administrators can connect to the computer that runs the Cisco Prime DCNM software using a web browser and HTTPS; the release number will be displayed in the login page, before logging in. The following example shows a device running version 6.1(1a):
Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Version: 6.1(1a)
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Details
Cisco Prime DCNM, previously known as Cisco Data Center Network Manager, is a network management application that combines the management of Ethernet and storage networks into a single dashboard to help network and storage administrators manage and troubleshoot health and performance across different families of Cisco products that run Cisco NX-OS Software.
Cisco Prime DCNM, both the Cisco DCNM-LAN Server and the Cisco DCNM-SAN Server components, running versions prior to 6.1(2) contain a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system that hosts the Cisco Prime DCNM application.
The vulnerability exists because JBoss Application Server Remote Method Invocation (RMI) services, specifically the jboss.system:service=MainDeployer functionality, are exposed to unauthorized users. An unauthenticated, remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending arbitrary commands via RMI services. An exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device.
Commands are executed in the context of the System user for Cisco Prime DCNM running on Microsoft Windows or the root user for Cisco Prime DCNM running on Linux.
Cisco Prime DCNM uses TCP port 1099 or 9099, depending on the Cisco Prime DCNM version, for the RMI registry function. An RMI transaction always starts with a TCP connection to the RMI registry port.
This vulnerability has been documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtz44924 (registered customers only) and CSCua31204 (registered customers only), for the Cisco DCNM-SAN Server and the Cisco DNCM-LAN Server components, respectively, and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2012-5417.
Cisco Prime DCNM, both the Cisco DCNM-LAN Server and the Cisco DCNM-SAN Server components, running versions prior to 6.1(2) contain a vulnerability that could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system that hosts the Cisco Prime DCNM application.
The vulnerability exists because JBoss Application Server Remote Method Invocation (RMI) services, specifically the jboss.system:service=MainDeployer functionality, are exposed to unauthorized users. An unauthenticated, remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending arbitrary commands via RMI services. An exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the device.
Commands are executed in the context of the System user for Cisco Prime DCNM running on Microsoft Windows or the root user for Cisco Prime DCNM running on Linux.
Cisco Prime DCNM uses TCP port 1099 or 9099, depending on the Cisco Prime DCNM version, for the RMI registry function. An RMI transaction always starts with a TCP connection to the RMI registry port.
This vulnerability has been documented in Cisco bug IDs CSCtz44924 (registered customers only) and CSCua31204 (registered customers only), for the Cisco DCNM-SAN Server and the Cisco DNCM-LAN Server components, respectively, and has been assigned the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2012-5417.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco has scored the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this security advisory is in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps organizations determine the urgency and priority of a response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can also compute environmental scores that help determine the impact of the vulnerability in their own networks.
Cisco has provided additional information regarding CVSS at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to compute the environmental impact for individual networks at the following link:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps organizations determine the urgency and priority of a response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can also compute environmental scores that help determine the impact of the vulnerability in their own networks.
Cisco has provided additional information regarding CVSS at the following link:
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to compute the environmental impact for individual networks at the following link:
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
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CSCtz44924 and CSCua31204 - JBoss installation allows remote command execution Calculate the environmental score of CSCtz44924 and CSCua31204 |
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CVSS Base Score - 10.0 |
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Access Vector |
Access Complexity |
Authentication |
Confidentiality Impact |
Integrity Impact |
Availability Impact |
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Network |
Low |
None |
Complete |
Complete |
Complete |
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CVSS Temporal Score - 8.3 |
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Exploitability |
Remediation Level |
Report Confidence |
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Functional |
Official-Fix |
Confirmed |
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Impact
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system that hosts the Cisco Prime DCNM application in the context of the System user for Cisco Prime DCNM running on Microsoft Windows, or the root user for Cisco Prime DCNM running on Linux.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, customers are advised to consult the Cisco Security Advisories, Responses, and Notices archive at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and review subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.
