Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin

Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for February 2012

 
Threat Type:IntelliShield: Applied Mitigation Bulletin
IntelliShield ID:25178
Version:4
First Published:2012 February 14 18:59 GMT
Last Published:2012 March 19 21:56 GMT
Port: Not available
CVE:CVE-2010-3138 , CVE-2010-5082 , CVE-2011-5046 , CVE-2012-0010 , CVE-2012-0011 , CVE-2012-0012 , CVE-2012-0014 , CVE-2012-0015 , CVE-2012-0017 , CVE-2012-0019 , CVE-2012-0020 , CVE-2012-0136 , CVE-2012-0137 , CVE-2012-0138 , CVE-2012-0144 , CVE-2012-0145 , CVE-2012-0148 , CVE-2012-0149 , CVE-2012-0150 , CVE-2012-0154 , CVE-2012-0155
Urgency:Unlikely Use
Credibility:Confirmed
Severity:Moderate Damage
 
Version Summary:

IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from March 15, 2012.

 

Contents

Introduction
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Additional Information
Cisco Security Procedures
Related Information

Introduction

Microsoft announced nine security bulletins that address 21 vulnerabilities as part of the monthly security bulletin release on February 14, 2012. A summary of these bulletins is on the Microsoft website at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-feb. This document provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device, require user interaction, or can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats) or e-mail attachments and files stored on network shares are in the following list:

The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector, which will be discussed in detail later in this document.

Information about affected and unaffected products is available in the respective Microsoft advisories and the Cisco IntelliShield alerts that are referenced in Cisco Event Response: Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for February 2012.

In addition, multiple Cisco products use Microsoft operating systems as their base operating system. Cisco products that may be affected by the vulnerabilities described in the referenced Microsoft advisories are detailed in the "Associated Products" table in the "Product Sets" section.

Vulnerability Characteristics

MS12-011, Vulnerabilities in Microsoft SharePoint Could Allow Elevation of Privilege (2663841): These vulnerabilities have been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) IDs CVE-2012-0017, CVE-2012-0144, and CVE-2012-0145.

These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and require user interaction. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow elevation of privilege or information disclosure, which enables an attacker to learn information about the user. The attack vector is using HTTP packets, which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. Due to the nature of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, no additional information will be presented in this bulletin. For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit these vulnerabilities, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.

MS12-012 Vulnerability in Color Control Panel Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2643719): This vulnerability has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2010-5082. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and requires user interaction.

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow remote code execution. An attack vector for exploitation of this vulnerability is through a specially crafted dynamic link library (DLL) file. The file can be opened separately or loaded by other applications, such as when the Color Control Panel loads .icm or .icc files. Another attack vector for exploitation of this vulnerability is Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) client service HTTP packets, which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. This vulnerability can also be exploited via Server Message Block (SMB) file sharing protocol packets using TCP ports 139 and 445.

Although the Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module (ASASM), the Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers, and the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module provide protection for potential attempts to exploit this vulnerability (a topic that is included in this document), cross-site scripting and phishing could also be used to exploit this vulnerability. For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit this vulnerability, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.

MS12-014 Vulnerability in Indeo Codec Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2661637): This vulnerability has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2010-3138. This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and requires user interaction.

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow remote code execution. An attack vector for exploitation of this vulnerability is through a specially crafted DLL file. The file can be opened separately or loaded when other media applications load .avi, .mka, .ra, or .ram files. Another attack vector for exploitation of this vulnerability is WebDAV client service HTTP packets, which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326. This vulnerability can also be exploited via SMB file sharing protocol packets using TCP ports 139 and 445.

Although Cisco IOS Software, the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module provide protection for potential attempts to exploit this vulnerability (a topic that is included in this document), cross-site scripting and phishing could also be used to exploit this vulnerability. For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit this vulnerability, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.

MS12-016 Vulnerabilities in .NET Framework and Microsoft Silverlight Could Allow Remote Code Execution (2651026): These vulnerabilities have been assigned CVE IDs CVE-2012-0014 and CVE-2012-0015. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely without authentication and require user interaction.

Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow remote code execution. The attack vector for exploitation of these vulnerabilities is through HTTP packets, which typically use TCP port 80 but may also use TCP ports 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326.

Although Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module provide protection for potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities (a topic that is included in this document), cross-site scripting and phishing could also be used to exploit this vulnerability. For additional information about cross-site scripting attacks and the methods used to exploit this vulnerability, refer to the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin Understanding Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Threat Vectors.

Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the Microsoft Security Bulletin Summary for February 2012, which is available at the following link: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/bulletin/ms12-feb

Mitigation Technique Overview

The vulnerabilities that have a client software attack vector, can be exploited locally on the vulnerable device, require user interaction, or can be exploited using web-based attacks (these include but are not limited to cross-site scripting, phishing, and web-based e-mail threats) or e-mail attachments and files stored on network shares are in the following list:

These vulnerabilities are mitigated most successfully at the endpoint through software updates, user education, desktop administration best practices, and endpoint protection software such as Cisco Security Agent Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) or antivirus products.

The vulnerabilities that have a network mitigation are in the following list. Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.

Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using transit access control lists (tACLs). This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector.

Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module (ASASM), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using the following methods:

  • tACLs
  • Application layer protocol inspection

These protection mechanisms filter and drop packets that are attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities that have a network attack vector.

Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module using application protocol inspection.

Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.

Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.

Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities, as discussed later in this document.

The Cisco Security Manager can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.

Risk Management

Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.

Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:

Cisco IOS Routers and Switches

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

For MS12-012 and MS12-014, to protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The tACL policy denies unauthorized SMB over IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 139 and 445 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 represent the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is available in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.

Caution: Several Windows services (including SMB, CIFS, and applications that use mailslots or named pipes {RPC over SMB} or File and Print Sharing) use the affected ports. Blocking connectivity to these ports may prevent various applications or services from functioning.

!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable ports
!-- for MS12-012 and MS12-014
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
!
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries 
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks against MS12-012 
!-- and MS12-014
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
access-list 150 deny tcp any eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list 150 deny ip any any
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
!
ipv6  access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
  !  
  !-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
  !-- that require access on the vulnerable ports
  !-- for MS12-012 and MS12-014
  !
  permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 139 2001:db8:1:60::/64 established
  permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 445 2001:db8:1:60::/64 established
  !
  !-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs can 
  !-- aid in identification of attacks to global and
  !-- link-local addresses
  !
  deny tcp any eq 139 2001:db8:1:60::/64
  deny tcp any eq 445 2001:db8:1:60::/64
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
  permit icmp any any nd-ns
  permit icmp any any nd-na
  ! 
!-- Explicit deny for all other IPv6 traffic !

deny ipv6 any any ! ! !-- Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction ! interface GigabitEthernet0/0 ip access-group 150 in ipv6 traffic-filter IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy in

Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration commands no ip unreachables and no ipv6 unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration commands ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms and ipv6 icmp error-interval interval-in-ms.

