Microsoft announced 16 security bulletins that address 49 vulnerabilities as part of the monthly security bulletin release on October 12, 2010. A summary of these bulletins is on the Microsoft website at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms10-oct.mspx. This document highlights the vulnerabilities that can be effectively identified and/or mitigated using Cisco network devices.
The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device, require user interaction, or can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats) or e-mail attachments, are in the following list:
The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector, which will be discussed in detail later in this document.
Information about affected and unaffected products is available in the respective Microsoft advisories and the Cisco IntelliShield alerts that are referenced in the following table. In addition, multiple Cisco products use Microsoft operating systems as their base operating system. Cisco products that may be affected by the vulnerabilities described in the referenced Microsoft advisories are detailed in the "Associated Products" table in the "Product Sets" section.
MS10-071, Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (KB2360131): These vulnerabilities have been assigned the following CVE identifiers:
CVE-2010-0808
CVE-2010-3243
CVE-2010-3324
CVE-2010-3325
CVE-2010-3326
CVE-2010-3327
CVE-2010-3328
CVE-2010-3329
CVE-2010-3330
CVE-2010-3331
These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and require user interaction. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow arbitrary script execution or allow information disclosure, which enables an attacker to learn information about the affected device. The attack vector for exploitation of these vulnerabilities is through HTTP packets, which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. Although the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers, and the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module provide protection for potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability described by CVE-2010-3329 (a topic that is included in this document), web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats), and e-mail attachments could also be used to exploit this as well as the remaining vulnerabilities in this bulletin. For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat
Vectors.
MS10-072, Vulnerabilities in toStaticHTML Could Allow Information Disclosure (KB2412048): These vulnerabilities haves been assigned CVE identifiers CVE-2010-3243 and CVE-2010-3324. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and require user interaction. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow arbitrary script execution or allow information disclosure, which enables an attacker to learn information about the affected device. The attack vector is the HTTP protocol using TCP port 80. Due to the nature of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, no additional information will be presented in this bulletin.
For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.
MS10-075, Vulnerability in Media Player Network Sharing Service Could Cause Remote Code Execution (KB2281679): This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2010-3225. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector is the Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) using TCP port 554 packets.
MS10-076, Vulnerabilities in the Embedded OpenType Font Engine Could Allow Remote Code Execution (KB982132): This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2010-1883. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and requires user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow arbitrary code execution. The attack vector for exploitation of this vulnerability is via the rendering of a specially crafted Embedded OpenType (EOT) font in applications such as Microsoft Internet Explorer, Microsoft Office PowerPoint, or Microsoft Office Word. Potential exploitation of this vulnerability leverages web-based threats and exploitation may be through the use of HTTP packets which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. This vulnerability can be exploited via
web-based threats (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based E-mail), E-mail attachments, and files stored on network shares.
Note: EOT font files typically use a file extension of ".eot".
For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.
The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device, require user interaction, or can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats) or e-mail attachments, are in the following list:
These vulnerabilities are mitigated most successfully at the endpoint through software updates, user education, desktop administration best practices, and endpoint protection software such as Cisco Security Agent Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) or antivirus products.
The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector, which will be discussed in detail later in this document.
Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using transit access control lists (tACLs). This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerability that has a network attack vector.
Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance and the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using the following methods:
tACLs
Application layer protocol inspection
These protection mechanisms filter and drop packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector.
Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module using application protocol inspection.
Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities as discussed later in this document.
Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.
Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.
Risk Management
Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.
Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:
For MS10-075, to protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against the vulnerability that has a network attack vector when the attack comes from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized RTSP packets on TCP port 554 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port
!-- for MS10-075
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 554
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entry
!-- (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks against
!-- MS10-075
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 554
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list 150 deny ip any any
!
!-- Apply tACL to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip access-group 150 in
Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachableinterval-in-ms.
