Microsoft announced nine security bulletins that contain 19 vulnerabilities as part of the monthly security bulletin release on August 11, 2009. A summary of these bulletins is on the Microsoft website at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms09-aug.mspx. This document highlights the vulnerabilities that can be effectively identified and/or mitigated using Cisco network devices.
The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, require user interaction, or can be exploited through web-based attacks such as cross-site scripting or phishing are in the following list:
The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector, which will be discussed in detail later in this document.
Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-037 (Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Active Template Library (ATL) Could Allow Remote Code Execution, 973908) is an update to Microsoft Security Bulletins MS09-032 (Cumulative Security Update of ActiveX Kill Bits, 973346), MS09-034 (Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer, 972260), and MS09-035 (Vulnerabilities in Visual Studio Active Template Library Could Allow Remote Code Execution, 969706). Information about these vulnerabilities are documented in the Cisco IntelliShield Vulnerability Alerts that are available at: 18595, 18721, 18723, 18724, 18725, 18726, and 18727. Cisco has released a related security advisory, Cisco Security Advisory: Active Template Library (ATL) Vulnerability, which also has a corresponding Cisco IntelliShield Vulnerability Alert that is available at 18722. Identification and mitigation solutions for MS09-032 are documented in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin that is available at 18608. General information on ActiveX attacks and mitigation techniques are available in the Preventing ActiveX Exploits with Cisco Firewall Application Layer Protocol Inspection whitepaper. Only IPS signatures and document reference information for these vulnerabilities will be presented in this bulletin.
CVE-2009-1136 which is documented in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS09-043 (Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Web Components Could Allow Remote Code Execution, 957638) has the following related Microsoft Security Advisory Vulnerability in Microsoft Office Web Components Control Could Allow Remote Code Execution (973472). Information about this vulnerability is document in Cisco IntelliShield Vulnerability Alert 18633. Identification and mitigation solutions for this vulnerability are document in the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin that is available at 18638. Only IPS signature and document reference information for CVE-2009-1136 will be presented in this bulletin.
Information about affected and unaffected products is available in the respective Microsoft advisories and the IntelliShield alerts that are referenced in the following table. In addition, multiple Cisco products use Microsoft operating systems as their base operating system. Cisco products that may be affected by the vulnerabilities described in the referenced Microsoft advisories are detailed in the "Associated Products" table in the "Product Sets" section.
MS09-039, Vulnerabilities in WINS Could Allow Remote Code Execution (969883): These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2009-1923 and CVE-2009-1924. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction.
Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities for CVE-2009-1923 and CVE-2009-1924 may allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector for exploitation of these vulnerabilities is through WINS using TCP and UDP port 42 packets. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities using spoofed UDP packets.
MS09-041, Vulnerability in Workstation Service Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (971657): This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2009-1544. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector is RPC using TCP ports 139 and 445 packets.
MS09-042, Vulnerability in Telnet Could Allow Remote Code Execution (960859): This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2009-1930. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and requires user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector is Telnet using TCP port 23 packets.
MS09-043,Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office Web Components Could Allow Remote Code Execution (957638): These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2009-0562, CVE-2009-2496, CVE-2009-1136, and CVE-2009-1534 . These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and require user interaction. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector for exploitation of these vulnerabilities is through HTTP packets, which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. Although the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance, the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers, and the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module provide protection for potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities (a topic that is included in this document), cross-site scripting and phishing could also be used to exploit these vulnerabilities. For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.
MS09-044, Vulnerabilities in Remote Desktop Connection Could Allow Remote Code Execution (970927): These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2009-1133 and CVE-2009-1929. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and require user interaction.
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability for CVE-2009-1133 may allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector for exploitation of CVE-2009-1133 is through RDP using TCP port 3389 packets.
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability for CVE-2009-1929 may allow arbitrary code execution . The attack vector for exploitation of CVE-2009-1929 is through HTTP packets, which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. Although the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance, the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers, and the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module provide protection for potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities (a topic that is included in this document), cross-site scripting and phishing could also be used to exploit these vulnerabilities. For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.
