Contents
Cisco Response
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Additional Information
Cisco Security Procedures
Related Information
Alert History
Cisco Response
This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the following
PSIRT Security Advisories:
- Cisco Unified Communications Manager Contains Multiple
Vulnerabilities
- Cisco Unified Presence Server Denial of Service
Vulnerability
- Cisco Prime Central for Hosted Collaboration Solution Assurance Excessive CPU Utilization Vulnerability
This document provides identification and mitigation techniques that
administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.
Vulnerability Characteristics
There are multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Voice and Unified Communications Products. The following subsections summarize these vulnerabilities:
Locations Bandwidth Manager (LBM) Cache Poisoning Vulnerability: This vulnerability can be
exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this
vulnerability could result in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The
attack vector for exploitation is through IPv4 and IPv6 packets using TCP
port 9004.
This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2013-1134.
Cisco Unified Presence Server Denial of Service Vulnerability: This vulnerability can be
exploited remotely without authentication and
without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this
vulnerability could result in a DoS condition. The
attack vector for exploitation is through SIP IPv4 and IPv6 packets using TCP
port 5060.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2013-1137.
Cisco Prime Central for Hosted Collaboration Solution Assurance Excessive CPU Utilization Vulnerability: This vulnerability can
be exploited remotely without authentication
and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of
this vulnerability could result in a DoS condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through
IPv4 and
IPv6 packets using TCP ports 9043 and 9443.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE identifier CVE-2013-1135.
Vulnerability Overview
Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in
the Cisco Security Advisories, which are available at the following links:
Mitigation Technique Overview
Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities.
Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general
security best practices for infrastructure devices and the traffic that
transits the network. This section of the document provides an overview of
these techniques.
Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using transit access control lists (tACLs)
This protection
mechanism filters and drops packets
that are attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Effective means of exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ASA
5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA
Services Module (ASASM), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using the
following:
These protection
mechanisms filter and drop packets
that are attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module using TCP normalization.
This protection mechanism filters and drops packets that are attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Cisco IOS NetFlow records
can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts.
Cisco IOS Software, Cisco
ASA, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control
Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and
counter values displayed in the output from show
commands.
Effective use of Cisco
Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) event actions provides visibility into and
protection against attacks that attempt to exploit these
vulnerabilities.
The Cisco Security Manager
can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event
reporting.
Risk Management
Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and
mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities.
Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely
to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations
develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk
Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk
Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security
evaluation and response processes.
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress
access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and
supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are
advised to deploy transit access control lists (tACLs) to perform policy
enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only
authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting
authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security
policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete
protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a
trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 9004, 5060, 9043, and 9443 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example,
192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 represent the IP address space that is
used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and
2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the
affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing
and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit
Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9004
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9043
access-list 150 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9443
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9004
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9043
access-list 150 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9443
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list 150 deny ip any any
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9004
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 5060
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9043
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9443
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs can
!-- aid in identification of attacks to global and
!-- link-local addresses
!
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9004
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 5060
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9043
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9443
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in
!-- accordance with existing security policies and configurations
!-- and allow IPv6 neighbor discovery packets, which
!-- include neighbor solicitation packets and neighbor
!-- advertisement packets
!
permit icmp any any nd-ns
permit icmp any any nd-na
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IPv6 traffic
!
deny ipv6 any any
!
!
!-- Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip access-group 150 in
ipv6 traffic-filter IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy in
Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the
transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered
traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of
increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP
unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by
default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the
interface configuration commands no ip unreachables and no
ipv6 unreachables. ICMP unreachable
rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration
commands ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms and ipv6
icmp error-interval interval-in-ms.
