Advisory ID: cisco-amb-20070412-wcs
For Public Release 2007 April 12 16:00 UTC (GMT)
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Cisco Security Procedures
This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the PSIRT security advisory "Multiple Vulnerabilities in the Cisco Wireless Control System." It documents additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the network.
There are three vulnerabilities associated with this Applied Mitigation Bulletin and the corresponding PSIRT security advisory. These vulnerabilities may result in the ability to write arbitrary files to the Wireless Control System (WCS), elevate privileges on the WCS, or access network organization information without authentication. The three vulnerabilities are summarized here:
- Fixed FTP Credentials for WCS Location Backup. This vulnerability may be exploited remotely using authentication with fixed credentials. Exploitation can allow the attacker to write arbitrary files to the server that is hosting the WCS application. In some cases, this capability could be leveraged to alter system files and compromise the server. The attack vector is through TCP ports 20 and 21. This vulnerability is not designated by a CVE ID.
- Account Group Privilege Escalation. This vulnerability may be exploited remotely with authentication using valid credentials of any user with a valid user name and password. This vulnerability allows a user to change his or her account group membership. This privilege escalation could allow full control of the WCS and the wireless networks managed by the WCS. The attack vector is through TCP ports 80 and 443. This vulnerability is not designated by a CVE ID.
- Information Disclosure to Unauthenticated Users. This vulnerability may be exploited remotely with no authentication. Exploitation can allow the attacker to obtain information about the organization of the network, including access point locations. The attack vector is through TCP ports 80 and 443. This vulnerability is not designated by a CVE ID.
This document contains information to assist Cisco customers in identifying and mitigating attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities in the Cisco WCS described above. Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the PSIRT security advisory: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20070412-wcs.
Mitigation Technique Overview
Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for the vulnerabilities in the Cisco Wireless Control System. Many of these countermeasures should be considered general security best practices.
The most preventive control is provided by access control lists (ACLs) applied on Cisco IOS software, Cisco PIX Security Appliances, Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliances, and Cisco Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series switches and Cisco 7600 Series routers.
Detective controls can also be performed using Cisco IOS NetFlow and access control lists on Cisco IOS devices, Cisco PIX Security Appliances, Cisco ASA Adaptive Security Appliances, and Cisco FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 switches and Cisco 7600 routers, as well as through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.
Organizations should follow their standard risk mitigation process to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Documents that may be used to aid in the risk triage are available at Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping.
Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.
Mitigation: Infrastructure Access Control Lists
In an effort to protect infrastructure devices and minimize the risk, impact, and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks, infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) should be deployed to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment. The construction of an iACL is accomplished by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. iACLs deployed on Cisco IOS routers should be applied to all interfaces (where a Layer 3 IP address is configured) in the ingress direction for maximum protection of infrastructure devices.
In the following example, the address 192.168.2.2 belongs to the Wireless Location Appliance (WLA) and the address 192.0.2.2 belongs to the WCS. The iACL policy permits FTP packets from the WLA to the WCS and denies all other FTP flows to the WCS. The iACL policy also permits HTTP traffic from a trusted subnet (for example 192.168.3.0/24) and denies other HTTP traffic.
Added access control entries (ACEs) should be implemented as part of an iACL policy that is used to filter traffic at network ingress points.
For more information on iACLs, refer to Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.
! -- Permit/Deny additional Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic sent to the ! -- infrastructure address space in accordance with existing security ! -- policies and configurations. ! !-- Allow FTP packets from known trusted hosts (WLA) to the WCS. access-list 100 permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp access-list 100 permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data ! – Allow HTTP packets from known trusted subnet to the WCS access-list 100 permit tcp 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.255 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq http !-- The following vulnerability-specific ACEs !--aid in the identification of attacks. access-list 100 deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp access-list 100 deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data access-list 100 deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq http !-- Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured !-- within the infrastructure address space. access-list 100 deny ip any 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 !-- Permit/deny all other Layer 3 or Layer 4 traffic in accordance with !-- existing security policies and configurations. ! !-- Apply access list to interface in the inbound direction. interface FastEthernet0/0 ip access-group 100 in !
Identification: Infrastructure Access Control Lists
With an iACL, once the access list has been applied to an interface in the ingress direction, the show access-list command can be used to identify the number of FTP packets that are being filtered. Filtered packets should be investigated to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show access-list 100 follows. In this example, there were 5 FTP packets and 3 HTTP packets dropped by access list 100. This access list has been applied in the inbound direction on interface FastEthernet0/0.
router#show access-list 100 Extended IP access list 100 10 permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp 20 permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data 30 permit tcp 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.255 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq http 40 deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp (5 matches) 50 deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data 60 deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq http (3 matches) 70 deny ip any 192.0.2.0 0.0.0.255 router#
Cisco IOS NetFlow can be configured on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of traffic flows that may be potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities described in this document. Packets should be investigated to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability or legitimate traffic.