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, show ip access-lists and show ipv6 access-list commands will identify the number of SMB over IPv4 or IPv6 packets on TCP ports 139 and 445 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 and show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy follows:

router#show ip access-lists 150
Extended IP access list 150
    10 permit tcp  host 192.168.100.1 eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
    20 permit tcp  host 192.168.100.1 eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 established
    30 deny tcp any eq 139 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (12 matches)
    40 deny tcp any eq 445 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (26 matches)
    50 deny ip any any
router#

In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 12 SMB packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 30
  • 26 SMB packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 40
router#show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy 
IPv6 access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
    permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 139 2001:db8:1:60::/64 established (55 matches) sequence 10
    permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 445 2001:db8:1:60::/64 established (38 matches) sequence 20
    deny tcp any eq 139 2001:db8:1:60::/64 (30 matches) sequence 30
    deny tcp any eq 445 2001:db8:1:60::/64 (41 matches) sequence 40
    permit icmp any any nd-ns (41 matches) sequence 50
    permit icmp any any nd-na (41 matches) sequence 60
    deny ipv6 any any (21 matches) sequence 70

In the preceding example, access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 30 SMB packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 30
  • 41 SMB packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 40

For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.

Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.

Identification: Access List Logging

The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.

Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.

For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.

The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.

For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.

Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

For MS12-012 and MS12-014, administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document that have a network attack vector. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
   1-32   64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
   .000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000

    512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
   .000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
  1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
  129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
  Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
  Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
  0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
  0 alloc failures, 0 force free
  1 chunk, 1 chunk added
  last clearing of statistics never
Protocol         Total    Flows   Packets Bytes  Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
--------         Flows     /Sec     /Flow  /Pkt     /Sec     /Flow     /Flow
TCP-Telnet    11393421      2.8         1    48      3.1       0.0       1.4
TCP-FTP            236      0.0        12    66      0.0       1.8       4.8
TCP-FTPD            21      0.0     13726  1294      0.0      18.4       4.1
TCP-WWW          22282      0.0        21  1020      0.1       4.1       7.3
TCP-X              719      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0       1.3
TCP-BGP              1      0.0         1    40      0.0       0.0      15.0
TCP-Frag         70399      0.0         1   688      0.0       0.0      22.7
TCP-other     47861004     11.8         1   211     18.9       0.0       1.3
UDP-DNS            582      0.0         4    73      0.0       3.4      15.4
UDP-NTP         287252      0.0         1    76      0.0       0.0      15.5
UDP-other       310347      0.0         2   230      0.1       0.6      15.9
ICMP             11674      0.0         3    61      0.0      19.8      15.5
IPv6INIP            15      0.0         1  1132      0.0       0.0      15.4
GRE                  4      0.0         1    48      0.0       0.0      15.3 
Total:        59957957     14.8         1   196     22.5       0.0       1.5

SrcIf         SrcIPaddress    DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.10.201  Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  06 008B 0984     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.54   Gi0/1         192.168.60.158  06 01BD 0911     3
Gi0/1         192.168.150.60  Gi0/0         10.89.16.226    06 0016 12CA     1
Gi0/0         10.88.226.1     Gi0/1         192.168.202.22  11 007B 007B     1
Gi0/0         192.168.12.185  Gi0/1         192.168.60.239  06 01BD 0BD7     1
Gi0/0         10.89.16.226    Gi0/1         192.168.150.60  06 12CA 0016     1

In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for SMB on TCP ports 139 (hex 008B) and 445 (hex 01BD).

As shown in the following example, to view only the traffic flows for SMB packets on TCP ports 139 and 445, use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(008B|01BD)_ command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

TCP Flows

router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(008B|01BD)_
SrcIf         SrcIPaddress     DstIf         DstIPaddress    Pr SrcP DstP  Pkts
Gi0/0         192.168.10.201   Gi0/1         192.168.60.102  06 008B 0984     1
Gi0/0         192.168.11.54    Gi0/1         192.168.60.158  06 01BD 0911     3
Gi0/0         192.168.12.185   Gi0/1         192.168.60.239  06 01BD 0BD7     1

Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

For MS12-012 and MS12-014, administrators can also configure Cisco IOS IPv6 NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

This output is from a Cisco IOS device running Cisco IOS software 12.4 mainline train. The command syntax will vary for different Cisco IOS software trains.

router#show ipv6 flow cache

IP packet size distribution (50078919 total packets):
   1-32  64   96  128  160  192  224  256  288  320  352  384  416  448  480
   .000 .990 .001 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
    512  544  576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
   .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
IP Flow Switching Cache, 475168 bytes
  8 active, 4088 inactive, 6160 added
  1092984 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
  Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
  Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 33928 bytes
  16 active, 1008 inactive, 12320 added, 6160 added to flow
  0 alloc failures, 0 force free
  1 chunk, 1 chunk added
SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress       OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...28::20 Gi0/1    0x06 0x008B 0x16C4      12
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...28::21 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000    1191
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...134::3 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000    1191
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000    1192    
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::2 Gi0/1    0x06 0x01BD 0x160A      26
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1    0x3A 0x0000 0x8000    1155
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1    0x06 0x01BD 0x05C6       2 

To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for SMB on TCP ports 139 (hex 008B) and 445 (hex 01BD).

This traffic is sent to addresses in the 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 address block, which is used by affected devices. The packets in these flows may be spoofed and may indicate an attempt to exploit this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to compare these flows to baseline utilization for SNA Server service traffic sent on UDP port 1478 and also investigate the flows to determine whether they are sourced from untrusted hosts or networks.

As shown in the following example, to view only the traffic flows for SMB packets on TCP ports 139 and 445 and SNA Server service packets on TCP ports 1477 and 1478, the command show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_06_.*(008B|01BD)_ will display the related TCP NetFlow records as shown here:

TCP Flows

router#show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_06_.*(008B|01BD)_
SrcAddress        InpIf    DstAddress       OutIf    Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...28::20 Gi0/1    0x06 0x008B 0x16C4      12  
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::2 Gi0/1    0x06 0x01BD 0x160A      26
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0    2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1    0x06 0x01BD 0x05C6       2
router#

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

For MS12-012 and MS12-014, administrators can also configure Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.

!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
 match ipv4 source address
 collect ipv4 protocol
 collect ipv4 destination address
 collect transport source-port
 collect transport destination-port
 collect interface input
 collect interface output
 collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow 
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4
 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
 ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 input

The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:

router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table
  Cache type:                               Normal
  Cache size:                                 4096
  Current entries:                               6
  High Watermark:                                1

  Flows added:                                   9181
  Flows aged:                                    9175
    - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          9000
    - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)           175
    - Event aged                                    0
    - Watermark aged                                0
    - Emergency aged                                0

IPV4 SRC ADDR  ipv4 dst addr  trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
============== ============== ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== =======
192.168.10.201 192.168.60.102         445           1456       Gi0/0       Gi0/1 1128       6
 192.168.13.97  192.168.60.28         139           3451       Gi0/0       Gi0/1    1       6
 192.168.10.17  192.168.60.97         445           4231       Gi0/0       Gi0/1  146       6
   10.88.226.1 192.168.202.22         2678           443      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  567       6
  10.89.16.226 192.168.150.60         3562            80      Gi0/0        Gi0/1  312       6

To view only SMB on TCP ports 139 and 445, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table | include IPV4 DST ADDR |_*(139|445)_.*_6_ command to display the related NetFlow records.