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of RTSP packets on TCP port 554 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 follows:
router#show ip access-lists 150
Extended IP access list 150
10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 554
20 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 554 (11 matches)
30 deny ip any any (387 matches)
In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped 11 RTSP packets on TCP port 554 for access control list entry (ACE) line 20.
Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Applied Intelligence white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.
Identification: Access List Logging
The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.
Caution: ACL logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.
For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging intervalinterval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by ACL logging. The logging rate-limitrate-per-second [exceptloglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.
The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Cisco Catalyst 6500/Cisco 7600 Series Supervisor Engine 720 or Cisco Catalyst 6500 Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.
Identification: Traffic Flow Identification Using NetFlow Records
For MS10-075, administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for RTSP on TCP port 554 (hex value 022A).
This traffic is sent to addresses within the 192.168.60.0/24 address block, which is used by affected devices. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for RTSP traffic sent on TCP port 554 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.
To view only the traffic flows for RTSP packets on TCP port 554 (hex value 022A), the command show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*022A will display the related TCP NetFlow records as shown here:
For MS10-075, to protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized RTSP packets on TCP port 554 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable port
!-- for MS10-075
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 554
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entry
!-- (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks against
!-- MS10-075
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 554
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any
!
!-- Apply tACL to interface(s) in the ingress direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside
Mitigation: Application Layer Protocol Inspection
Application layer protocol inspection is available beginning in software release 7.2(1) for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance and in software release 4.0(1) for the Firewall Services Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the firewall. Administrators may construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspect class maps and inspect policy maps, which are applied by means of a global or interface service policy.
Caution: Application layer protocol inspection will decrease firewall performance. Administrators are advised to test performance impact in a lab environment before this feature is deployed in production environments.
HTTP Application Inspection
For MS10-071 and MS10-076, by using the HTTP inspection engine on the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances and the Firewall Services Module, administrators can configure regular expressions (regexes) for pattern matching and construct inspect class maps and inspect policy maps. These methods can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as the ones described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application inspection configuration uses the Cisco Modular Policy Framework (MPF) to create a policy for inspection of traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP response body contains the regexes that are associated with these vulnerabilities.
Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the body of an HTML response. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings without calling the ActiveX control are not affected. Additional information about regex syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.
!
!-- Configure a case-insensitive (upper and lower case) regex
!-- that matches the file extension of ".eot" that is typically
!-- associated with Embedded OpenType (EOT) font files that are
!-- associated with CVE-2010-1883 (MS10-076)
!
regex CVE-2010-1883 ".+\x2e[Ee][Oo][Tt]" !
!-- Configure regex for the ActiveX Class ID
!-- "3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b" associated
!-- with CVE-2010-3329 (MS10-071)
!
regex CVE-2010-3329_CLSID_activeX "3050[Ff]4[Ee]1[-]98[Bb]5[-]11[Cc][Ff][-][Bb][Bb]82[-]00[Aa][Aa]00[Bb][Dd][Cc][Ee]0[Bb]"
!
!-- Configure a regex class to match on the regular
!-- expressions that are configured above
!
class-map type regex match-any CVE-2010-3329_regex_class match regex CVE-2010-3329_CLSID_activeX
!
!-- Configure an object group for the default ports that
!-- are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable, which
!-- are TCP ports 80 (www), 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888,
!-- and 24326
!
object-group service WEBPORTS tcp
port-object eq www
port-object eq 3128
port-object eq 8000
port-object eq 8010
port-object eq 8080
port-object eq 8888
port-object eq 24326
!
!-- Configure an access list that uses the WEBPORTS object
!-- group, which will be used to match TCP packets that
!-- are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is used
!-- by a Cisco IPS device
!
access-list Webports-ACL extended permit tcp any any object-group WEBPORTS
!
!-- Configure a class that uses the above-configured
!-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
!-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
!-- variable
!
class-map Webports-Class
match access-list Webports-ACL
!
!