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the administrator applies the tACL to an interface, the show ip
access-lists and show ipv6 access-list commands will
identify the number of IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 9004, 5060, 9043, and 9443 that have
been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to
determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example
output for show ip access-lists 150 and show ipv6
access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy follows:
router#show ip access-lists 150
Extended IP access list 150
10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9004
20 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060
30 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9043
40 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9443
50 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9004 (3 matches)
60 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 5060 (40 matches)
70 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9043 (17 matches)
80 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 9443 (19 matches)
90 deny ip any any
router#
In the preceding example, access list 150 has dropped the following packets
received from an untrusted host or network:
- 3 packets on TCP port
9004 for ACE line 50
- 40 SIP packets on TCP port
5060 for ACE line 60
- 17 packets on TCP port
9043 for ACE line 70
- 19 packets on TCP port
9443 for ACE line 80
router#show ipv6 access-list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
IPv6 access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9004 (48 matches) sequence 10
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 5060 (10 matches) sequence 20
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9043 (50 matches) sequence 30
permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9443 (29 matches) sequence 40
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9004 (19 matches) sequence 50
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 5060 (16 matches) sequence 60
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9043 (8 matches) sequence 70
deny tcp any 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 eq 9443 (39 matches) sequence 80
permit icmp any any nd-ns (80 matches) sequence 90
permit icmp any any nd-na (91 matches) sequence 100
deny ipv6 any any (121 matches) sequence 110
In the preceding example, access list IPv6-Transit-ACL-Policy has
dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:
- 19 packets on TCP port 9004 for ACE line 50
- 16 SIP packets on TCP port
5060 for ACE line 60
- 8 packets on TCP port
9043 for ACE line 70
- 39 packets on TCP port
9443 for ACE line 80
For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters
and syslog events, reference the Identifying
Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security
Intelligence Operations white paper.
Administrators can use Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation
when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Cisco Security
Intelligence Operations white paper Embedded
Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how
to use this feature.
Identification: Access List Logging
The log and log-input access control list
(ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The
log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in
addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.
Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU
intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU
impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process
switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.
For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval
interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching
induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit
rate-per-second except loglevel command
limits the impact of log generation and transmission.
The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor
Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.
For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging,
reference the Understanding
Access Control List Logging Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white
paper.
Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS
NetFlow
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and
switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be
attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators are advised to
investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these
vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.
router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480
.000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
.000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
0 alloc failures, 0 force free
1 chunk, 1 chunk added
last clearing of statistics never
Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
-------- Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow
TCP-Telnet 11393421 2.8 1 48 3.1 0.0 1.4
TCP-FTP 236 0.0 12 66 0.0 1.8 4.8
TCP-FTPD 21 0.0 13726 1294 0.0 18.4 4.1
TCP-WWW 22282 0.0 21 1020 0.1 4.1 7.3
TCP-X 719 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 1.3
TCP-BGP 1 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 15.0
TCP-Frag 70399 0.0 1 688 0.0 0.0 22.7
TCP-other 47861004 11.8 1 211 18.9 0.0 1.3
UDP-DNS 582 0.0 4 73 0.0 3.4 15.4
UDP-NTP 287252 0.0 1 76 0.0 0.0 15.5
UDP-other 310347 0.0 2 230 0.1 0.6 15.9
ICMP 11674 0.0 3 61 0.0 19.8 15.5
IPv6INIP 15 0.0 1 1132 0.0 0.0 15.4
GRE 4 0.0 1 48 0.0 0.0 15.3
Total: 59957957 14.8 1 196 22.5 0.0 1.5
SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts
Gi0/0 192.168.10.201 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 11 0984 84D1 1
Gi0/0 192.168.11.54 Gi0/1 192.168.60.158 06 0911 2353 3
Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 06 0016 12CA 1
Gi0/0 192.168.13.97 Gi0/1 192.168.60.28 06 0B3E 24E3 5
Gi0/0 192.168.10.17 Gi0/1 192.168.60.97 06 0B89 13C4 1
Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1 192.168.202.22 11 007B 13C4 1
Gi0/0 192.168.12.185 Gi0/1 192.168.60.239 06 0BD7 232C 1
Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 06 12CA 0016 1
router#
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows on TCP ports 9004 (hex value 232C), 5060 (hex value 13C4), 9043 (hex value 2353), and 9443 (hex value 24E3).