The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, require user interaction, or can be exploited through web-based attacks such as cross-site scripting or phishing are in the following list:
These vulnerabilities are best mitigated at the endpoint through software updates, user education, desktop administration best practices, and endpoint protection software such as Cisco Security Agent Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) or antivirus products.
The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.
Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using the following methods:
Transit access control lists (tACLs)
Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF)
IP source guard (IPSG)
Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance, and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers using the following:
tACLs
Application layer protocol inspection
Unicast RPF
Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module using Application Protocol Inspection.
Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities as discussed later in this document.
Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.
Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA and Cisco PIX security appliances, FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.
Risk Management
Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.
Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector when the attack comes from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized RPC packets using TCP ports 139 and 445 and WINS packets using TCP and UDP port 42 that are sent to affected devices and RDP packets using TCP port 3389 and Telnet packets using TCP port 23 that are sent from affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable ports for MS09-041
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 139
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 445
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port for MS09-044
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 3389 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 gt 1023
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable ports for MS09-039
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 42
access-list 150 permit udp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 42
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port for MS09-042
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 23 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 gt 1023
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-041
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 139
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 445
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-045
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any eq 3389 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-039
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 42
access-list 150 deny udp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 42
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-042
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any eq 23 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list 150 deny ip any any
!
!-- Apply tACL to interfaces in the ingress direction
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip access-group 150 in
Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachableinterval-in-ms.
Mitigation: Spoofing Protection
Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
One of the vulnerabilities described in this document that has a network attack vector can be exploited by spoofed IP packets. The proper deployment and configuration of Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) can provide protection mechanisms for spoofing related to the following vulnerabilities:
Unicast RPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. Administrators should not rely on Unicast RPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a Unicast RPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. Administrators are advised to take care to ensure that the appropriate Unicast RPF mode (loose or strict) is configured during the deployment of this feature because it can drop legitimate traffic that is transiting the network. In an enterprise environment, Unicast RPF might be enabled at the Internet edge and the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces.
IP source guard (IPSG) is a security feature that restricts IP traffic on nonrouted, Layer 2 interfaces by filtering packets based on the DHCP snooping binding database and manually configured IP source bindings. Administrators can use IPSG to prevent attacks from an attacker who attempts to spoof packets by forging the source IP address and/or the MAC address. The proper deployment and configuration of IPSG coupled with strict mode Unicast RPF can provide the most effective means of spoofing protection to help mitigate the following vulnerabilities:
After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of RPC packets using TCP ports 139 and 445, RDP packets using TCP port 3389, WINS packets using TCP and UDP port 42, and Telnet packets using TCP port 23 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 follows:
Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Applied Intelligence white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.
Identification: Access List Logging
The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.
Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.
For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Applied Intelligence white paper.
Identification: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
With Unicast RPF properly deployed and configured throughout the network infrastructure, administrators can use the show cef interfacetype slot/portinternal, show ip interface, show cef drop, and show ip traffic commands to identify the number of packets that Unicast RPF has dropped.
Identification: Traffic Flow Identification Using NetFlow Records
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for RPC on TCP ports 139 (hex value 008B) and 445(hex value 01BD), RDP on TCP port 3389 (hex value 0D3D), WINS on TCP port 42 and UDP port 42 (hex value 002A), and Telnet on TCP port 23(hex value 0017).
TCP Flows
To view only the traffic flows for RPC on TCP ports 139 (hex value 008B) and 445 (hex value 01BD), RDP on TCP port 3389 (hex value 0D3D), WINS on TCP port 42 (hex value 002A), and Telnet on TCP port 23 (hex value 0017), the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(008B|01BD|0D3D|002A|0017)_ will display the related TCP NetFlow records as shown here:
To view only the traffic flows for WINS on UDP port 42 (hex value 002A), the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_11_.*002A will display the related UDP NetFlow records as shown here:
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector when the attack comes from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized RPC packets using TCP ports 139 and 445, RDP packets using TCP port 3389, WINS packets using TCP and UDP port 42, and Telnet packets using TCP port 23 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- requiring access on the vulnerable port MS09-041
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 139
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 445
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- requiring access on the vulnerable port MS09-039
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 42
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 42
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-041
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 139
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 445
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-039
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 42
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 42
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress extended deny ip any any
!