This vulnerability is first fixed in Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager release 6.1(2).
Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager can be downloaded from the Software Center on Cisco.com by visiting http://www.cisco.com/cisco/software/navigator.html and navigating to Products > Cloud and Systems Management > Data Center Infrastructure Management > Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager.
In all cases, customers should ensure that the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and confirm that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, customers are advised to contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or their contracted maintenance providers.
This vulnerability is first fixed in Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager release 6.1(2).
Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager can be downloaded from the Software Center on Cisco.com by visiting http://www.cisco.com/cisco/software/navigator.html and navigating to Products > Cloud and Systems Management > Data Center Infrastructure Management > Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager.
Workarounds
Because RMI transactions start with a connection to the RMI registry port, which by default is TCP port 1099 or 9099 depending on the Cisco Prime DCNM version, allowing only legitimate devices to connect to the RMI registry port can mitigate this vulnerability.
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the companion document "Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Remote Command Execution Vulnerability," which is available at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAMBAlert.x?alertId=27268
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network are available in the companion document "Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Cisco Prime Data Center Network Manager Remote Command Execution Vulnerability," which is available at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewAMBAlert.x?alertId=27268
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco has released free software updates that address the vulnerability described in this advisory. Prior to deploying software, customers are advised to consult their maintenance providers or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues that are specific to their environments.
Customers may only install and expect support for feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html.
Customers may only install and expect support for feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing, or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to follow the terms of the Cisco software license at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/general/warranty/English/EU1KEN_.html.
Customers with Service Contracts
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, upgrades should be obtained through the Software Navigator on Cisco.com at http://www.cisco.com/cisco/software/navigator.html.
Customers Using Third-Party Support Organizations
Customers with Cisco products that are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers, should contact that organization for assistance with the appropriate course of action.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix depends on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Because of the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult their service providers or support organizations to ensure that any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate in the intended network before it is deployed.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix depends on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Because of the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult their service providers or support organizations to ensure that any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers Without Service Contracts
Customers who purchase directly from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who make purchases through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should obtain upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC):
Refer to Cisco Worldwide Contacts at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, instructions, and e-mail addresses for support in various languages.
- +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
- +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
- e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Refer to Cisco Worldwide Contacts at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/support/tsd_cisco_worldwide_contacts.html for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, instructions, and e-mail addresses for support in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) is not aware of malicious use of the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.
The Metasploit framework has an exploit module (Jboss_maindeployer) that would exploit the JBoss configuration that caused this vulnerability.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by Paul O'Grady of Security Compass (www.securitycompass.com). Cisco would like to thank Mr. O'Grady for reporting this vulnerability to us and for working with us towards coordinated disclosure of the vulnerability.
The Metasploit framework has an exploit module (Jboss_maindeployer) that would exploit the JBoss configuration that caused this vulnerability.
This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by Paul O'Grady of Security Compass (www.securitycompass.com). Cisco would like to thank Mr. O'Grady for reporting this vulnerability to us and for working with us towards coordinated disclosure of the vulnerability.
Status of This Notice: Final
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
This advisory is posted on Cisco Security Intelligence Operations at the following link:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20121031-dcnm
Additionally, a text version of this advisory is clear signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and circulated among the following e-mail addresses:
http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20121031-dcnm
Additionally, a text version of this advisory is clear signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and circulated among the following e-mail addresses:
- cust-security-announce@cisco.com
- first-bulletins@lists.first.org
- bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
- cisco@spot.colorado.edu
- cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
- full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
Revision History
| Revision 2.0 | 2013-May-08 | Updated advisory to indicate that the DCNM LAN server component of DNCM is also affected by this vulnerability. Added corresponding Cisco bug ID CSCua31204 and updated fixed software. |
| Revision 1.0 | 2012-October-31 | Initial public release. |
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information about reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco is available on Cisco.com at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This web page includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco Security Advisories. All Cisco Security Advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