As shown in the following example, to view only the packets on TCP ports 9004 (hex value 232C),
5060 (hex value 13C4), 9043 (hex value 2353), and 9443 (hex value 24E3), use the
show ip cache flow | include
SrcIf|_06_.*(232C|13C4|2353|24E3)_ command to display
the related Cisco NetFlow records:
TCP Flows
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(232C|13C4|2353|24E3)_
SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts
Gi0/0 192.168.12.110 Gi0/1 192.168.60.163 06 092A 24E3 6
Gi0/0 192.168.11.230 Gi0/1 192.168.60.20 06 0C09 13C4 1
Gi0/0 192.168.11.131 Gi0/1 192.168.60.245 06 0B66 232C 18
Gi0/0 192.168.13.7 Gi0/1 192.168.60.162 06 0914 232C 1
Gi0/0 192.168.41.86 Gi0/1 192.168.60.27 06 0B7B 2353 2
router#
Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS
NetFlow
Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and
switches to aid in the identification of IPv6 traffic flows that may be
attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.
Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are
attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate
traffic flows.
The following output is from a Cisco IOS device running Cisco IOS Software
12.4 mainline train. The command syntax will vary for different Cisco IOS
Software trains.
router#show ipv6 flow cache
IP packet size distribution (50078919 total packets):
1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480
.000 .990 .001 .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
IP Flow Switching Cache, 475168 bytes
8 active, 4088 inactive, 6160 added
1092984 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 33928 bytes
16 active, 1008 inactive, 12320 added, 6160 added to flow
0 alloc failures, 0 force free
1 chunk, 1 chunk added
SrcAddress InpIf DstAddress OutIf Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...28::20 Local 0x11 0x16C4 0x13C4 1464
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...28::21 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1191
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...134::3 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1191
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1192
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::2 Gi0/1 0x06 0x160A 0x232C 1597
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1 0x06 0x1610 0x2353 1001
2001:DB...06::201 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::4 Gi0/1 0x06 0x1634 0x24E3 1292
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::3 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1155
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...146::3 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1092
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...144::4 Gi0/1 0x3A 0x0000 0x8000 1193
To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal
width 132 exec mode command.
In the preceding example, there are multiple flows on TCP ports 9004 (hex value 232C), 5060 (hex value 13C4), 9043 (hex value 2353), and 9443 (hex value 24E3).
As shown in the following example, to view only the packets on TCP ports 9004 (hex value 232C),
5060 (hex value 13C4), 9043 (hex value 2353), and 9443 (hex value 24E3),
use the show ipv6 flow cache | include
SrcIf|_06_.*(232C|13C4|2353|24E3)_ command to display
the related Cisco NetFlow records:
TCP Flows
router#show ipv6 flow cache | include SrcIf|_06_.*(232C|13C4|2353|24E3)_
SrcAddress InpIf DstAddress OutIf Prot SrcPrt DstPrt Packets
2001:DB...6A:5BA6 Gi0/0 2001:DB...128::2 Gi0/1 0x06 0x160A 0x13C4 1597
router#
Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco Flexible
NetFlow
Introduced in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2(31)SB2 and 12.4(9)T, Cisco
IOS Flexible NetFlow improves original Cisco NetFlow by adding the capability
to customize the traffic analysis parameters for the administrator''s specific
requirements. Original Cisco NetFlow uses a fixed seven tuples of IP
information to identify a flow, whereas Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow allows the
flow to be user defined. It facilitates the creation of more complex
configurations for traffic analysis and data export by using reusable
configuration components.
The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a
version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the
syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary
slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following
configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface
GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as
defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement.
Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about
source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress
and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.
!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
match ipv4 source address
collect ipv4 protocol
collect ipv4 destination address
collect transport source-port
collect transport destination-port
collect interface input
collect interface output
collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4
record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 input
The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:
router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table
Cache type: Normal
Cache size: 4096
Current entries: 6
High Watermark: 1
Flows added: 9181
Flows aged: 9175
- Active timeout ( 1800 secs) 9000
- Inactive timeout ( 15 secs) 175
- Event aged 0
- Watermark aged 0
- Emergency aged 0
IPV4 SRC ADDR ipv4 dst addr trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
=============== =============== ============= ============= ========== =========== ====== =======
192.168.10.201 192.168.60.102 1456 9043 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 1128 6
192.168.11.54 192.168.60.158 123 123 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 2212 17
192.168.150.60 10.89.16.226 2567 9443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 13 6
192.168.13.97 192.168.60.28 3451 9004 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 1 6
192.168.10.17 192.168.60.97 4231 5060 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 146 6
10.88.226.1 192.168.202.22 2678 443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 10567 6
10.89.16.226 192.168.150.60 3562 80 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 30012 6
To only view the packets
on TCP ports
9004, 5060, 9043, and 9443, use the show flow monitor
FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table | include IPV4 DST ADDR
|_(9004|5060|9043|9443)_.*_6_ command to display the related
NetFlow records.