!-- Apply tACL to interfaces facing untrusted networks in the in direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy-Ingress in interface outside
Egress Transit ACL Policy
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- requiring access on the vulnerable port MS09-044
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
host 192.168.100.1 eq 3389
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- requiring access on the vulnerable port MS09-042
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 23
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-044
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
host 192.168.100.1 eq 3389
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS09-042
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
host 192.168.100.1 eq 23
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny ip any any
!
!-- Since this ACL is for outbound connections, apply tACL !-- to internal network facing interfaces in the ingress direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy-Egress in interface inside
Mitigation: Application Layer Protocol Inspection
Application layer protocol inspection is available beginning in software release 7.2(1) for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance and the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliance and in software release 4.0(1) for the Firewall Services Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the firewall. Administrators may construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspect class maps and inspect policy maps, which are applied via a global or interface service policy.
Caution: Application layer protocol inspection will decrease firewall performance. Administrators are advised to test performance impact in a lab environment before this feature is deployed in production environments.
HTTP Application Inspection By using the HTTP inspection engine on the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, the Cisco PIX 500 Series Security Appliances, and the Firewall Services Module, administrators can configure regular expressions (regexes) for pattern matching and construct inspect class maps and inspect policy maps. These methods can can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as the ones described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application inspection configuration uses the Cisco Modular Policy Framework (MPF) to create a policy for inspection of traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP response body contains any of the regexes that are configured to match the ActiveX control that is associated with this vulnerability.
Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the body of an HTML response. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings without calling the ActiveX control are not affected. Additional information about regex syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.
!
!-- Configure regexes for MS09-044
!-- ActiveX Class IDs:
!-- * 7390f3d8-0439-4c05-91e3-cf5cb290c3d0
!-- * 4EB89FF4-7F78-4A0F-8B8D-2BF02E94E4B2
!-- ActiveX Program IDs:
!-- * MsRDP.MsRDP.
! !-- Configure regexes for MS09-043
!-- ActiveX Class IDs:
!-- * 0002E543-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E55B-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E541-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E559-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E512-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- ActiveX Program IDs:
!-- * OWC10.DataSourceControl.
!-- * OWC11.DataSourceControl.
!-- * OWC10.Spreadsheet.
!-- * OWC11.Spreadsheet.
!-- Mitigations for CVE-2009-1136 are covered
!-- in 18638
!
regex 970927_CLSID_activeX1 "7390[Ff]3[Dd]8[-]0439[-]4[Cc]05[-]91[Ee]3[-]
[Cc][Ff]5[Cc][Bb]290[Cc]3[Dd]0"
regex 970927_CLSID_activeX2 "4[Ee][Bb]89[Ff][Ff]4[-]7[Ff]78[-]4[Aa]0[Ff][-]
8[Bb]8[Dd][-]2[Bb][Ff]02[Ee]94[Ee]4[Bb]2"
regex 970927_ProgID_activeX "[Mm][Ss][Rr][Dd][Pp]\.[Mm][Ss][Rr][Dd][Pp]\."
regex 957638_CLSID_activeX1 "0002[Ee]543[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046"
regex 957638_ProgID_activeX1 "[Oo][Ww][Cc]10\.[Dd][Aa][Tt][Aa][Ss][Oo][Uu][Rr]
[Cc][Ee][Cc][Oo][Nn][Tt][Rr][Oo][Ll]\."
regex 957638_CLSID_activeX2 "0002[Ee]55[Bb][-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046"
regex 957638_ProgID_activeX2 "[Oo][Ww][Cc]11\.[Dd][Aa][Tt][Aa][Ss][Oo][Uu][Rr]
[Cc][Ee][Cc][Oo][Nn][Tt][Rr][Oo][Ll]\."
regex 957638_CLSID_activeX3 "0002[Ee]541[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046"
regex 957638_ProgID_activeX3 "[Oo][Ww][Cc]10\.[Ss][Pp][Rr][Ee][Aa][Dd][Ss][Hh]
[Ee][Ee][Tt]\."
regex 957638_CLSID_activeX4 "0002[Ee]559[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046"
regex 957638_ProgID_activeX4 "[Oo][Ww][Cc]11\.[Ss][Pp][Rr][Ee][Aa][Dd][Ss][Hh]
[Ee][Ee][Tt]\."
regex 957638_CLSID_activeX5 "0002[Ee]512[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046"
!