!-- Configure http inspection classes to group traffic matches
!-- needed to identify the specific vulnerabilities
!
class-map type inspect http match-all CVE-2010-1883_class
match request uri regex CVE-2010-1883
match request method get
!
class-map type inspect http match-all CVE-2010-3329_class
match response body regex class CVE-2010-3329_regex_class
!
!-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that
!-- looks for and drops connections that contain HTTP
!-- protocol violations and looks for and drops connections
!-- that contain the regex that is configured above
!
!-- NOTE: "protocol-violation" below is not required to
!-- mitigate this vulnerability but is
!-- included to provide more robust protection against
!-- potential HTTP attacks. Care should be taken to ensure that
!-- legitimate applications that do not fully conform to
!-- HTTP protocol standards are not dropped by this inspection
!
policy-map type inspect http MS_Oct_2010_policy
parameters
protocol-violation action drop-connection
class CVE-2010-1883_class
drop-connection log
class CVE-2010-3329_class
drop-connection log
!
!-- Add the above-configured "Webports-Class" that matches
!-- TCP packets that are destined to the default ports
!-- that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable to
!-- the default policy "global_policy" and use it to
!-- inspect HTTP traffic that transits the firewall
!
policy-map global_policy
class Webports-Class
inspect http MS_Oct_2010_policy
!
!-- By default, the policy "global_policy" is applied
!-- globally, which results in the inspection of
!-- traffic that enters the firewall from all interfaces
!
service-policy global_policy global
For additional information about the configuration and use of object groups, reference the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2 for Configuring Object Groups.
After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of RTSP packets on TCP port 554 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy follows:
firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy
access-list tACL-Policy; 3 elements
access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq rtsp (hitcnt=73)
access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq rtsp (hitcnt=48)
access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=7)
firewall#
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped 48 RTSP packets on TCP port 554 (rtsp) received from an untrusted host or network. In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, including the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages
Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grepregex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
firewall#show logging | grep 106023
Oct 12 2010 13:31:29: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.168.0.8/30496
dst inside:192.168.60.6/554 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 12 2010 13:31:29: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.168.1.10/56574
dst inside:192.168.60.7/554 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 12 2010 13:31:29: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.168.0.10/5587
dst inside:192.168.60.4/554 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 12 2010 13:31:29: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.168.2.7/1024
dst inside:192.168.60.4/554 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Oct 12 2010 13:31:29: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.168.7.5/1024
dst inside:192.168.60.2/554 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
firewall#
In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy show RTSP packets for TCP port 554 sent to the address block assigned to the affected devices.
Firewall syslog message 415006 will be generated when the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 415006.
Firewall syslog message 415007 will be generated when an HTTP message body matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 415007.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grepregex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators can use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
firewall#show logging | grep 415006
Oct 12 2010 09:51:39: %ASA-5-415006: HTTP - matched Class 29:
CVE-2010-1883_class in policy-map MS_Oct_2010_policy, URI matched -
Dropping connection from inside:192.168.130.71/1261 to outside:192.168.60.63/80
Oct 12 2010 09:51:47: %ASA-5-415006: HTTP - matched Class 29:
CVE-2010-1883_class in policy-map MS_Oct_2010_policy, URI matched -
Dropping connection from inside:192.168.130.71/1262 to outside:192.168.60.63/80
firewall#show logging | grep 415007 Oct 12 2010 09:55:59: %ASA-5-415007: HTTP - matched Class 30:
CVE-2010-3329_class in policy-map MS_Oct_2010_policy, Body matched -
Dropping connection from inside:192.168.130.71/1270 to outside:192.168.60.63/80
Oct 12 2010 09:56:13: %ASA-5-415007: HTTP - matched Class 30:
CVE-2010-3329_class in policy-map MS_Oct_2010_policy, Body matched -
Dropping connection from inside:192.168.130.71/1271 to outside:192.168.60.63/80
With HTTP application inspection enabled, the show service-policy inspectprotocol command will identify the number of HTTP packets that are inspected and dropped by this feature. The following example shows output for show service-policy inspect http:
firewall#show service-policy inspect http
Global policy: Service-policy: global_policy Class-map: inspection_default Class-map: Webports-Class Inspect: http MS_Oct_2010_policy, packet 112, drop 4, reset-drop 0 protocol violations packet 0 class CVE-2010-1883_class drop-connection log, packet 2 class CVE-2010-3329_class drop-connection log, packet 2
In the preceding example, 112 HTTP packets have been inspected and 4 HTTP packets have been dropped.