For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release
15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release
12.4T.
Identification: IPv6 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS Flexible
NetFlow
The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a
version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the
syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary
slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following
configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface
GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv6 flows based on the source IPv6 address, as
defined by the match ipv6 source address key field statement.
Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about
source and destination IPv6 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress
and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.
!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!
flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
match ipv6 source address
collect ipv6 protocol
collect ipv6 destination address
collect transport source-port
collect transport destination-port
collect interface input
collect interface output
collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow
!-- record
!
flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6
record FLOW-RECORD-ipv6
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ipv6 flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 input
The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:
router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table
Cache type: Normal
Cache size: 4096
Current entries: 6
High Watermark: 2
Flows added: 539
Flows aged: 532
- Active timeout ( 1800 secs) 350
- Inactive timeout ( 15 secs) 182
- Event aged 0
- Watermark aged 0
- Emergency aged 0
IPV6 SRC ADDR ipv6 dst addr trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
================= ================= ============= ============= ========== =========== ==== =======
2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 123 123 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 17 17
2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 1265 9004 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 1237 6
2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 1441 9443 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 2346 6
2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 1890 5060 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 5009 6
2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 2856 5060 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 486 17
2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 3012 53 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 1016 17
2001:DB...06::201 2001:DB...28::20 2477 53 Gi0/0 Gi0/0 1563 17
To permit display of the full 128-bit IPv6 address, use the terminal
width 132 exec mode command.
To view only the packets on TCP ports 9004, 5060, 9043, and 9443, use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv6 cache format table | include IPV6
DST ADDR|_(9004|5060|9043|9443)_.*_6_ command to display the
related Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow records.
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress
access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and
supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are
advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can
construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the
network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit
the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A
tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these
vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.
The tACL policy denies unauthorized IPv4 and IPv6 packets on TCP ports 9004, 5060, 9043, and 9443, that are sent to affected devices. In the following example,
192.168.60.0/24 and 2001:DB8:1:60::/64 represent the IP address space that is
used by the affected devices, and the hosts at 192.168.100.1 and
2001:DB8::100:1 are considered trusted sources that require access to the
affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing
and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.
Additional information about tACLs is in Transit
Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9004
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9043
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9443
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9004
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 5060
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9043
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9443
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any
!
!-- Create the corresponding IPv6 tACL
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9004
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 5060
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9043
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy permit tcp host 2001:DB8::100:1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9443
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny tcp any 2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9004
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny tcp any 2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 5060
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny tcp any 2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9043
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny tcp any 2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9443
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy deny ip any any
!