!-- Configure a regex class to match on the regular
!-- expressions that are configured above
!
class-map type regex match-any vulnerable-activeX-Class
match regex 970927_CLSID_activeX1
match regex 970927_CLSID_activeX2
match regex 970927_ProgID_activeX
match regex 957638_CLSID_activeX1
match regex 957638_ProgID_activeX1
match regex 957638_CLSID_activeX2
match regex 957638_ProgID_activeX2
match regex 957638_CLSID_activeX3
match regex 957638_ProgID_activeX3
match regex 957638_CLSID_activeX4
match regex 957638_ProgID_activeX4
match regex 957638_CLSID_activeX5
!
!-- Configure an object group for the default ports that
!-- are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable, which
!-- are TCP ports 80 (www), 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888,
!-- and 24326
!
object-group service WEBPORTS tcp
port-object eq www
port-object eq 3128
port-object eq 8000
port-object eq 8010
port-object eq 8080
port-object eq 8888
port-object eq 24326
!
!-- Configure an access list that uses the WEBPORTS object
!-- group, which will be used to match TCP packets that
!-- are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is used
!-- by a Cisco IPS device
!
access-list Webports-ACL extended permit tcp any any object-group WEBPORTS
!
!-- Configure a class that uses the above-configured
!-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
!-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
!-- variable
!
class-map Webports-Class
match access-list Webports-ACL
!
!-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that
!-- looks for and drops connections that contain HTTP
!-- protocol violations and looks for and drops connections
!-- that contain the regexes for the affected ActiveX Class
!-- ID or Program ID that are configured above
!
policy-map type inspect http http-Policy
parameters
!
!-- "protocol-violation" below is not required to
!-- mitigate this vulnerability but is
!-- included to provide more robust protection against
!-- potential HTTP attacks. Care should be taken to ensure that
!-- legitimate applications that do not fully conform to
!-- HTTP protocol standards are not dropped by this inspection
!
protocol-violation action drop-connection
match response body regex class vulnerable-activeX-Class
drop-connection log
!
!-- Add the above-configured "Webports-Class" that matches
!-- TCP packets that are destined to the default ports
!-- that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable to
!-- the default policy "global_policy" and use it to
!-- inspect HTTP traffic that transits the firewall
!
policy-map global_policy
class Webports-Class
inspect http http-Policy
!
!-- By default, the policy "global_policy" is applied
!-- globally, which results in the inspection of
!-- traffic that enters the firewall from all interfaces
!
service-policy global_policy global
For additional information about the configuration and use of object groups, reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command Reference for object-group.
Additional information about HTTP application inspection and the MPF is in the HTTP Inspection Overview section of the Cisco Security Appliance Command Line Configuration Guide.
Mitigation: Spoofing Protection Using Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
One of the vulnerabilities described in this document that has a network attack vector can be exploited by spoofed IP packets. The proper deployment and configuration of Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (Unicast RPF) can provide protection mechanisms for spoofing related to the following vulnerability:
Unicast RPF is configured at the interface level and can detect and drop packets that lack a verifiable source IP address. Administrators should not rely on Unicast RPF to provide complete spoofing protection because spoofed packets may enter the network through a Unicast RPF-enabled interface if an appropriate return route to the source IP address exists. In an enterprise environment, Unicast RPF might be enabled at the Internet edge and at the internal access layer on the user-supporting Layer 3 interfaces.