Application protocol inspection is available for the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the Cisco ACE device. Administrators can construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspect class maps and inspect policy maps, which are applied via a global or interface service policy.
To conduct HTTP deep packet inspection for MS10-071 and MS10-076, administrators can configure regular expressions (regexes) for pattern matching and construct inspect class maps and inspect policy maps. These methods can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as the ones described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application protocol inspection configuration inspects traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application protocol inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP content contains any of the regexes that are configured to match the file extension and ActiveX control that are associated with these vulnerabilities.
Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the content of an HTML packet. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings are not affected.
!
!-- Configure HTTP application inspection classes that
!-- looks for HTTP packets that contain the regexes
!-- that are associated with these vulnerabilities:
!-- MS10-076 (CVE-2010-1883) File Extension: regex matches the file
!-- extension of ".eot" that is typically
!-- associated with Embedded OpenType (EOT) font files
!-- MS10-071 (CVE-2010-3329) ActiveX Class ID: "3050f4e1-98b5-11cf-bb82-00aa00bdce0b"
!
class-map type http inspect match-all CVE-2010-1883-class
match url .*.+\x2e[Ee][Oo][Tt].*
class-map type http inspect match-any CVE-2010-3329-class
match content ".*3050[Ff]4[Ee]1[-]98[Bb]5[-]11[Cc][Ff][-][Bb][Bb]82[-]00 [Aa][Aa]00[Bb][Dd][Cc][Ee]0[Bb].*"
!
!-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that
!-- identifies, resets and logs connections that contain
!-- the regex for the vulnerable file extension (.eot)
!-- that is configured above
!
policy-map type inspect http all-match MS-Oct-2010
class CVE-2010-1883-class
reset log
class CVE-2010-3329-class
reset log
!
!-- Configure an access list that matches TCP packets
!-- that are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is
!-- used by a Cisco IPS device
!
access-list WEBPORTS line 8 extended permit tcp any any eq www
access-list WEBPORTS line 16 extended permit tcp any any eq 3128
access-list WEBPORTS line 24 extended permit tcp any any eq 8000
access-list WEBPORTS line 32 extended permit tcp any any eq 8010
access-list WEBPORTS line 40 extended permit tcp any any eq 8080
access-list WEBPORTS line 48 extended permit tcp any any eq 8888
access-list WEBPORTS line 56 extended permit tcp any any eq 24326
!
!-- Configure a Layer 4 class that uses the above-configured
!-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
!-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
!-- variable
!
class-map match-all L4-http-class
match access-list WEBPORTS
!
!-- Configure a Layer 4 policy that applies the HTTP application
!-- inspection policy configured above to TCP packets that
!-- are destined to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS
!-- #WEBPORTS variable
!
policy-map multi-match L4-MS-Oct-2010
class L4-http-class
inspect http policy MS-Oct-2010
!
!-- Apply the configuration globally
!-- which results in the inspection of traffic that enters
!-- the ACE from any interface
service-policy input L4-MS-Oct-2010
Identification: Application Protocol Inspection
HTTP Deep Packet Inspection
Cisco ACE Application Control Engine syslog message 415006 will be generated when the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) matches a user-defined regular expression. . The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance System Message Guide - System Message 415006.
Cisco ACE Application Control Engine syslog message 415007 will be generated when an HTTP message body matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance System Message Guide - System Message 415007.