!-- Apply tACLs to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside
access-group IPv6-tACL-Policy in interface outside
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the
show access-list command to identify the number of IPv4 and IPv6 packets on
TCP ports 9004, 5060, 9043, and 9443 that have been filtered. Administrators are
advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts
to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list
tACL-Policy and show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy
follows:
firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy
access-list tACL-Policy; 9 elements; name hash: 0x3452703d
access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9004 (hitcnt=61)
access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq sip (hitcnt=91)
access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9043 (hitcnt=27)
access-list tACL-Policy line 4 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1
192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 9443 (hitcnt=4)
access-list tACL-Policy line 5 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 9004 (hitcnt=14)
access-list tACL-Policy line 6 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq sip (hitcnt=30)
access-list tACL-Policy line 7 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 9043 (hitcnt=19)
access-list tACL-Policy line 8 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0
255.255.255.0 eq 9443 (hitcnt=13)
access-list tACL-Policy line 9 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=34)
In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped the
following packets received from an untrusted host or network:
- 14 packets on port
9004 for ACE line 5
- 30 SIP packets on port
5060 for ACE line 6
- 19 packets on port
9043 for ACE line 7
- 13 packets on port
9443 for ACE line 8
firewall#show access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy; 9 elements; name hash: 0x566a4229
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 1 permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9004 (hitcnt=28)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 2 permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq sip (hitcnt=124)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 3 permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9043 (hitcnt=81)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 4 permit tcp host 2001:db8:1:100::1
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9443 (hitcnt=81)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 5 deny tcp any
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9004 (hitcnt=3)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 6 deny tcp any
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq sip (hitcnt=49)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 7 deny tcp any
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9043 (hitcnt=67)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 8 deny tcp any
2001:db8:1:60::/64 eq 9443 (hitcnt=80)
ipv6 access-list IPv6-tACL-Policy line 9 deny ip any any (hitcnt=27)
In the preceding example, access list IPv6-tACL-Policy has dropped
the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:
- 3 packets on TCP port
9004 for ACE line 5
- 49 SIP packets on TCP port
5060 for ACE line 6
- 67 packets on TCP port
9043 for ACE line 7
- 80 packets on TCP port 9443 for ACE line 8
In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable
information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source
and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.
Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages
Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied
by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log
keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is
in Cisco
ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.
Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive
Security Appliance is in Monitoring
- Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring
Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the FWSM for Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring
the Firewall Services Module.
In the following example, the show logging | grep
regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the
firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets
that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are
described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions
with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the
logged messages.
Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating
a Regular Expression.
firewall#show logging | grep 106023
Feb 27 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.99/3342
dst inside:192.168.60.240/9043 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 27 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.100/3343
dst inside:192.168.60.115/9443 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 27 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.88/3344
dst inside:192.168.60.38/5060 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
Feb 27 2013 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:2001:db8:d::a85e:172/5343
dst inside:2001:db8:1:60::134/9004 by access-group "IPv6-tACL-Policy"
firewall#
Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco ASA Series Adaptive
Security Appliances is in Cisco
ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages, 8.2. Additional information about
syslog messages for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in the Analyzing
Syslog Messages section of the Cisco
ASASM CLI Configuration Guide. Additional information about syslog messages
for the Cisco FWSM is in Catalyst
6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module
Logging System Log Messages.
For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog
events, reference the Identifying
Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security
Intelligence Operations white paper.
Mitigation: TCP Normalization
The TCP normalization feature identifies abnormal packets that the security
appliance can act on when they are detected; for example, the security
appliance can allow, drop, or clear the packets. The TCP normalizer includes
nonconfigurable actions and configurable actions. Typically, nonconfigurable
actions that drop or clear connections apply to packets that are considered
malicious. TCP normalization is available beginning in software release 7.0(1)
for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, software release 8.5
for the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module, and in software release
3.1(1) for the Cisco Firewall Services Module.
TCP normalization is enabled by default and drops packets that may exploit these vulnerabilities. Protection against packets that may exploit these vulnerabilities is a non-configurable TCP normalization action; no configuration changes are required to enable this functionality.
The TCP normalization feature can be used to limit the concurrent connection limit and idle timeout for TCP connections to the Cisco Unified Presence Server, thus preventing the DoS condition. The limits should be configured according to the maximum normal number of connections observed toward the Cisco Unified Presence Server. The reader should note that configuring the TCP normalizer to prevent an abnormal number of connections to the Cisco Unified Presence Server will not prevent a persistent attacker from exhausting the allowed number of connections but it will prevent the Cisco Unified Presence Server from running out of memory due to many idle connections.
Note: Care should be taken with the limits set in each environment as they could deny legitimate connections if they are not set to adhere to the legitimate maximum limits for the specific environment.
In the following example, 192.168.60.200/24 is the IP address of the affected device. The configuration limits the TCP concurrent connections to the device to 1000 and sets the connection idle timeout to 30 minutes. Care should be taken with the limits set in each environments as they could deny legitimate connections if they are not set to adhere to the normal maximum limits for the specific environment.
!
!-- Match TCP traffic to the Cisco Unified Presence Server
!
access-list CVE-2013-1137-acl extended permit tcp any host 192.168.60.200
class-map CVE-2013-1137-cm
match access-list CVE-2013-1137-acl
!