After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of RPC packets using TCP ports 139 and 445, RDP packets using TCP port 3389, WINS packets using TCP and UDP port 42, and Telnet packets using TCP port 23 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress and show access-list tACL-Policy-Egress follows:
firewall# show access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress; 9 elements access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq netbios-ssn (hitcnt=0)
access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 445 (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 3 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 42 (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 4 extended permit udp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq nameserver (hitcnt=0) access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 5 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq netbios-ssn (hitcnt=48) access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 6 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 445 (hitcnt=81) access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 7 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 42 (hitcnt=142) access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 8 extended deny udp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq nameserver (hitcnt=37) access-list tACL-Policy-Ingress line 9 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=0)
firewall#
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy-Ingress has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:
48 RPC packets on TCP port 139 (netbios-ssn) for ACE line 5
81 RPC packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 6
142 WINS packets on TCP port 42 for ACE line 7
37 WINS packets on UDP port 42 (nameserver) for ACE line 8
firewall# show access-list tACL-Policy-Egress
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress; 5 elements access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 1 extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
host 192.168.100.1 eq 3389 (hitcnt=0)
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq telnet (hitcnt=0)
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 3 extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
host 192.168.100.1 eq 3389 (hitcnt=93)
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 4 extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
host 192.168.100.1 eq telnet (hitcnt=58) access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 5 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=0)
firewall#
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy-Egress has dropped the following packets sent to an untrusted host or network:
93 RDP packets on TCP port 3389 for ACE line 3
58 Telnet packets on TCP port 23 (telnet) for ACE line 4
In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
Application layer protocol inspection is available for the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the Cisco ACE. Administrators can construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspect class maps and inspect policy maps, which are applied via a global or interface service policy.
To conduct HTTP deep packet inspection, administrators can configure regular expressions (regexes) for pattern matching and construct inspect class maps and inspect policy maps. These methods can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as the one described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application protocol inspection configuration inspects traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application protocol inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP content contains any of the regexes that are configured to match the ActiveX control that is associated with this vulnerability.
Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the content of an HTML packet. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings without calling the ActiveX control are not affected.
!
!-- Configure an HTTP application inspection
!-- class that looks for HTTP packets
!-- that contain the regexes for:
!
!-- MS09-044
!-- ActiveX Class IDs:
!-- * 7390f3d8-0439-4c05-91e3-cf5cb290c3d0
!-- * 4EB89FF4-7F78-4A0F-8B8D-2BF02E94E4B2
!-- ActiveX Program IDs:
!-- * MsRDP.MsRDP.*
!
!-- MS09-043
!-- ActiveX Class IDs:
!-- * 0002E543-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E55B-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E541-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E559-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- * 0002E512-0000-0000-C000-000000000046
!-- ActiveX Program IDs:
!-- * OWC10.DataSourceControl.
!-- * OWC11.DataSourceControl.
!-- * OWC10.Spreadsheet.
!-- * OWC11.Spreadsheet.
!-- Mitigations for CVE-2009-1136 are covered
!-- in 18638
class-map type http inspect match-any vulnerable-activeX-http-class
match content ".*7390[Ff]3[Dd]8[-]0439[-]4[Cc]05[-]91[Ee]3[-]
[C][Ff]5[Cc][Bb]290[Cc]3[Dd]0.*"
match content ".*4[Ee][Bb]89[Ff][Ff]4[-]7[Ff]78[-]4[Aa]0[Ff][-]8
[Bb]8[Dd][-]2[Bb][Ff]02[Ee]94[Ee]4[Bb]2.*"
match content ".*[Mm][Ss][Rr][Dd][Pp]\.[Mm][Ss][Rr][Dd][Pp]\..*"
match content ".*0002[Ee]543[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046.*"
match content ".*[Oo][Ww][Cc]10\.[Dd][Aa][Tt][Aa][Ss][Oo][Uu][Rr][Cc]
[Ee][Cc][Oo][Nn][Tt][Rr][Oo][Ll]\..*"
match content ".*0002[Ee]55[Bb][-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046.*"
match content ".*[Oo][Ww][Cc]11\.[Dd][Aa][Tt][Aa][Ss][Oo][Uu][Rr][Cc]
[Ee][Cc][Oo][Nn][Tt][Rr][Oo][Ll]\..*"
match content ".*0002[Ee]541[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046.*"
match content ".*[Oo][Ww][Cc]10\.[Ss][Pp][Rr][Ee][Aa][Dd][Ss][Hh][Ee][Ee][Tt]\..*"
match content ".*0002[Ee]559[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046.*"
match content ".*[Oo][Ww][Cc]11\.[Ss][Pp][Rr][Ee][Aa][Dd][Ss][Hh][Ee][Ee][Tt]\..*"
match content ".*0002[Ee]512[-]0000[-]0000[-][Cc]000[-]000000000046.*"
!