ACE/Admin# show logging | include 415006 Oct 12 2010 08:48:38 : %ACE-5-415006: HTTP - matched CVE-2010-1883-class in policy-map
L4-MS-Oct-2010, URI matched - Resetting connection from vlan130:192.168.130.71/1281
to vlan206:192.168.60.63/80 Connection 0x265
Oct 12 2010 08:48:39 : %ACE-5-415006: HTTP - matched CVE-2010-1883-class in policy-map
L4-MS-Oct-2010, URI matched - Resetting connection from vlan130:192.168.130.71/1282
to vlan206:192.168.60.63/80 Connection 0x269
ACE/Admin# show logging | include 415007 Oct 12 2010 08:48:25 : %ACE-5-415007: HTTP - matched CVE-2010-3329-class in policy-map
L4-MS-Oct-2010, Body matched - Resetting connection from vlan206:192.168.208.63/80
to vlan130:192.168.130.71/1279 Connection 0x266
Oct 12 2010 08:48:27 : %ACE-5-415007: HTTP - matched CVE-2010-3329-class in policy-map
L4-MS-Oct-2010, Body matched - Resetting connection from vlan206:192.168.208.63/80
to vlan130:192.168.130.71/1280 Connection 0x268
When HTTP deep packet inspection is enabled, the show service-policypolicyname detail command will identify the number of HTTP connections that are inspected and dropped by this feature. The following example shows output for show service-policy L4-MS-Oct-2010 detail:
ACE/Admin# show service-policy L4-MS-Oct-2010 detail
Status : ACTIVE Description: ----------------------------------------- Context Global Policy: service-policy: L4-MS-Oct-2010 class: L4-http-class inspect http: L7 inspect policy : MS-Oct-2010 Url Logging: DISABLED curr conns : 0 , hit count : 22 dropped conns : 0 client pkt count : 49 , client byte count: 8375 server pkt count : 29 , server byte count: 3016 conn-rate-limit : 0 , drop-count : 0 bandwidth-rate-limit : 0 , drop-count : 0 L4 policy stats: Total Req/Resp: 17 , Total Allowed: 6 Total Dropped : 11 , Total Logged : 0 L7 Inspect policy : MS-Oct-2010 class/match : CVE-2010-1883-class Inspect action : reset log Total Inspected : 17 , Total Matched: 5 Total Dropped OnError: 0 class/match : CVE-2010-3329-class Inspect action : reset log Total Inspected : 12 , Total Matched: 6 Total
Dropped OnError: 0
In the preceding example, 29 HTTP connections have been inspected and 11 HTTP connections have been dropped.
Administrators can use the Cisco IPS appliances and services modules to provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit several of the vulnerabilities described in this document. The following table provides an overview of CVE identifiers and the respective Cisco IPS signatures that will trigger events on potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities.
CVE ID
Signature Release
Signature ID
Signature Name
Enabled
Severity
Fidelity*
Notes
CVE-2010-3328
S519
30320/0
Microsoft Internet Explorer CSS Remote Code Execution
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-2740
S519
30339/0
Microsoft Windows OpenType Compact Font Format Parsing
Yes
Medium
90
CVE-2010-2741
S519
30359/0
Microsoft Windows Opentype Compact Font Format Validation
Yes
Medium
90
CVE-2010-3219
S519
30399/0
Word Index Parsing Vulnerability
Yes
High
80
CVE-2010-3220
S519
30382/0
MS Word Parsing Vulnerability
Yes
High
85
CVE-2010-3230
S519
30381/0
Excel Record Parsing Integer Overflow
Yes
High
85
CVE-2010-3231
S519
30539/0
Microsoft Excel Record Parsing Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-3232
S519
30380/0
Microsoft Office Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-3239
S519
30279/0
Microsoft Office Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-3237
S519
30461/0
Microsoft Office Excel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-3240
S519
30383/0
Microsoft Excel Real Time Data Array Record Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-3242
S519
30659/0
Microsoft Excel Ghost Record Type Parsing Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-3324
S519
30419/0
Internet Explorer 8 XSS Attack
Yes
Low
85
CVE-2010-3326
S519
30519/0
Internet Explorer Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Yes
High
95
CVE-2010-3329
S519
30299/0
Microsoft HtmlDlgHelper Remote Code Execution
Yes
High
90
CVE-2010-3330
S519
30462/0
Internet Explorer Cross Domain Infoleak
Yes
Medium
95
CVE-2010-3331
S519
30500/0
Internet Explorer Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Yes
High
90
* Fidelity is also referred to as Signature Fidelity Rating (SFR) and is the relative measure of the accuracy of the signature (predefined). The value ranges from 0 through 100 and is set by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the preceding table.
Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 6.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.
Cisco IPS 5.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode require an event action configured on a per-signature basis. Alternatively, administrators can configure an override that can perform an event action for any signatures that are triggered and are calculated as a high-risk threat. Using an event action on sensors deployed in inline protection mode provides the most effective exploit prevention.
The following data has been compiled through remote monitoring services provided by the Cisco Remote Management Services team from a sample group of Cisco IPS sensors running Cisco IPS Signature Update version S519 or greater. The purpose of this data is to provide visibility into attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities released as part of the Microsoft October Security Update released on October 12, 2010. This data was gathered from events triggered on November 11, 2010.
CVE ID
Signature ID
Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature
Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature Among Top Ten Most-Seen Events
Identification: Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System Incidents
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) appliance can create incidents on events for the following Microsoft Security Bulletins. After the S519 dynamic signature update has been downloaded, using the following keywords for each of the respective IPS signatures and a query type of All Matching Event Raw Messages on the Cisco Security MARS appliance will provide a report that lists the incidents created by these IPS signatures.
Microsoft ID
Signature ID(s)
MARS Query Keyword(s)
MS10-071
30320/0
NR-30320
30299/0
NR-30299
30519/0
NR-30519
30462/0
NR-30462
30500/0
NR-30500
30419/0
NR-30419
MS10-072
30419/0
NR-30419
MS10-078
30339/0
NR-30339
30359/0
NR-30359
MS10-079
30399/0
NR-30399
30382/0
NR-30382
MS10-080
30380/0
NR-30380
30381/0
NR-30381
30279/0
NR-30279
30461/0
NR-30461
30539/0
NR-30539
30383/0
NR-30383
30659/0
NR-30540
Beginning with the 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 releases of Cisco Security MARS appliances, support for the Cisco IPS dynamic signature updates feature has been added. This feature downloads new signatures from Cisco.com or from a local web server, correctly processes and categorizes received events that match those signatures, and includes them in inspection rules and reports. These updates provide event normalization and event group mapping, and they also enable the MARS appliance to parse new signatures from the IPS devices.
Caution: If dynamic signature updates are not configured, events that match these new signatures appear as unknown event type in queries and reports. Because MARS will not include these events in inspection rules, incidents may not be created for potential threats or attacks that occur within the network.
By default, this feature is enabled but requires configuration. If it is not configured, the following Cisco Security MARS rule will be triggered:
System Rule: CS-MARS IPS Signature Update Failure
When this feature is enabled and configured, administrators can determine the current signature version downloaded by MARS by selecting Help ] About and reviewing the IPS Signature Version value.
Additional information about dynamic signature updates and instructions for configuring dynamic signature updates is available for the Cisco Security MARS 4.3.1 and 5.3.1 releases.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Complete information about reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco is available on Cisco.com at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This web page includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco Security Advisories. All Cisco Security Advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
Version 4, October 27, 2010, 12:29 PM: IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from October 26, 2010.
Version 3, October 20, 2010, 9:23 AM: IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from October 19, 2010.
Version 2, October 15, 2010, 9:26 AM: IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from October 14, 2010.
Version 1, October 12, 2010, 2:29 PM: This initial version of the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin addresses the Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for October 2010.