For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release 15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T.

Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

For MS12-012 and MS12-014, administrators can also configure Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv6 flows based on the source IPv6 address, as defined by the match ipv6 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv6 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.

!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
 match ipv6 source address
 collect ipv6 protocol
 collect ipv6 destination address
 collect transport source-port
 collect transport destination-port
 collect interface input
 collect interface output
 collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow 
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6
 record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
  ipv6 flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 input

The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:

router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table
  Cache type:                               Normal
  Cache size:                                 4096
  Current entries:                               6
  High Watermark:                                2

  Flows added:                                   539
  Flows aged:                                    532
    - Active timeout      (  1800 secs)          350
    - Inactive timeout    (    15 secs)          182
    - Event aged                                   0
    - Watermark aged                               0
    - Emergency aged                               0

IPV6 SRC ADDR     ipv6 dst addr     trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
================= ================= ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== =======
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20           123           123      Gi0/0       Gi0/0   17      17
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20           139          1265      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1237       6
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20           445          1441      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 2346       6
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          2856          5060      Gi0/0       Gi0/0  486      17
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          3012            53      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1016      17
2001:DB...06::201  2001:DB...28::20          2477            53      Gi0/0       Gi0/0 1563      17

To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal width 132 exec mode command.

To view only SMB on TCP ports 139 and 445, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table | include IPV6 DST ADDR|_*(139|445)_.*_6_ command to display the related Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow records.

Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

For MS12-012 and MS12-014, to protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The tACL-Policy-Egress policy denies unauthorized SMB over IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 139 and 445 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 is the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and 2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.

Caution: Several Windows services (including SMB, CIFS, and applications that use mailslots or named pipes {RPC over SMB} or File and Print Sharing) use the affected ports. Blocking connectivity to these ports may prevent various applications or services from functioning.

!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!-- for MS12-012 and MS12-014
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
     host 192.168.100.1 eq 139
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
     host 192.168.100.1 eq 445
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs
!-- can aid in identification of attacks
!
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 any eq 139
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 any eq 445
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Apply tACL to interface(s) in the egress direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy-Egress in interface inside
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp
     2001:db8:1:60::/64 host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 139
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress extended permit tcp
     2001:db8:1:60::/64 host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 445
!
!--  The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!--  (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 any eq 139
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 any eq 445
!
!--  Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!--  with existing security policies and configurations
!
!--  Apply tACL to interface(s) in the egress direction
!
access-group IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress in interface inside

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of SMB over IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 139 and 445 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy-Egress and show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress follows:

firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy-Egress
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress; 4 elements; name hash: 0x126b4273
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 1 extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
     host 192.168.100.1 eq 139 (hitcnt=221)
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 2 extended permit tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0
     host 192.168.100.1 eq 445 (hitcnt=789)
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 3 extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
     any eq 139 (hitcnt=12)
access-list tACL-Policy-Egress line 4 extended deny tcp 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 
     any eq 445 (hitcnt=226)

In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy-Egress has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 12 TCP packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 3
  • 226 TCP packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 4
firewall#show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress                 
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress; 4 elements; name hash: 0x566a4229
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 1 permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
     host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 139 (hitcnt=59) 
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 2 permit tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
     host 2001:db8:1:100::1 eq 445 (hitcnt=28)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 3 deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
     any eq 139 (hitcnt=47)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress line 4 deny tcp 2001:db8:1:60::/64 
     any eq 445 (hitcnt=33) 

In the preceding example, access list IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 47 SMB packets on TCP port 139 for ACE line 3
  • 33 SMB packets on TCP port 445 for ACE line 4

In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.

Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages

Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.

Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.

In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.

firewall#show logging | grep 106023
  Feb 14 2012 16:15:11: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src inside:192.168.60.191/1674
         dst outside:192.0.2.18/139 by access-group "tACL-Policy-Egress"
  Feb 14 2012 16:15:12: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src inside:192.168.60.240/1477
         dst outside:192.0.2.99/445 by access-group "tACL-PolicyIngress"
  Feb 14 2012 16:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp inside:192.168.60.115/1478
         dst src outside:192.0.2.100/139 by access-group "tACL-PolicyIngress"
  Feb 14 2012 16:15:17: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src inside:2001:db8:1:60::23/2947
         dst outside:2001:db8:2::172/139 by access-group "IPv6-tACL-Policy-Egress"
firewall#

Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco ASA Series Adaptive Security Appliances is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages, 8.2. Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in the Analyzing Syslog Messages section of the Cisco ASASM CLI Configuration Guide. Additional information about syslog messages for the Cisco FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.

For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.

Mitigation: Application Layer Protocol Inspection

Application layer protocol inspection is available beginning in software release 7.2(1) for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, software release 8.5 for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module, and in software release 4.0(1) for the Cisco Firewall Services Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the firewall. Administrators may construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspection class maps and inspection policy maps, which are applied by means of a global or interface service policy.

Additional information about application layer protocol inspection is in the Configuring Application Layer Protocol Inspection section of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2 and the Configuring Application Inspection section of the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module CLI Configuration Guide, 8.5.

Caution: Application layer protocol inspection will decrease firewall performance. Administrators are advised to test performance impact in a lab environment before this feature is deployed in production environments.

HTTP Application Inspection
For MS12-012, MS12-014, and MS12-016, by using the HTTP inspection engine on the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliances, Cisco 6500 Series ASA Services Modules, and the Cisco Firewall Services Module, administrators can configure regular expressions (regexes) for pattern matching and construct inspection class maps and inspection policy maps. These methods can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as those described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application inspection configuration uses the Cisco Modular Policy Framework (MPF) to create a policy for inspection of traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP response body contains any of the regexes that are configured to match the ActiveX control that is associated with these vulnerabilities.

Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the body of an HTML response. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings are not affected. Additional information about regex syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.

Additional information about ActiveX exploits and mitigations that leverage Cisco firewall technologies is available in the Preventing ActiveX Exploits with Cisco Firewall Application Layer Protocol Inspection Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.