!-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that
!-- looks for and resets connections that contain
!-- the regexes for the ActiveX Class ID or
!-- Program ID that are configured above
!
policy-map type inspect http all-match vulnerable-activeX-http-policy
class vulnerable-activeX-http-class
reset
!
!-- Configure an access list that matches TCP packets
!-- that are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is
!-- used by a Cisco IPS device
!
access-list WEBPORTS line 8 extended permit tcp any any eq www
access-list WEBPORTS line 16 extended permit tcp any any eq 3128
access-list WEBPORTS line 24 extended permit tcp any any eq 8000
access-list WEBPORTS line 32 extended permit tcp any any eq 8010
access-list WEBPORTS line 40 extended permit tcp any any eq 8080
access-list WEBPORTS line 48 extended permit tcp any any eq 8888
access-list WEBPORTS line 56 extended permit tcp any any eq 24326
!
!-- Configure a Layer 4 class that uses the above-configured
!-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
!-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
!-- variable
!
class-map match-all L4-http-class
match access-list WEBPORTS
!
!-- Configure a Layer 4 policy that applies the HTTP application
!-- inspection policy configured above to TCP packets that
!-- are destined to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS
!-- #WEBPORTS variable
!
policy-map multi-match L4-http-inspect-policy
class L4-http-class
inspect http policy vulnerable-activeX-http-policy
!
!-- Apply the configuration to a specific vlan interface,
!-- which results in the inspection of traffic that enters
!-- the ACE from this interface only
!
!-- The configuration could also be applied globally
!-- which is not shown here
!
interface vlan 200
service-policy input L4-http-inspect-policy
Administrators can use the Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) appliances and services modules to provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit several of the vulnerabilities described in this document. The following table provides an overview of CVE identifiers and the respective Cisco IPS signatures that will trigger events on potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities.
CVE ID
Signature Release
Signature ID
Signature Name
Enabled
Severity
Fidelity*
Notes
CVE-2009-1536
S424
20150/0
ASP.NET Denial Of Service
Yes
Medium
90
CVE-2008-0015
S411
19339/0
Microsoft DirectShow msvidctl.dll Code Execution
Yes
High
85
S414
19339/1-9
Microsoft DirectShow msvidctl.dll Code Execution
Yes
High
85
CVE-2009-2493
S422
20059/0
Microsoft Internet Explorer KillBit Bypass
Yes
High
95
Meta
CVE-2009-1545
S424
20182/0
Malformed AVI Header Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2009-1546
S424
20183/0
AVI Integer Overflow Vulnerability
Yes
High
80
20183/1
AVI Integer Overflow Vulnerability
Yes
High
80
CVE-2009-1923
S424
20179/0
WINS Heap Overflow
Yes
High
90
CVE-2009-1924
S424
20181/0
WINS Heap Overflow
Yes
High
90
CVE-2009-1544
S424
20220/0
Workstation Service Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Yes
High
80
CVE-2009-0562
S424
20148/0
Microsoft Office Web Components ActiveX Buffer Overflow
Yes
High
90
Meta
CVE-2009-1136
S424
20143/0
Microsoft Office Web Components ActiveX Buffer Overflow
Yes
High
90
Meta
CVE-2009-1534
S424
20145/0
Microsoft Office Web Components ActiveX Buffer Overflow
Yes
High
90
Meta
CVE-2009-2496
S424
20141/0
Microsoft Office Web Components ActiveX Buffer Overflow
Yes
High
90
Meta
CVE-2009-1133
S424
20119/0
Microsoft Remote Desktop Client Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2009-1929
S424
20120/0
Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Protocol RCE
Yes
High
85
Meta
Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the preceding table.
Exploits that use spoofed IP addresses may cause a configured event action to inadvertently deny traffic from trusted sources.
Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 6.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.
The following data has been compiled through remote monitoring services provided by the Cisco Remote Management Services team from a sample group of Cisco IPS sensors running Cisco IPS Signature Update version S424 or greater. The purpose of this data is to provide visibility into attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities released as part of the Microsoft August Security Update released on August 11, 2009. This data was gathered from events triggered on September 8, 2009.