!-- Configure the connection limits for TCP traffic
!-- to the Cisco Unified Presence Server
!
policy-map global_policy
class CVE-2013-1137-cm
set connection conn-max 1000
set connection timeout idle 0:30:00
service-policy global_policy global
Additional information about TCP normalization is in the Configuring
TCP Normalization section of the Cisco
ASA 5500 Series Configuration Guide using the CLI, 8.2 and the Configuring
TCP Normalization section of the Cisco
Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module CLI Configuration Guide, 8.5.
Identification: TCP Normalization
For the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance the show service-policy command can identify the number of packets that the TCP normalization feature has dropped, as shown in the following example:
firewall# show service-policy set connection detail
Global policy:
Service-policy: global_policy
Class-map: CVE-2013-1137-cm
Set connection policy: conn-max 10000
current conns 15, drop 5
Set connection timeout policy:
idle 0:30:00
DCD: disabled, retry-interval 0:00:15, max-retries 5
DCD: client-probe 0, server-probe 0, conn-expiration 0 11
firewall#
For additional information about debugging accelerated security path dropped
packets or connections, reference the Cisco Security Appliance Command
Reference for show
asp drop.
Mitigation: TCP Normalization
TCP normalization is a Layer 4 feature that consists of a series of checks
that the Cisco ACE performs at various stages of a flow, beginning with the
initial connection setup through the closing of a connection. Many of the
segment checks can be controlled or altered by configuring one or more advanced
TCP connection settings. The Cisco ACE uses these TCP connection settings to
decide which checks to perform and whether to discard a TCP segment based on
the results of the checks. The Cisco ACE discards segments that appear to be
abnormal or malformed.
TCP normalization is enabled by default and drops packets that may exploit
these vulnerabilities. Protection against packets that may exploit these
vulnerabilities is a nonconfigurable TCP normalization action; no
configuration changes are required to enable this functionality.
The TCP normalization feature can be used to limit the concurrent connection limit, connection rate and idle timeout for TCP connections to the Cisco Unified Communications Manager, thus preventing the DoS condition. The limits should be configured according to the maximum normal number and rate of connections observed toward the Cisco Unified Communications Manager. The reader should note that configuring the TCP normalizer to prevent an abnormal number of connections to the Cisco Unified Presence Server will not prevent a persistent attacker from exhausting the allowed number of connections but it will prevent the Cisco Unified Presence Server from running out of memory due to many idle connections.
Note: Care should be taken with the limits set in each environment as they could deny legitimate connections if they are not set to adhere to the legitimate maximum limits for the specific environment.
In the following example, 192.168.60.200/24 is the IP address of the affected device. The configuration limits the TCP concurrent connections to the device to 1000, the connection rate to 100000 connections per second and sets the connection idle timeout to 30 minutes.
!
!-- Create a connection parameter map to group together TCP/IP
!-- normalization and termination parameters
!
parameter-map type connection CVE-2013-1137-parameter-map
limit-resource conc-connections 1000
set timeout inactivity 1800
rate-limit connection 100000
!
!-- Match TCP traffic to the Cisco Unified Presence Server
!
class-map match-any CVE-2013-1137-cm
match destination-address 192.168.60.200
!
!-- Configure the connection limits for TCP
!-- traffic to the Cisco Unified Presence Server
!
policy-map multi-match CVE-2013-1137-policy
class CVE-2013-1137-cm
connection advanced-options CVE-2013-1137-parameter-map
!
!-- Apply the policy to the interface
!
interface vlan 50
service-policy input CVE-2013-1137-policy
Additional information about TCP normalization is in the Configuring
TCP/IP Normalization and IP Reassembly Parameters section of the Cisco
ACE 4700 Series Appliance Security Configuration Guide.