!
!-- Configure regexes that are associated with these vulnerabilities: 
!-- MS12-012 DLL file:                      sti.dll
!-- MS12-014 media files:                   .avi, .mka, .ra, or .ram 
!--        with DLL file:                   acenc.dll
!-- MS12-016 XAML Browser application type: application/xaml+xml
!-- MS12-016 XAML Browser files:            .xbap
!-- MS12-016 Silverlight application type:  application/x-silverlight
! 
regex MS12-012-dll_reg "[Ss][Tt][Ii]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll]"
regex MS12-014-1_reg ".+\x2e[Aa][Vv][Ii].*
                [Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll]"
regex MS12-014-2_reg ".+\x2e[Mm][Kk][Aa].*
                [Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll]"
regex MS12-014-3_reg ".+\x2e[Rr][Aa][Mm]?.*
                [Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll]"
regex MS12-014-4_reg "[Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*
                .+\x2e[Aa][Vv][Ii]"
regex MS12-014-5_reg "[Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*
                .+\x2e[Mm][Kk][Aa]"
regex MS12-014-6_reg "[Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*
                .+\x2e[Rr][Aa][Mm]?"
regex MS12-016-xaml_reg "application\x2f[Xx][Aa][Mm][Ll]\x2b
                [Xx][Mm][Ll]"
regex MS12-016-xbap_reg ".+\x2e[Xx][Bb][Aa][Pp]"
regex MS12-016-silverlight_reg "application\x2f[Xx]\x2d
                [Ss][Ii][Ll][Vv][Ee][Rr][Ll][Ii][Gg][Hh][Tt]"
! 
!-- Configure a regex class to match on the regular  
!-- expressions that are configured above
! 
class-map type regex match-any MS_Feb_2012_regex_class
 match regex MS12-012-dll_reg
 match regex MS12-016-xaml_reg
 match regex MS12-016-xbap_reg
 match regex MS12-016-silverlight_reg

class-map type regex match-any MS12-014_class
 match response body regex MS12-014-1_reg
 match response body regex MS12-014-2_reg
 match response body regex MS12-014-3_reg
 match response body regex MS12-014-4_reg
 match response body regex MS12-014-5_reg
 match response body regex MS12-014-6_reg
!
!-- Configure an object group for the default ports that 
!-- are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable, which 
!-- are TCP ports 80 (www), 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, 
!-- and 24326
!
object-group service WEBPORTS tcp
 port-object eq www 
 port-object eq 3128 
 port-object eq 8000 
 port-object eq 8010 
 port-object eq 8080 
 port-object eq 8888 
 port-object eq 24326 
!
!-- Configure an access list that uses the WEBPORTS object 
!-- group, which will be used to match TCP packets that 
!-- are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is used 
!-- by a Cisco IPS device
!
access-list Webports_ACL extended permit tcp any any object-group WEBPORTS 
!
!-- Configure a class that uses the above-configured
!-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
!-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
!-- variable
!
class-map Webports_Class
 match access-list Webports_ACL
!
!-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that  
!-- identifies, drops, and logs connections that contain   
!-- the regexes that are configured above
! 
policy-map type inspect http MS_Feb_2012_policy
 parameters
!
!-- "body-match-maximum" indicates the maximum number of 
!-- characters in the body of an HTTP message that
!-- should be searched in a body match. The default value is
!-- 200 bytes. A large number such as shown here may have an
!-- impact on system performance.  Administrators are advised
!-- to test performance impact in a lab environment before 
!-- this command is deployed in production environments
!
 body-match-maximum 1380
 match response body regex class MS_Feb_2012_regex_class
  drop-connection log
 match response body regex class MS12-014_class
  drop-connection log
!
!-- Add the above-configured "Webports_Class" that matches 
!-- TCP packets that are destined to the default ports  
!-- that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable to  
!-- the default policy "global_policy" and use it to 
!-- inspect HTTP traffic that transits the firewall
! 
policy-map global_policy
 class Webports_Class
  inspect http MS_Feb_2012_policy 
!
!-- By default, the policy "global_policy" is applied 
!-- globally, which results in the inspection of 
!-- traffic that enters the firewall from all interfaces 
!
service-policy global_policy global

For additional information about the configuration and use of object groups, reference the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2 for Configuring Object Groups and the Configuring Objects and Access Lists section of the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module CLI Configuration Guide, 8.5.

Additional information about HTTP application inspection and the MPF is in the HTTP Inspection Overview section of the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2.

Identification: Application Layer Protocol Inspection

Firewall syslog message 415006 will be generated when the URI matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 415006.

Firewall syslog message 415007 will be generated when an HTTP message body matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 415007.

Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.

In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators can use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.

HTTP Application Inspection

firewall#show logging | grep 415007
Feb 14 2012 14:35:54: %ASA-5-415007: HTTP - matched Class 22: MS_Feb_2012_regex_class in policy-map MS_Feb_2012_policy, Body matched - Dropping connection from inside:192.168.60.85/2130 to outside:192.0.2.63/80 Feb 14 2012 14:35:55: %ASA-5-415007: HTTP - matched Class 24: MS12-014_class in policy-map MS_Feb_2012_policy, Body matched - Dropping connection from inside:192.168.60.86/2133 to outside:192.0.2.63/80

With HTTP application inspection enabled, the show service-policy inspect protocol command will identify the number of HTTP packets that are inspected and dropped by this feature. The following example shows output for show service-policy inspect http:

firewall# show service-policy inspect http
Global policy: 
  Service-policy: global_policy
    Class-map: inspection_default
    Class-map: Webports_Class
      Inspect: http MS_Feb_2012_policy, packet 5025, drop 20, reset-drop 0
       protocol violations
          packet 0        
       match response body regex class MS_Feb_2012_regex_class
         drop-connection log, packet 13
       match response body regex class MS12-014_class
         drop-connection log, packet 7

In the preceding example, 5025 HTTP packets have been inspected and 20 HTTP packets have been dropped.

Cisco ACE

Mitigation: Application Protocol Inspection

Application protocol inspection is available for the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module. This advanced security feature performs deep packet inspection of traffic that transits the Cisco ACE device. Administrators can construct an inspection policy for applications that require special handling through the configuration of inspection class maps and inspection policy maps, which are applied via a global or interface service policy.

Additional information about application protocol inspection is in the Configuring Application Protocol Inspection section of the Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance Security Configuration Guide.

HTTP Deep Packet Inspection

To conduct HTTP deep packet inspection for MS12-012, MS12-014, and MS12-016, administrators can configure regexes for pattern matching and construct inspection class maps and inspection policy maps. These methods can help protect against specific vulnerabilities, such as those described in this document, and other threats that may be associated with HTTP traffic. The following HTTP application protocol inspection configuration inspects traffic on TCP ports 80, 3128, 8000, 8010, 8080, 8888, and 24326, which are the default ports for the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS variable. The HTTP application protocol inspection policy will drop connections where the HTTP content contains any of the regexes that are configured to match the ActiveX control that is associated with these vulnerabilities.

Caution: The configured regexes can match text strings at any location in the content of an HTML packet. Care should be taken to ensure that legitimate business applications that use matching text strings are not affected.

Additional information about ActiveX exploits and mitigations that leverage the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module is available in the Preventing ActiveX Exploits with Cisco Application Control Engine Application Layer Protocol Inspection Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.