Cisco IP Interoperability and Collaboration System
1.0 (1.1)
Cisco
Cisco IP Queue Manager
2.2 Base
Cisco
Cisco Media Blender
3.0 Base | 4.0 Base | 5.0 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, Base | Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Networking Services for Active Directory
Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Outbound Option
Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Personal Assistant
1.0 (1), Base | 1.1 Base | 1.3 .1, .2, .3, .4, Base | 1.4 .2, .3, .4, .5, .6, Base
Cisco
Cisco Remote Monitoring Suite Option
1.0 Base | 2.0 (0)_SR1, Base
Cisco
Cisco Secure Access Control Server (ACS) for Windo
2.6 Base | 2.6.3.2 Base | 2.6.4 Base | 2.6.4.4 Base | 3.0 Base | 3.0.1 Base | 3.0.1.40 Base | 3.0.2 Base | 3.0.3 Base | 3.0.3.6 Base | 3.0.4 Base | 3.1.1 Base | 3.1.1.27 Base | 3.1.2 Base | 3.2 Base | 3.2.1 Base | 3.2.3 Base | 3.3.1 Base | 3.3.1.16 Base | 3.3.2.2 Base | 3.3.3.11 Base | 4.0 Base | 4.0.1 Base | 4.0.1.27 Base | 4.1.1.23 Base
Cisco
Cisco Secure Access Control Server Solution Engine
3.1 .1, Base | 3.2 .1.20, .2.5 , .3, Base | 3.3 .1, .1.16, .2.2, .3, .4, .4.12, Base | 4.0 .1, .1.42, .1.44, .1.49, Base | 4.1 .1.23, .1.23.3, .3, .3.12, Base
Cisco
Cisco Secure User Registration Tool (URT)
1.2 .1, Base | 2.0 .7, .8, Base | 2.5 .1, .2, .3, .4, .5, Base | Original Release Base
2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 .1, Base | 3.0 .1, .2, Base | 3.1 Base | 3.2 Base | 4.0 Base | 4.1 .4, .6, .6.6.1, Base | 4.6 Base | 4.7 Base | 5.0 .0.867.2, .1.873.2, .2, .2.105.1, .2.110.1, .2.92.1, .2.99.1, Base | 6.0 .0.405.1, .0.407.1, .0.412.1, Base | 7.0 .0.370.1, .0.372.1, .0.377.1 , .0.389.1, .0.400.1, .395.1, Base | 7.2 .0.199.1, Base | Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Unified Communications Manager
1.0 Base | 2.0 Base | 3.0 Base | 3.0.3(a) Base | 3.1 .1, .2, .3a, Base | 3.1(1) Base | 3.1(2) Base | 3.1(2)SR3 Base | 3.1(3) Base | 3.1(3)SR2 Base | 3.1(3)SR4 Base | 3.2 Base | 3.2(3)SR3 Base | 3.3 Base | 3.3(2)SPc Base | 3.3(3) Base | 3.3(3)ES61 Base | 3.3(3)SR3 Base | 3.3(3)SR4a Base | 3.3(3a) Base | 3.3(4) Base | 3.3(4)ES25 Base | 3.3(4)SR2 Base | 3.3(4c) Base | 3.3(5) Base | 3.3(5)ES24 Base | 3.3(5)SR1 Base | 3.3(5)SR1a Base | 3.3(5)SR2 Base | 3.3(5)SR2a Base | 3.3(5)SR3 Base | 3.3(59) Base | 3.3(61) Base | 3.3(63) Base | 3.3(64) Base | 3.3(65) Base | 3.3(66) Base | 3.3(67.5) Base | 3.3(68.1) Base | 3.3(71.0) Base | 3.3(74.0) Base | 3.3(76) Base | 3.3(78) Base | 4.0 .1, .2 | 4.0(2a)ES40 Base | 4.0(2a)ES56 Base | 4.0(2a)SR2b Base | 4.0(2a)SR2c Base | 4.1 Base | 4.1(17) Base | 4.1(19) Base | 4.1(2) Base | 4.1(2)ES33 Base | 4.1(2)ES50 Base | 4.1(2)SR1 Base | 4.1(22) Base | 4.1(23) Base | 4.1(25) Base | 4.1(26) Base | 4.1(27.7) Base | 4.1(28.2) Base | 4.1(3) Base | 4.1(3)ES Base | 4.1(3)ES07 Base | 4.1(3)ES24 Base | 4.1(3)SR Base | 4.1(3)SR1 Base | 4.1(3)SR2 Base | 4.1(3)SR3 Base | 4.1(3)SR3b Base | 4.1(3)SR3c Base | 4.1(3)SR4 Base | 4.1(3)SR4b Base | 4.1(3)SR4d Base | 4.1(3)SR5 Base | 4.1(30.4) Base | 4.1(36) Base | 4.1(39) Base | 4.1(4) Base | 4.1(9) Base | 4.2(1.02) Base | 4.2(1.05.3) Base | 4.2(1.06) Base | 4.2(1.07) Base | 4.2(1) Base | 4.2(1)SR1b Base | 4.2(3.08) Base | 4.2(3.13) Base | 4.2(3.2.3) Base | 4.2(3.3) Base | 4.2(3) Base | 4.2(3)SR1 Base | 4.2(3)SR2 Base | 4.3(1.57) Base | 4.3(1) Base | 4.3(1)SR Base | Original Release Base