Identification: TCP Normalization
The Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module does not
provide show command output for packets that are dropped while
attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Mitigation: Cisco IPS Signature Table
Administrators can use the Cisco IPS appliances and services modules to
provide threat detection and help prevent attempts to exploit several of the
vulnerabilities described in this document. The following table provides an
overview of CVE identifiers and the respective Cisco IPS signatures that will
trigger events on potential attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities.
| CVE ID |
Signature Release |
Signature ID |
Signature Name |
Enabled |
Severity |
Fidelity* |
| CVE-2013-1137 |
S593 |
6009/0 |
SYN Flood DOS |
No |
Medium |
85 |
| CVE-2013-1137 |
S573 |
6920/0 |
Net Flood TCP |
No |
Info |
100 |
* Fidelity is also referred to as Signature Fidelity Rating (SFR) and is the
relative measure of the accuracy of the signature (predefined). The value
ranges from 0 through 100 and is set by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Administrators can configure Cisco IPS sensors to perform an event action
when an attack is detected. The configured event action performs preventive or
deterrent controls to help protect against an attack that is attempting to
exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the preceding table.
Cisco IPS sensors are most effective when deployed in inline protection mode
combined with the use of an event action. Automatic Threat Prevention for Cisco
IPS 7.x and 6.x sensors that are deployed in
inline protection mode provides threat prevention against an attack that is
attempting to exploit the vulnerability that is described in this document.
Threat prevention is achieved through a default override that performs an event
action for triggered signatures with a riskRatingValue greater than
90.
For additional information about the risk rating and threat rating
calculation, reference Risk
Rating and Threat Rating: Simplify IPS Policy Management.
Identification: Cisco Security Manager
Cisco Security Manager, Event Viewer
Beginning in software version 4.0, Cisco Security Manager can collect
syslogs from Cisco firewalls and Cisco IPS devices and provides the Event
Viewer, which can query for events that are related to the vulnerabilities that
are described in this document.
Using the IPS Alert Events predefined view in the Event
Viewer, the user can enter the search strings 6009/0, and 6920/0 in the
event filter to return all captured events related to Cisco IPS signatures
6009/0, and 6920/0.
Using the following filters in the Firewall Denied Events
predefined view in the Event Viewer provides all captured Cisco firewall access
list deny syslog messages that could indicate potential
attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.
- Use the Destination event filter to filter network objects that contain
the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example,
IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range
2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
- Use the Destination Service event filter to filter objects that contain
TCP ports 9004, 5060, 9043, and 9443
An Event Type ID filter can be used with the Firewall Denied
Events predefined view in the Event Viewer to filter the syslog IDs
shown in the following list to provide all captured Cisco firewall
deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to
exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:
For more information about Cisco Security Manager Events, refer to the Filtering
and Querying Events section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.
Cisco Security Manager Report Manager
Beginning in software version 4.1, Cisco Security Manager supports the
Report Manager, the Cisco IPS event reporting feature. This feature allows an
administrator to define reports based on Cisco IPS events of interest. Reports
can be scheduled or users can run ad hoc reports as required.
Using the Report Manager, the user can define an IPS Top Signatures report
for Cisco IPS devices of interest based on time-range and signature
characteristics. When the Signature ID is set to
Cisco Security Manager will generate a comprehensive report that ranks the
count of the alerts fired for the signature of interest compared to the total
sum of all signature alerts shown in the report.
Also in the Report Manager, the Top Services report can be used with the
following configuration to generate a report of events that indicate potential
attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:
- Use the Destination IP network filter to filter network objects that
contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for
example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24 and IPv6 address range
2001:DB8:1:60::/64)
- Set an action of Deny on the Criteria settings page
For more information about Cisco Security Manager IPS Event Reporting refer
to the Understanding
IPS Top Reports section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.
Identification: Event Management System Partner Events
Cisco works with industry-leading Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) companies through the Cisco
Developer Network. This partnership helps Cisco deliver validated and tested SIEM
systems that address business concerns such as long-term log archiving and
forensics, heterogeneous event correlation, and advanced compliance reporting.
Security Information and Event Management partner products can be leveraged to
collect events from Cisco devices and then query the collected events for the
incidents created by a Cisco IPS signature or deny syslog
messages from firewalls that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the
vulnerabilities that are described in this document. The queries can be made by
Sig ID and Syslog ID as shown in the following list:
- 6009/0 SYN Flood DOS
- 6920/0 Net Flood TCP
- ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny)
For more information about SIEM partners, refer to the Security
Management System website.
Additional Information
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco''s worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
Related Information