!
!-- Configure regexes that are associated with these vulnerabilities: 
!-- MS12-012 DLL file:                      sti.dll
!-- MS12-014 media files:                   .avi, .mka, .ra, or .ram 
!--        with DLL file:                   acenc.dll 
!-- MS12-016 XAML Browser application type: application/xaml+xml
!-- MS12-016 XAML Browser files:            .xbap
!-- MS12-016 Silverlight application type:  application/x-silverlight
! 
class-map type http inspect match-any MS12_Feb_http_class
  match content ".*[Ss][Tt][Ii]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*"
  match content ".*application\x2f[Xx][Aa][Mm][Ll]\x2b
                [Xx][Mm][Ll].*"
  match content ".*.+\x2e[Xx][Bb][Aa][Pp].*"
  match content ".*application\x2f[Xx]\x2d
                [Ss][Ii][Ll][Vv][Ee][Rr][Ll][Ii][Gg][Hh][Tt].*"

class-map type http inspect match-any MS12-014_http_class
  match content ".*.+\x2e[Aa][Vv][Ii].*
                [Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*"
  match content ".*.+\x2e[Mm][Kk][Aa].*
                [Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*"
  match content ".*.+\x2e[Rr][Aa][Mm]?.*
                [Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*"
  match content ".*[Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*
                 .+\x2e[Aa][Vv][Ii].*"
  match content ".*[Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*
                 .+\x2e[Mm][Kk][Aa].*"
  match content ".*[Aa][Cc][Ee][Nn][Cc]\x2e[Dd][Ll][Ll].*
                 .+\x2e[Rr][Aa][Mm]?.*"
!
!-- Configure an HTTP application inspection policy that
!-- identifies, resets, and logs connections that contain
!-- the regexes that are configured above
!
policy-map type inspect http all-match MS_Feb_2012
  class MS12_Feb_http_class
    reset log
  class MS12-014_http_class
    reset log
!
!-- Configure an access list that matches TCP packets
!-- that are destined to the #WEBPORTS variable that is
!-- used by a Cisco IPS device
!
access-list WEBPORTS line 8 extended permit tcp any any eq www 
access-list WEBPORTS line 16 extended permit tcp any any eq 3128 
access-list WEBPORTS line 24 extended permit tcp any any eq 8000 
access-list WEBPORTS line 32 extended permit tcp any any eq 8010 
access-list WEBPORTS line 40 extended permit tcp any any eq 8080 
access-list WEBPORTS line 48 extended permit tcp any any eq 8888 
access-list WEBPORTS line 56 extended permit tcp any any eq 24326 
!
!-- Configure a Layer 4 class that uses the above-configured
!-- access list to match TCP packets that are destined
!-- to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS #WEBPORTS
!-- variable
!
class-map match-all L4_http_class
  match access-list WEBPORTS
!
!-- Configure a Layer 4 policy that applies the HTTP application
!-- inspection policy configured above to TCP packets that
!-- are destined to the ports that are used by the Cisco IPS
!-- #WEBPORTS variable
!
policy-map multi-match L4_MS_Feb_2012
  class L4_http_class
    inspect http policy MS_Feb_2012  
!
!-- Apply the configuration globally across all interfaces,
!-- which results in the inspection of all traffic that enters
!-- the ACE
!
service-policy input L4_MS_Feb_2012

Identification: Application Protocol Inspection

HTTP Deep Packet Inspection

Cisco ACE Application Control Engine syslog message 415006 will be generated when the URI matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance System Message Guide - System Message 415006.

Cisco ACE Application Control Engine syslog message 415007 will be generated when an HTTP message body matches a user-defined regular expression. The syslog message will identify the corresponding HTTP class and HTTP policy and indicate the action applied to the HTTP connection. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance System Message Guide - System Message 415007.

ACE/Admin# show logging | include 415007
Feb 14 2012 16:26:43: %ACE-5-415007: HTTP - matched MS12-014_http_class in policy-map L4_MS_Feb_2012, Body matched - Resetting connection from vlan130:192.0.2.94/80 to vlan206:192.168.60.63/1776 Connection 0x3a Feb 14 2012 16:30:33: %ACE-5-415007: HTTP - matched MS12_Feb_http_class in policy-map L4_MS_Feb_2012, Body matched - Resetting connection from vlan130:192.0.2.94/80 to vlan206:192.168.60.63/1778 Connection 0x3c

When HTTP deep packet inspection is enabled, the show service-policy policyname detail command will identify the number of HTTP connections that are inspected and dropped by this feature. The following example shows output for show service-policy L4_MS_Feb_2012 detail:

ACE/Admin# show service-policy L4_MS_Feb_2012 detail

Status     : ACTIVE
Description: -----------------------------------------
Context Global Policy: service-policy: L4_MS_Feb_2012 class: L4_http_class inspect http: L7 inspect policy : MS_Feb_2012 Url Logging: DISABLED curr conns : 0 , hit count : 1 dropped conns : 0 client pkt count : 3 , client byte count: 589 server pkt count : 3 , server byte count: 547 conn-rate-limit : 0 , drop-count : 0 bandwidth-rate-limit : 0 , drop-count : 0 L4 policy stats: Total Req/Resp: 5 , Total Allowed: 2 Total Dropped : 3 , Total Logged : 0 L7 Inspect policy : MS_Feb_2012 class/match : MS12_Feb_http_class Inspect action : reset log Total Inspected : 2 , Total Matched: 1 Total Dropped OnError: 0 class/match : MS12-014_http_class Inspect action : reset log Total Inspected : 1 , Total Matched: 0 Total Dropped OnError: 0

In the preceding example, 5 HTTP connections have been inspected and 3 HTTP connections have been dropped.

Additional information about HTTP Deep Packet Inspection and Application Protocol Inspection is in the Configuring Application Protocol Inspection section of the Cisco ACE 4700 Series Appliance Security Configuration Guide.

Cisco Intrusion Prevention System

Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Event Actions

Administrators can use the Cisco IPS appliances and services modules to provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit several of the vulnerabilities described in this document. The following table provides an overview of CVE identifiers and the respective Cisco IPS signatures that will trigger events on potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. 

CVE ID Signature Release Signature ID Signature Name Enabled Severity Fidelity*
CVE-2011-5046 S625 41806/0 Windows Kernel-Mode Drivers GDI Access Violation Vulnerability Yes High 90
CVE-2012-0011 S625 41847/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer HtmlLayout Remote Code Execution Yes High 90
CVE-2012-0012 S625 41866/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer Null Byte Information Disclosure Yes Low 90
CVE-2012-0155 S625 41886/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer VML Remote Code Execution Yes High 90
CVE-2012-0017 S625 41846/1 Cross Site Scripting Generic Signatures Yes High 90
CVE-2012-0144 S625 41946/0 Microsoft Sharepoint XSS Vulnerability Yes High 90
CVE-2012-0145 S625 41846/0 Cross Site Scripting Generic Signatures Yes High 90
CVE-2010-5082 S625 31419/0 Microsoft Office Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability Yes High 90
CVE-2012-0150 S625 41906/0 Windows Msvcrt.dll Buffer Overflow Yes High 90
CVE-2010-3138 S625 31419/0 Microsoft Office Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability Yes High 90
CVE-2012-0014 S625 41766/0 Microsoft .NET Framework Unmanaged Objects Vulnerability Yes High 85
CVE-2012-0015 S625 41786/0 Microsoft .NET Framework Heap Corruption Yes High 85

* Fidelity is also referred to as Signature Fidelity Rating (SFR) and is the relative measure of the accuracy of the signature (predefined). The value ranges from 0 through 100 and is set by Cisco Systems, Inc.

Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the preceding table.

Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco IPS 7.x and 6.x sensors that are deployed in inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is attempting to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document. Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.

For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating calculation, reference Risk Rating and Threat Rating: Simplify IPS Policy Management.

Cisco IPS Signature Event Data

The following data has been compiled through remote monitoring services provided by the Cisco Remote Management Services team from a sample group of Cisco IPS sensors running Cisco IPS Signature Update version S625 or greater. The purpose of this data is to provide visibility into attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities released as part of the Microsoft February Security Update released on February 14, 2012. This data was gathered from events triggered on March 15, 2012.

CVE ID Signature ID Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature Percentage of Sensors Reporting the Signature Among Top Ten Most-Seen Events
CVE-2011-5046 41806/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0011 41847/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0012 41866/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0155 41886/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0017 41846/1 0 0
CVE-2012-0144 41946/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0145 41846/0 3 0
CVE-2010-5082 31419/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0150 41906/0 0 0
CVE-2010-3138 31419/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0014 41766/0 0 0
CVE-2012-0015 41786/0 0 0

Cisco Security Manager

Identification: Cisco Security Manager

Cisco Security Manager, Event Viewer

Beginning in software version 4.0, Cisco Security Manager can collect syslogs from Cisco firewalls and Cisco IPS devices and provides the Event Viewer, which can query for events that are related to the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

Using the IPS Alert Events predefined view in the Event Viewer, the user can enter the following search strings in the event filter to return all captured events related to the respective Cisco IPS signature:
  • 41806/0
  • 41847/0
  • 41866/0
  • 41886/0
  • 41846/0
  • 41846/1
  • 41946/0
  • 31419/0
  • 41906/0
  • 41766/0
  • 41786/0

Using the following filters in the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer provides all captured Cisco firewall access list deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:

  • Use the Destination event filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
  • Use the Destination Service event filter to filter objects that contain TCP port 139
  • Use the Destination Service event filter to filter objects that contain TCP port 445

An Event Type ID filter can be used with the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer to filter the syslog IDs shown in the following list to provide all captured Cisco firewall deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:

  • ASA-4-415006 (HTTP inspection)
  • ASA-4-415007 (HTTP inspection)

For more information about Cisco Security Manager Events, refer to the Filtering and Querying Events section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

Cisco Security Manager Report Manager

Beginning in software version 4.1, Cisco Security Manager supports the Report Manager, the Cisco IPS event reporting feature. This feature allows an administrator to define reports based on Cisco IPS events of interest. Reports can be scheduled or users can run ad hoc reports as required.

Using the Report Manager, the user can define an IPS Top Signatures report for Cisco IPS devices of interest based on time range and signature characteristics. When the Signature ID is set to one of the following signatures, Cisco Security Manager will generate a comprehensive report that ranks the count of the alerts fired for the signatures of interest compared to the total sum of all signature alerts shown in the report.

  • 41806/0
  • 41847/0
  • 41866/0
  • 41886/0
  • 41846/0
  • 41846/1
  • 41946/0
  • 31419/0
  • 41906/0
  • 41766/0
  • 41786/0

For more information about Cisco Security Manager IPS Event Reporting, refer to the Understanding IPS Top Reports section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

Also in the Report Manager, the Top Services report can be used with the following configuration to generate a report of events that indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:

  • Use the Destination IP network filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range 2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
  • Set an action of Deny on the Criteria settings page

Identification: Event Management System Partner Events

Cisco works with industry-leading Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) companies through the Cisco Developer Network. This partnership helps Cisco deliver validated and pretested SIEM systems that address business concerns such as long-term log archiving and forensics, heterogeneous event correlation, and advanced compliance reporting. Security Information and Event Management partner products can be leveraged to collect events from Cisco devices and then query the collected events for the incidents created by a Cisco IPS signature or deny syslog messages from firewalls that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. The queries can be made by Sig ID and Syslog ID as shown in the following list:

  • 41806/0 Windows Kernel-Mode Drivers GDI Access Violation Vulnerability
  • 41847/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer HtmlLayout Remote Code Execution
  • 41866/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer Null Byte Information Disclosure
  • 41886/0 Microsoft Internet Explorer VML Remote Code Execution
  • 41846/0 Cross Site Scripting Generic Signatures
  • 41846/1 Cross Site Scripting Generic Signatures
  • 41946/0 Microsoft Sharepoint XSS Vulnerability
  • 31419/0 Microsoft Office Insecure Library Loading Vulnerability
  • 41906/0 Windows Msvcrt.dll Buffer Overflow
  • 41766/0 Microsoft .NET Framework Unmanaged Objects Vulnerability
  • 41786/0 Microsoft .NET Framework Heap Corruption
  • ASA-4-415006 (HTTP inspection)
  • ASA-4-415007 (HTTP inspection)

For more information about SIEM partners, refer to the Security Management System website.

Additional Information

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Cisco Security Procedures

Complete information about reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco is available on Cisco.com at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/psirt/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This web page includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco Security Advisories. All Cisco Security Advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

Related Information

Vulnerability Characteristics

Mitigation Technique Overview

Risk Management

Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of <this vulnerability | these vulnerabilities>. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Caution:The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.

Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:

Additional Information

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Cisco Security Procedures

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/psirt/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

Related Information

 
Alert History
 

Version 3, February 29, 2012, 5:01 PM: IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from February 28, 2012.

Version 2, February 17, 2012, 11:13 AM: IPS signature event data from Cisco Remote Management Services is available for IPS signatures from February 17, 2012.

Version 1, February 14, 2012, 1:59 PM: This initial version of the Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin addresses the Microsoft Security Bulletin Release for February 2012.



Product Sets
 
The security vulnerability applies to the following combinations of products.