4.3 Base | 5.2 Base | 5.3 Base | 5.4 Base | 6.0 Base
Cisco
Cisco Unified MeetingPlace Express
1.1 Base | 1.2 Base | 2.0 Base
Cisco
Cisco Unity
2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.3 Base | 2.4 Base | 2.46 Base | 3.0 .1, Base | 3.1 .2, .3, .5, .6, Base | 3.2 Base | 3.3 Base | 4.0 .1, .2, .3, .3b, .4, .5, Base | 4.1 .1, Base | 4.2 .1, .1 ES27, Base | 5.0 (1) | 7.0 (2) | Original Release Base
Cisco
Cisco Unity Express
1.0.2 Base | 1.1.1 Base | 1.1.2 Base | 2.0.1 Base | 2.0.2 Base | 2.1.1 Base | 2.1.2 Base | 2.1.3 Base | 2.2.0 Base | 2.2.1 Base | 2.2.2 Base | 2.3.0 Base | 2.3.1 Base
Cisco
Cisco Wireless Control System (WCS) Software
1.0 Base | 2.0 44.14, 44.24, Base | 2.2 .0, .111.0 | 3.0 .101.0 , .105.0, Base | 3.1 .20.0, .33.0, .35.0, Base | 3.2 .23.0, .25.0, .40.0, .51.0, .64.0, Base | 4.0 .1.0, .43.0, .66.0, .81.0, .87.0, .96.0, .97.0, Base | 4.1 .83.0, Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks IP Telephony Environment Monitor (ITEM)
1.3 Base | 1.4 Base | 2.0 Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks LAN Management Solution (LMS)
1.3 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.5 Base | 2.6 Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks QoS Policy Manager (QPM)
2.0 .1, .2, .3, Base | 2.1 .2 | 3.0 .1, Base | 3.1 Base | 3.2 .1, .2, .3, Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks Routed WAN Management Solution (RWAN)
1.0 Base | 1.1 Base | 1.2 Base | 1.3 .1, Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks Small Network Management Solution (SNMS
1.0 Base | 1.5 Base
Cisco
CiscoWorks VPN/Security Management Solution (VMS)
1.0 Base | 2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.3 Base
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LEGAL DISCLAIMER The urgency and severity ratings of this alert are not tailored to individual users; users may value alerts differently based upon their network configurations and circumstances. THE ALERT, AND INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN, ARE PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DO NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE ALERT, AND INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN, OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ALERT, IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. INFORMATION IN THIS ALERT AND ANY RELATED COMMUNICATIONS IS BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION AND IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE ALERTS AT ANY TIME.