CVE ID
Signature ID
Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature
Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature Among Top Ten Most-Seen Events
Identification: Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System Incidents
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can create incidents on events for the following Microsoft Security Bulletins. After the S424 dynamic signature update has been downloaded, using the following keywords for each of the respective IPS signatures and a query type of All Matching Event Raw Messages on the Cisco Security MARS appliance will provide a report that lists the incidents created by these IPS signatures.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
Version 3, August 26, 2009 04:30 PM:IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from August 25, 2009.
Version 2, August 13, 2009, 4:24 PM: IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from August 12, 2009.
Version 1, August 11, 2009, 4:52 PM: This initial version of the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin addresses the Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for August 2009.
Cisco IP Interoperability and Collaboration System
1.0 (1.1)
Cisco
Cisco IP Queue Manager
2.2 Base
Cisco
Cisco Media Blender
3.0 Base | 4.0 Base | 5.0 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, Base | Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Networking Services for Active Directory
Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Outbound Option
Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Personal Assistant
1.0 (1), Base | 1.1 Base | 1.3 .1, .2, .3, .4, Base | 1.4 .2, .3, .4, .5, .6, Base
Cisco
Cisco Remote Monitoring Suite Option
1.0 Base | 2.0 (0)_SR1, Base
Cisco
Cisco Secure Access Control Server (ACS) for Windo
2.6 Base | 2.6.3.2 Base | 2.6.4 Base | 2.6.4.4 Base | 3.0 Base | 3.0.1 Base | 3.0.1.40 Base | 3.0.2 Base | 3.0.3 Base | 3.0.3.6 Base | 3.0.4 Base | 3.1.1 Base | 3.1.1.27 Base | 3.1.2 Base | 3.2 Base | 3.2.1 Base | 3.2.3 Base | 3.3.1 Base | 3.3.1.16 Base | 3.3.2.2 Base | 3.3.3.11 Base | 4.0 Base | 4.0.1 Base | 4.0.1.27 Base | 4.1.1.23 Base
Cisco
Cisco Secure Access Control Server Solution Engine
3.1 .1, Base | 3.2 .1.20, .2.5 , .3, Base | 3.3 .1, .1.16, .2.2, .3, .4, .4.12, Base | 4.0 .1, .1.42, .1.44, .1.49, Base | 4.1 .1.23, .1.23.3, .3, .3.12, Base
Cisco
Cisco Secure User Registration Tool (URT)
1.2 .1, Base | 2.0 .7, .8, Base | 2.5 .1, .2, .3, .4, .5, Base | Original Release Base
2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 .1, Base | 3.0 .1, .2, Base | 3.1 Base | 3.2 Base | 4.0 Base | 4.1 .4, .6, .6.6.1, Base | 4.6 Base | 4.7 Base | 5.0 .0.867.2, .1.873.2, .2, .2.105.1, .2.110.1, .2.92.1, .2.99.1, Base | 6.0 .0.405.1, .0.407.1, .0.412.1, Base | 7.0 .0.370.1, .0.372.1, .0.377.1 , .0.389.1, .0.400.1, .395.1, Base | 7.2 .0.199.1, Base | Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Unified Communications Manager