Primary Products:
Microsoft, Inc.Windows 7 for 32-bit systems Base, SP1 | for x64-based systems Base, SP1
Microsoft, Inc.Windows Server 2003 Datacenter Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Datacenter Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) Base, SP2 | Enterprise Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Enterprise Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) Base, SP2 | Standard Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Standard Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) Base, SP2 | Web Edition Base, SP1, SP2
Microsoft, Inc.Windows Server 2008 Datacenter Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Datacenter Edition, 64-bit Base, SP1, SP2 | Enterprise Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Enterprise Edition, 64-bit Base, SP1, SP2 | Standard Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Standard Edition, 64-bit Base, SP1, SP2
Microsoft, Inc.Windows Server 2008 R2 x64-Based Systems Edition Base, SP1 | Itanium-Based Systems Edition Base, SP1
Microsoft, Inc.Windows Vista Home Basic Base, SP1, SP2 | Home Premium Base, SP1, SP2 | Business Base, SP1, SP2 | Enterprise Base, SP1, SP2 | Ultimate Base, SP1, SP2 | Home Basic x64 Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Home Premium x64 Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Business x64 Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Enterprise x64 Edition Base, SP1, SP2 | Ultimate x64 Edition Base, SP1, SP2
Microsoft, Inc.Windows XP Home Edition Base, SP1, SP2, SP3 | Professional Edition Base, SP1, SP2, SP3 | Professional x64 (AMD/EM64T) Base, SP1, SP2

