Contents
Cisco Response
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Additional Information
Cisco Security Procedures
Related Information
Alert History
Cisco Response
This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the PSIRT
Security Advisory Cisco ATA 187 Analog Telephone Adaptor Remote Access
Vulnerability and provides identification and mitigation techniques that
administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.
Vulnerability Characteristics
The Cisco ATA 187 contains a vulnerability when it processes malicious
Telnet IP version 4 (IPv4) packets. This vulnerability can be exploited
remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful
exploitation of this vulnerability could allow access to the device operating
system. The attack vector for exploitation is through Telnet IPv4 packets using
TCP port 7870.
Vulnerability Overview
Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in
the Cisco Security Advisory, which is available at the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20130206-ata187.
Mitigation Technique Overview
Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for this vulnerability.
Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general
security best practices for infrastructure devices and the traffic that
transits the network. This section of the document provides an overview of
these techniques.
Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using
transit access control lists (tACLs). This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to
exploit this vulnerability.
Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ASA 5500
Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services
Module (ASASM), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500
Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using tACLs. This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to
exploit this vulnerability.
Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based
exploitation attempts.
Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM firewalls can
provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the
output from show commands.
Effective use of Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions
provides visibility into and protection against attacks that attempt to exploit
this vulnerability.
The Cisco Security Manager can also provide visibility through incidents,
queries, and event reporting.
Risk Management
Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and
mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of this vulnerability.
Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely
to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations
develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk
Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk
Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security
evaluation and response processes.
Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on
specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change,
evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for
these devices:
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress
access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and
supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are
advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy
enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only
authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting
authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security
policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete
protection against this vulnerability when the attack originates from a trusted
source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized IPv4 packets on TCP port 7870 that are
sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 represents
the IP address space that is used by the affected devices. Care should be taken
to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to
denying all unauthorized traffic.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit
Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!
!-- The open port in the advisory has no legitimate
!-- purpose and for that reason this tACL does not
!-- include any explicit permit statements
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control
!-- entry (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 7870
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list 150 deny ip any any
Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the
transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered
traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of
increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP
unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by
default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the
interface configuration commands no ip unreachables. ICMP unreachable
rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration
commands ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms.
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, the show ip
access-lists command will identify the number of IPv4 packets on TCP port
7870 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate
filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this
vulnerability. Example output for show ip access-lists 150 follows:
router#show ip access-lists 150
Extended IP access list 150
10 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 7870 (12 matches)
20 deny ip any any
router#
In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped 12 packets on
TCP port 7870 for access control list entry (ACE) line 10.
For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters
and syslog events, reference the Identifying
Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security
Intelligence Operations white paper.
Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation
when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Cisco Security
Intelligence Operations white paper Embedded
Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how
to use this feature.
Identification: Access List Logging
The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will
cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input
option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet
source and destination IP addresses and ports.
Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and
must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL
logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward
packets that match log-enabled ACEs.
For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval
interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching
induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit
rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the
impact of log generation and transmission.
The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor
Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.
For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging,
reference the Understanding
Access Control List Logging Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white
paper.
Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS
NetFlow
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and
switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be
attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Administrators are advised to
investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this
vulnerability or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480
.000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
.000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
0 alloc failures, 0 force free
1 chunk, 1 chunk added
last clearing of statistics never
Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
-------- Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow
TCP-Telnet 11393421 2.8 1 48 3.1 0.0 1.4
TCP-FTP 236 0.0 12 66 0.0 1.8 4.8
TCP-FTPD 21 0.0 13726 1294 0.0 18.4 4.1
TCP-WWW 22282 0.0 21 1020 0.1 4.1 7.3
TCP-X 719 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 1.3
TCP-BGP 1 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 15.0
TCP-Frag 70399 0.0 1 688 0.0 0.0 22.7
TCP-other 47861004 11.8 1 211 18.9 0.0 1.3
UDP-DNS 582 0.0 4 73 0.0 3.4 15.4
UDP-NTP 287252 0.0 1 76 0.0 0.0 15.5
UDP-other 310347 0.0 2 230 0.1 0.6 15.9
ICMP 11674 0.0 3 61 0.0 19.8 15.5
IPv6INIP 15 0.0 1 1132 0.0 0.0 15.4
GRE 4 0.0 1 48 0.0 0.0 15.3
Total: 59957957 14.8 1 196 22.5 0.0 1.5
SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts
Gi0/0 192.168.10.20 Gi0/1 192.168.60.112 06 487C 1EBE 1
Gi0/0 192.168.11.52 Gi0/1 192.168.60.118 06 487D 1EBE 3
Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 06 0016 12CA 1
Gi0/0 192.168.113.97 Gi0/1 192.168.60.128 06 487E 1EBE 5
Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1 192.168.202.22 11 007B 007B 1
Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 06 12CA 0016 1
router#
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows on TCP port
7870 (hex value 1EBE).