1.0 Base | 2.0 Base | 3.0 Base | 3.0.3(a) Base | 3.1 .1, .2, .3a, Base | 3.1(1) Base | 3.1(2) Base | 3.1(2)SR3 Base | 3.1(3) Base | 3.1(3)SR2 Base | 3.1(3)SR4 Base | 3.2 Base | 3.2(3)SR3 Base | 3.3 Base | 3.3(2)SPc Base | 3.3(3) Base | 3.3(3)ES61 Base | 3.3(3)SR3 Base | 3.3(3)SR4a Base | 3.3(3a) Base | 3.3(4) Base | 3.3(4)ES25 Base | 3.3(4)SR2 Base | 3.3(4c) Base | 3.3(5) Base | 3.3(5)ES24 Base | 3.3(5)SR1 Base | 3.3(5)SR1a Base | 3.3(5)SR2 Base | 3.3(5)SR2a Base | 3.3(5)SR3 Base | 3.3(59) Base | 3.3(61) Base | 3.3(63) Base | 3.3(64) Base | 3.3(65) Base | 3.3(66) Base | 3.3(67.5) Base | 3.3(68.1) Base | 3.3(71.0) Base | 3.3(74.0) Base | 3.3(76) Base | 3.3(78) Base | 4.0 .1, .2 | 4.0(2a)ES40 Base | 4.0(2a)ES56 Base | 4.0(2a)SR2b Base | 4.0(2a)SR2c Base | 4.1 Base | 4.1(17) Base | 4.1(19) Base | 4.1(2) Base | 4.1(2)ES33 Base | 4.1(2)ES50 Base | 4.1(2)SR1 Base | 4.1(22) Base | 4.1(23) Base | 4.1(25) Base | 4.1(26) Base | 4.1(27.7) Base | 4.1(28.2) Base | 4.1(3) Base | 4.1(3)ES Base | 4.1(3)ES07 Base | 4.1(3)ES24 Base | 4.1(3)SR Base | 4.1(3)SR1 Base | 4.1(3)SR2 Base | 4.1(3)SR3 Base | 4.1(3)SR3b Base | 4.1(3)SR3c Base | 4.1(3)SR4 Base | 4.1(3)SR4b Base | 4.1(3)SR4d Base | 4.1(3)SR5 Base | 4.1(30.4) Base | 4.1(36) Base | 4.1(39) Base | 4.1(4) Base | 4.1(9) Base | 4.2(1.02) Base | 4.2(1.05.3) Base | 4.2(1.06) Base | 4.2(1.07) Base | 4.2(1) Base | 4.2(1)SR1b Base | 4.2(3.08) Base | 4.2(3.13) Base | 4.2(3.2.3) Base | 4.2(3.3) Base | 4.2(3) Base | 4.2(3)SR1 Base | 4.2(3)SR2 Base | 4.3(1.57) Base | 4.3(1) Base | 4.3(1)SR Base | Original Release Base
4.3 Base | 5.2 Base | 5.3 Base | 5.4 Base | 6.0 Base
Cisco
Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Express
1.1 Base | 1.2 Base | 2.0 Base
Cisco
Cisco Unity
2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.3 Base | 2.4 Base | 2.46 Base | 3.0 .1, Base | 3.1 .2, .3, .5, .6, Base | 3.2 Base | 3.3 Base | 4.0 .1, .2, .3, .3b, .4, .5, Base | 4.1 .1, Base | 4.2 .1, .1 ES27, Base | 5.0 (1) | 7.0 (2) | Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Unity Express
1.0.2 Base | 1.1.1 Base | 1.1.2 Base | 2.0.1 Base | 2.0.2 Base | 2.1.1 Base | 2.1.2 Base | 2.1.3 Base | 2.2.0 Base | 2.2.1 Base | 2.2.2 Base | 2.3.0 Base | 2.3.1 Base
Cisco
Cisco Wireless Control System (WCS) Software
1.0 Base | 2.0 44.14, 44.24, Base | 2.2 .0, .111.0 | 3.0 .101.0 , .105.0, Base | 3.1 .20.0, .33.0, .35.0, Base | 3.2 .23.0, .25.0, .40.0, .51.0, .64.0, Base | 4.0 .1.0, .43.0, .66.0, .81.0, .87.0, .96.0, .97.0, Base | 4.1 .83.0, Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks IP Telephony Environment Monitor (ITEM)
1.3 Base | 1.4 Base | 2.0 Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks LAN Management Solution (LMS)
1.3 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.5 Base | 2.6 Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks QoS Policy Manager (QPM)
2.0 .1, .2, .3, Base | 2.1 .2 | 3.0 .1, Base | 3.1 Base | 3.2 .1, .2, .3, Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks Routed WAN Management Solution (RWAN)
1.0 Base | 1.1 Base | 1.2 Base | 1.3 .1, Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks Small Network Management Solution (SNMS
1.0 Base | 1.5 Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks VPN/Security Management Solution (VMS)
1.0 Base | 2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.3 Base
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