Associated Products:
CiscoCisco Broadband Troubleshooter Original Release Base | 3.1 Base | 3.2 Base
CiscoCisco Building Broadband Service Manager (BBSM) Original Release Base | 2.5 .1 | 3.0 Base | 4.0 Base, .1 | 4.2 Base | 4.3 Base | 4.4 Base | 4.5 Base | 5.0 Base | 5.1 Base | 5.2 Base
CiscoCisco CNS Network Registrar 2.5 Base | 3.0 Base | 3.5 Base, .1 | 5.0 Base | 5.5 Base, .13 | 6.0 .5, .5.2, .5.3, .5.4 | 6.1 Base, .1, .1.1, .1.2, .1.3, .1.4
CiscoCisco Collaboration Server Dynamic Content Adapter (DCA) Original Release Base | 1.0 Base | 2.0 Base, (1)_SR2
CiscoCisco Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) Option 4.7 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4 | 5.1 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3 | 6.0 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5 | 7.0 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2 | 7.1 (2), (3), (4), (5)
CiscoCisco Conference Connection 1.1 (3), (3)spA | 1.2 Base, (1), (2), (2)SR1, (2)SR2
CiscoCisco E-mail Manager Original Release Base | 4.0 Base, .5i, .6 | 5.0 Base, (0)_SR1, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR6, (0)_SR7
CiscoCisco Emergency Responder 1.1 Base, (3), (4) | 1.2 Base, (1), (1)SR1, (2), (2)sr1, (3)a, (3)SR1, (3a)SR2 | 1.3 Base, (1a), (2)
CiscoCisco Intelligent Contact Manager (ICM) Original Release Base | 4.6 (2)_SR1, (2)_SR2, (2)_SR3, (2)_SR4, (2)_SR5, (2)_SR6 | 5.0 (0), (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR7, (0)_SR8, (0)_SR9, (0)_SR10, (0)_SR11, (0)_SR12, (0)_SR13 | 6.0 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4, (0)_SR5, (0)_SR6, (0)_SR7, (0)_SR8, (0)_SR9, (0)_SR10 | 7.0 (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2, (0)_SR3, (0)_SR4 | 7.1 (2), (3), (4), (5)
CiscoCisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise Edition Base, 4.6.2, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.3 | Express Edition Base, 2.0, 2.0.2, 2.1, 2.1.1a, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3b, 2.2.3b_spE, 3.0, 3.0.2, 3.0.3a_spA, 3.0.3a_spB, 3.0.3a_spC, 3.0.3a_spD, 3.1, 3.1(1)_SR1, 3.1(1)_SR2, 3.1(2)_SR1, 3.1(2)_SR2, 3.1(2)_SR3, 3.1(2)_SR4, 3.1(3)_SR2, 3.1(3)_SR3, 3.1(3)_SR4, 3.1(3)_SR5, 3.5, 3.5.1, 3.5(1)_SR1, 3.5(2)_SR1, 3.5(3), 3.5(3)_SR1, 3.5(3)_SR2, 3.5(3)_SR3, 3.5(4)_SR1, 3.5(4)_SR2, 4.0, 4.0(1)_SR1, 4.0(4)_SR1, 4.0(5)_SR1, 4.1, 4.1(1)_SR1, 4.5, 4.5(2)_SR1, 4.5(2)_SR2, 5.0(1)_SR1 | Hosted Edition Base, 4.6.2, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.3
CiscoCisco Unified IP IVR 2.0 .2 | 2.1 .1a, .2, .3 | 2.2 (5), .1, .2, .3b, .3b_spE, .5, .4 | 3.0 .1_spB, .2, .3a_spA, .3a_spB, .3a_spC, .3a_spD | 3.1 (1)_SR2, (2)_SR1, (2)_SR2, (2)_SR3, (3)_SR1, (3)_SR2, (3)_SR3, (3)_SR4, (3)_SR5 | 3.5 (1)_SR1, (1)_SR2, (1)_SR3, (2)_SR1, (3)_SR1, (3)_SR2, (3)_SR3, (4)_SR1, (4)_SR2, .1, .3 | 4.0 (1)_SR1, (4)_SR1 | 4.1 (1)_SR1 | 4.5 (2)_SR1, (2)_SR2 | 5.0 (1)_SR1
CiscoCisco IP Interoperability and Collaboration System (IPICS) 1.0 (1.1)
CiscoCisco IP Queue Manager 2.2 Base
CiscoCisco IP/VC 3540 Application Server Module 3.2 .0.1, .138 | 3.5 .0.8
CiscoCisco IP/VC 3540 Rate Matching Module 3.0 .9
CiscoCisco Media Blender Original Release Base | 3.0 Base | 4.0 Base | 5.0 Base, (0)_SR1, (0)_SR2
CiscoCisco Networking Services for Active Directory Original Release Base
CiscoCisco Outbound Option Original Release Base
CiscoCisco Personal Assistant 1.0 Base, (1) | 1.1 Base | 1.3 Base, .1, .2, .3, .4 | 1.4 Base, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6
CiscoCisco Remote Monitoring Suite Option 1.0 Base | 2.0 Base, (0)_SR1
CiscoCisco Secure Access Control Server (ACS) for Windows 2.6 Base | 2.6.3.2 Base | 2.6.4 Base | 2.6.4.4 Base | 3.0 Base | 3.0.1 Base | 3.0.1.40 Base | 3.0.2 Base | 3.0.3 Base | 3.0.3.6 Base | 3.0.4 Base | 3.1.1 Base | 3.1.1.27 Base | 3.1.2 Base | 3.2 Base | 3.2.1 Base | 3.2.3 Base | 3.3.1 Base | 3.3.2.2 Base | 3.3.1.16 Base | 3.3.3.11 Base | 4.0 Base | 4.0.1 Base | 4.0.1.27 Base | 4.1.1.23 Base
CiscoCisco Secure Access Control Server Solution Engine (ACSE) 3.1 Base, .1 | 3.2 Base, .1.20, .2.5, .3 | 3.3 Base, .1, .1.16, .2.2, .3, .4, .4.12 | 4.0 Base, .1, .1.42, .1.44, .1.49 | 4.1 Base, .1.23, .1.23.3, .3, .3.12
CiscoCisco Secure User Registration Tool (URT) Original Release Base | 1.2 Base, .1 | 2.0 Base, .7, .8 | 2.5 Base, .1, .2, .3, .4, .5
CiscoCisco SN 5420 Storage Router 1.1 Base, .3, .4, .5, .7, .8 | 2.1 .1, .2
CiscoCisco SN 5428-2 Storage Router 3.2 .1, .2 | 3.3 .1, .2 | 3.4 .1 | 3.5 Base, .1, .2, .3, .4
CiscoCisco Trailhead Original Release Base | 4.0 Base
CiscoCisco Unified Communications Manager Original Release Base | 1.0 Base | 2.0 Base | 3.0 Base | 3.0.3(a) Base | 3.1 Base, .1, .2, .3a | 3.1(1) Base | 3.1(2) Base | 3.1(2)SR3 Base | 3.1(3) Base | 3.1(3)SR2 Base | 3.1(3)SR4 Base | 3.2 Base | 3.2(3)SR3 Base | 3.3 Base | 3.3(2)SPc Base | 3.3(3) Base | 3.3(3)ES61 Base | 3.3(3)SR3 Base | 3.3(3)SR4a Base | 3.3(3a) Base | 3.3(4) Base | 3.3(4)ES25 Base | 3.3(4)SR2 Base | 3.3(4c) Base | 3.3(5) Base | 3.3(5)ES24 Base | 3.3(5)SR1 Base | 3.3(5)SR1a Base | 3.3(5)SR2 Base | 3.3(5)SR2a Base | 3.3(5)SR3 Base | 3.3(59) Base | 3.3(61) Base | 3.3(63) Base | 3.3(64) Base | 3.3(65) Base | 3.3(66) Base | 3.3(67.5) Base | 3.3(68.1) Base | 3.3(71.0) Base | 3.3(74.0) Base | 3.3(78) Base | 3.3(76) Base | 4.0 .1, .2 | 4.0(2a)ES40 Base | 4.0(2a)ES56 Base | 4.0(2a)SR2b Base | 4.0(2a)SR2c Base | 4.1 Base | 4.1(2) Base | 4.1(2)ES33 Base | 4.1(2)ES50 Base | 4.1(2)SR1 Base | 4.1(3) Base | 4.1(3)ES Base | 4.1(3)ES07 Base | 4.1(3)ES24 Base | 4.1(3)SR Base | 4.1(3)SR1 Base | 4.1(3)SR2 Base | 4.1(3)SR3 Base | 4.1(3)SR3b Base | 4.1(3)SR3c Base | 4.1(3)SR4 Base | 4.1(3)SR4b Base | 4.1(3)SR4d Base | 4.1(3)SR5 Base | 4.1(4) Base | 4.1(9) Base | 4.1(17) Base | 4.1(19) Base | 4.1(22) Base | 4.1(23) Base | 4.1(25) Base | 4.1(26) Base | 4.1(27.7) Base | 4.1(28.2) Base | 4.1(30.4) Base | 4.1(36) Base | 4.1(39) Base | 4.2(1) Base | 4.2(1)SR1b Base | 4.2(1.02) Base | 4.2(1.05.3) Base | 4.2(1.06) Base | 4.2(1.07) Base | 4.2(3) Base | 4.2(3)SR1 Base | 4.2(3)SR2 Base | 4.2(3.08) Base | 4.2(3.2.3) Base | 4.2(3.3) Base | 4.2(3.13) Base | 4.3(1) Base | 4.3(1)SR Base | 4.3(1.57) Base
CiscoCisco Unified Customer Voice Portal (CVP) 3.0 (0), (0)SR1, (0)SR2 | 3.1 (0), (0)SR1, (0)SR2 | 4.0 (0), (1), (1)SR1, (2)
CiscoCisco Unified MeetingPlace 4.3 Base | 5.3 Base | 5.2 Base | 5.4 Base | 6.0 Base
CiscoCisco Unified MeetingPlace Express 1.1 Base | 1.2 Base | 2.0 Base
CiscoCisco Unity Original Release Base | 2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.3 Base | 2.4 Base | 2.46 Base | 3.0 Base, .1 | 3.1 Base, .2, .3, .5, .6 | 3.2 Base | 3.3 Base | 4.0 Base, .1, .2, .3, .3b, .4, .5 | 4.1 Base, .1 | 4.2 Base, .1, .1 ES27 | 5.0 (1) | 7.0 (2)
CiscoCisco Unity Express 1.0.2 Base | 1.1.1 Base | 1.1.2 Base | 2.0.1 Base | 2.0.2 Base | 2.1.1 Base | 2.1.2 Base | 2.1.3 Base | 2.2.0 Base | 2.2.1 Base | 2.2.2 Base | 2.3.0 Base | 2.3.1 Base
CiscoCisco Wireless Control System (WCS) Software 1.0 Base | 2.0 Base, 44.14, 44.24 | 2.2 .0, .111.0 | 3.0 Base, .101.0, .105.0 | 3.1 Base, .20.0, .33.0, .35.0 | 3.2 Base, .23.0, .25.0, .40.0, .51.0, .64.0 | 4.0 Base, .1.0, .43.0, .66.0, .81.0, .87.0, .96.0, .97.0 | 4.1 Base, .83.0
CiscoCiscoWorks IP Telephony Environment Monitor (ITEM) 1.3 Base | 1.4 Base | 2.0 Base
CiscoCiscoWorks LAN Management Solution (LMS) 1.3 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.5 Base | 2.6 Base
CiscoCiscoWorks QoS Policy Manager (QPM) 2.0 Base, .1, .2, .3 | 2.1 .2 | 3.0 Base, .1 | 3.1 Base | 3.2 Base, .1, .2, .3
CiscoCiscoWorks Routed WAN Management Solution (RWAN) 1.0 Base | 1.1 Base | 1.2 Base | 1.3 Base, .1
CiscoCiscoWorks Small Network Management Solution (SNMS) 1.0 Base | 1.5 Base
CiscoCiscoWorks VPN/Security Management Solution (VMS) 1.0 Base | 2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 Base | 2.3 Base
CiscoCisco Collaboration Server 3.0 Base | 3.01 Base | 3.02 Base | 4.0 Base | 5.0 Base
CiscoCisco DOCSIS CPE Configurator 1.0 Base | 1.1 Base | 2.0 Base
CiscoCisco Unified IP Interactive Voice Response (IVR) 2.0 Base | 2.1 Base
CiscoCisco Service Control Engine (SCE) 3.0 Base | 3.1 Base
CiscoCisco Transport Manager Original Release Base | 2.0 Base | 2.1 Base | 2.2 Base, .1 | 3.0 Base, .1, .2 | 3.1 Base | 3.2 Base | 4.0 Base | 4.1 Base, .4, .6, .6.6.1 | 4.6 Base | 4.7 Base | 5.0 Base, .0.867.2, .1.873.2, .2, .2.92.1, .2.99.1, .2.105.1, .2.110.1 | 6.0 Base, .0.405.1, .0.407.1, .0.412.1 | 7.0 Base, .0.370.1, .0.372.1, .0.377.1, .0.389.1, .0.400.1, .395.1 | 7.2 Base, .0.199.1
Microsoft, Inc.Windows Server 2003 Datacenter Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) SP1 | Enterprise Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) SP1 | Standard Edition x64 (AMD/EM64T) SP1




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