As shown in the following example, to view only the packets on TCP port 7870
(hex value 1EBE), use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*1EBE
command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:
TCP Flows
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*1EBE
SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts
Gi0/0 192.168.12.110 Gi0/1 192.168.60.163 06 487F 1EBE 6
Gi0/0 192.168.11.230 Gi0/1 192.168.60.20 06 4880 1EBE 1
Gi0/0 192.168.11.131 Gi0/1 192.168.60.245 06 4881 1EBE 18
Gi0/0 192.168.13.7 Gi0/1 192.168.60.162 06 4882 1EBE 1
Gi0/0 192.168.41.86 Gi0/1 192.168.60.27 06 4883 1EBE 2
router#
Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco Flexible
NetFlow
Introduced in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2(31)SB2 and 12.4(9)T, Cisco
IOS Flexible NetFlow improves original Cisco NetFlow by adding the capability
to customize the traffic analysis parameters for the administrator''s specific
requirements. Original Cisco NetFlow uses a fixed seven tuples of IP
information to identify a flow, whereas Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow allows the
flow to be user defined. It facilitates the creation of more complex
configurations for traffic analysis and data export by using reusable
configuration components.
The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a
version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax
will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly
depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following
configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface
GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as
defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement.
Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about
source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress
and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.
!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
match ipv4 source address
collect ipv4 protocol
collect ipv4 destination address
collect transport source-port
collect transport destination-port
collect interface input
collect interface output
collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4
record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 input
The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:
router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table
Cache type: Normal
Cache size: 4096
Current entries: 6
High Watermark: 1
Flows added: 9181
Flows aged: 9175
- Active timeout ( 1800 secs) 9000
- Inactive timeout ( 15 secs) 175
- Event aged 0
- Watermark aged 0
- Emergency aged 0
IPV4 SRC ADDR ipv4 dst addr trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
=============== =============== ============= ============= ========== =========== ===== =======
192.168.10.201 192.168.60.102 1456 7870 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 1128 6
192.168.11.54 192.168.60.158 123 7870 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 2212 17
192.168.150.60 10.89.16.226 2567 443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 13 6
192.168.13.97 192.168.60.28 3451 7870 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 1 6
10.88.226.1 192.168.202.22 2678 443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 10567 6
10.89.16.226 192.168.150.60 3562 80 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 30012 6
To view only the
packets on TCP port
7870, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format
table | include IPV4 DST ADDR |_7870_.*_6_ command to display the
related NetFlow records.
For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release
15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release
12.4T.
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress
access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and
supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are
advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can
construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the
network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit
the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A
tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against this vulnerability
when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized IPv4 packets on TCP port 7870 that are
sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 represents
the IP address space that is used by the affected devices. Care should be taken
to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to
denying all unauthorized traffic.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit
Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!
!-- The open port in the advisory has no legitimate
!-- purpose and for that reason this tACL does not
!-- include any explicit permit statements
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control
!-- entry (ACE) can aid in identification of attacks
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 7870
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any
!
!-- Apply tACL to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the
show access-list command to identify the number of IPv4 packets on TCP
port 7870 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate
filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this
vulnerability. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy
follows:
firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy
access-list tACL-Policy; 2 elements; name hash: 0x3452703d
access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 7870 (hitcnt=8)
access-list tACL-Policy line 9 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=28)
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped
8 packets on TCP port 7870 received from an untrusted host or
network. In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable
information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source
and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages
Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied
by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword
present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco
ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive
Security Appliance is in Monitoring
- Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring
Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring
the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grep regex
command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These
messages provide additional information about denied packets that could
indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerability that is described in
this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the
grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.
Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating
a Regular Expression.
firewall#show logging | grep 106023
Feb 06 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.99/43946
dst inside:192.168.60.240/7870 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 06 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.100/43947
dst inside:192.168.60.115/7870 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 06 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.88/43949
dst inside:192.168.60.38/7870 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 06 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.175/43950
dst inside:192.168.60.250/7870 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
firewall#
In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL
tACL-Policy show packets for TCP port 7870 sent to the
address block assigned to affected devices.
Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco ASA Series Adaptive
Security Appliances is in Cisco
ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages, 8.2. Additional information about
syslog messages for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in the Analyzing
Syslog Messages section of the Cisco
ASASM CLI Configuration Guide. Additional information about syslog messages
for the Cisco FWSM is in Catalyst
6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module
Logging System Log Messages.
For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog
events, reference the Identifying
Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security
Intelligence Operations white paper.
Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Table
Administrators can use the Cisco IPS appliances and services modules to
provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit the vulnerability
described in this document. The following table provides an overview of CVE
identifier and the respective Cisco IPS signature that will trigger events on
potential attempts to exploit this vulnerability.
| CVE ID |
Signature Release |
Signature ID |
Signature Name |
Enabled |
Severity |
Fidelity* |
| CVE-2013-1111 |
S694 |
1873/0 |
Cisco ATA 187 Remote Access Vulnerability |
Yes |
High |
95 |
* Fidelity is also referred to as Signature Fidelity Rating (SFR) and is the
relative measure of the accuracy of the signature (predefined). The value
ranges from 0 through 100 and is set by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action
when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or
deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to
exploit the vulnerability listed in the preceding table.
Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode
combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco
IPS 7.x and 6.x sensors that are deployed in
inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is
attempting to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document.
Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event
action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than 90.
For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating
calculation, reference Risk
Rating and Threat Rating: Simplify IPS Policy Management.
Identification: Cisco Security Manager
Cisco Security Manager, Event Viewer
Beginning in software version 4.0, Cisco Security Manager can collect
syslogs from Cisco firewalls and Cisco IPS devices and provides the Event
Viewer, which can query for events that are related to the vulnerability that
is described in this document.
Using the IPS Alert Events predefined view in the Event
Viewer, the user can enter the search string 1873/0 in the event filter
to return all captured events related to Cisco IPS signature 1873/0.
Using the following filters in the Firewall Denied Events
predefined view in the Event Viewer provides all captured Cisco firewall access
list deny syslog messages that could indicate potential
attempts to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document.
- Use the Destination event filter to filter network objects that contain
the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example,
IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24)
- Use the Destination Service event filter to filter objects that contain
TCP port 7870
An Event Type ID filter can be used with the Firewall Denied
Events predefined view in the Event Viewer to filter the syslog IDs
shown in the following list to provide all captured Cisco firewall
deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to
exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document:
For more information about Cisco Security Manager Events, refer to the Filtering
and Querying Events section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.
Cisco Security Manager Report Manager
Beginning in software version 4.1, Cisco Security Manager supports the
Report Manager, the Cisco IPS event reporting feature. This feature allows an
administrator to define reports based on Cisco IPS events of interest. Reports
can be scheduled or users can run ad hoc reports as required.
Using the Report Manager, the user can define an IPS Top Signatures report
for Cisco IPS devices of interest based on time-range and signature
characteristics. When the Signature ID is set to 1873/0, Cisco Security Manager
will generate a comprehensive report that ranks the count of the alerts fired
for the signature of interest compared to the total sum of all signature alerts
shown in the report.
Cisco Security Manager will generate a comprehensive report that ranks the
count of the alerts fired for the signature of interest compared to the total
sum of all signature alerts shown in the report.
Also in the Report Manager, the Top Services report can be used with the
following configuration to generate a report of events that indicate potential
attempts to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document:
- Use the Destination IP network filter to filter network objects that
contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for
example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24)
- Set an action of Deny on the Criteria settings page
For more information about Cisco Security Manager IPS Event Reporting refer
to the Understanding
IPS Top Reports section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.
Identification: Event Management System Partner Events
Cisco works with industry-leading Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) companies through the Cisco
Developer Network. This partnership helps Cisco deliver validated and tested SIEM
systems that address business concerns such as long-term log archiving and
forensics, heterogeneous event correlation, and advanced compliance reporting.
Security Information and Event Management partner products can be leveraged to
collect events from Cisco devices and then query the collected events for the
incidents created by a Cisco IPS signature or deny syslog
messages from firewalls that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the
vulnerability that is described in this document. The queries can be made by
Sig ID and Syslog ID as shown in the following list:
- 1873/0 Cisco ATA 187 Remote Access Vulnerability
- ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny)
For more information about SIEM partners, refer to the Security
Management System website.
Additional Information
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco''s worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
Related Information