router#show ip cache flow IP packet size distribution (128222696 total packets): 1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480 .009 .619 .037 .008 .008 .008 .005 .012 .000 .001 .004 .001 .002 .002 .007 512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608 .001 .001 .188 .012 .065 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes 20 active, 65516 inactive, 64268350 added 191788566 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures Active flows timeout in 1 minutes Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes 20 active, 16364 inactive, 3795862 added, 3795862 added to flow 0 alloc failures, 0 force free 1 chunk, 11 chunks added last clearing of statistics never Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec) -------- Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow TCP-Telnet 11404486 2.6 1 49 3.0 0.0 1.5 TCP-FTP 6777 0.0 8 53 0.0 6.0 7.7 TCP-FTPD 673 0.0 3294 889 0.5 53.4 0.5 TCP-WWW 166480 0.0 13 747 0.5 4.2 9.3 TCP-SMTP 12 0.0 1 47 0.0 0.0 10.5 TCP-X 731 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 1.4 TCP-BGP 13 0.0 1 46 0.0 0.0 10.3 TCP-NNTP 12 0.0 1 47 0.0 0.0 9.7 TCP-Frag 70399 0.0 1 688 0.0 0.0 22.7 TCP-other 49169783 11.4 2 264 24.1 0.1 1.4 UDP-DNS 971384 0.2 1 58 0.2 0.0 15.4 UDP-NTP 1179572 0.2 1 76 0.2 0.6 15.5 UDP-TFTP 10 0.0 2 57 0.0 6.6 18.6 UDP-other 1023814 0.2 1 163 0.4 0.3 16.7 ICMP 273311 0.0 8 47 0.5 13.0 20.9 IPv6INIP 15 0.0 1 1132 0.0 0.0 15.4 GRE 694 0.0 1 50 0.0 0.0 15.4 IP-other 2 0.0 2 20 0.0 0.1 15.7 Total: 64268168 14.9 1 252 29.8 0.1 2.3 SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts Gi0/1 192.168.132.44 Gi0/0 10.89.245.149 11 007B 007B 1 Gi0/1 192.168.128.23 Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 11 007B 007B 1 Gi0/1 192.168.2.2 Gi0/0 192.0.2.2 11 03B1 0015 21 Gi0/1 192.168.2.2 Gi0/0 192.0.2.2 11 03B2 0014 6 Gi0/1 192.168.150.1 Gi0/0* 22.214.171.124 11 0401 0035 1 Gi0/1 192.168.150.1 Gi0/0 126.96.36.199 11 0401 0035 1 Gi0/1 192.168.15.11 Gi0/0 192.0.2.2 11 05C7 0015 11 Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1* 192.168.128.23 11 007B 007B 1 Gi0/1 192.168.160.9 Gi0/0 192.0.2.2 11 1811 0015 8 Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1 192.168.128.23 11 007B 007B 1 Gi0/1 192.168.132.44 Gi0/0* 188.8.131.52 11 E094 0035 2 Gi0/1 192.168.132.44 Gi0/0 184.108.40.206 11 E094 0035 2 Gi0/0 192.168.208.64 Null 192.168.208.255 11 0089 0089 3 Gi0/1 192.168.128.56 Gi0/0 192.0.2.2 06 B184 0050 2 Gi0/1 192.168.3.44 Gi0/0 192.0.2.2 06 A301 0050 2 Gi0/0 220.127.116.11 Gi0/1* 192.168.132.44 11 0035 E094 2 Gi0/0 18.104.22.168 Gi0/1 192.168.132.44 11 0035 E094 2 router#
In the preceding example, there are several flows of FTP packets on TCP port 21 (hex value 0015) and TCP port 20 (hex value 0014). This traffic is being sourced from IP addresses in the 192.168.x.x address block and destined for IP address 192.0.2.2, which is the WCS. These flows should be compared to baseline utilization for FTP traffic and should also be investigated to determine whether the flows are sourced from trusted hosts and networks. There are also two flows of HTTP packets on TCP port 80 (hex value 0050). This traffic is also being sourced from IP addresses in the 192.168.x.x address block and destined for IP address 192.0.2.2, which is the WCS. These flows should be compared to baseline utilization for HTTP and investigated to determine whether the flows are trusted.
Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists
In an effort to protect the network from edge traffic that enters the network at ingress access points or traffic that transits the network, transit access control lists (tACLs) should be deployed to perform policy enforcement for this traffic. The construction of a tACL is accomplished by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations.
These access list statements may be deployed on a Cisco ASA, PIX, or FWSM firewall as part of a firewall policy that will protect devices deployed behind it, including the WCS. The following access list permits FTP traffic on TCP ports 20 and 21 from a known trusted host, the WLC (for example, 192.168.2.2) to a WCS (for example, 192.0.2.2) and filters all other FTP traffic destined for the WCS. This access list also permits HTTP traffic on TCP port 80 from a trusted subnet (for example 192.168.3.0/24) and filters all other HTTP traffic destined for the WCS.
Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic. Whenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of tACLs.
Additional information about tACLs is available at Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.
!-- Permit FTP packets from the WLC to the WCS and filter other FTP traffic. access-list outside extended permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp access-list outside extended permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data access-list outside extended permit tcp 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.255 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq http access-list outside extended deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp access-list outside extended deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data access-list outside extended deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq http !-- Permit/deny all other IP traffic in accordance !-- with existing security policies and configuration. ! !-- Apply access list to interface in the inbound direction. access-group outside in interface outside !
Identification: Transit Access Control Lists
When an access list has been applied to an interface on an ASA, PIX, or FWSM firewall, the show access-list command can be used to identify the number of packets being filtered. Filtered packets should be investigated to determine whether they are attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Example output for show access-list outside follows. In this example, there were 16 FTP packets destined for the WCS on TCP port 21 and 5 HTTP packets destined for the WCS on TCP port 80 and dropped by access list outside. This access list has been applied in the inbound direction on the outside interface.
ASA5520# show access-list outside access-list outside; 6 elements access-list outside line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp (hitcnt=0) 0x39e4b2b3 access-list outside line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.168.2.2 gt 1023 host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data (hitcnt=0) 0x473839eb access-list outside line 3 extended permit tcp 192.168.3.0 0.0.0.255 host 192.0.2.2 eq http (hitcnt=0) 0xef3df216 access-list outside line 4 extended deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp (hitcnt=16) 0xaa1c10b3 access-list outside line 5 extended deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq ftp-data (hitcnt=0) 0x3521deb5 access-list outside line 6 extended deny tcp any host 192.0.2.2 eq http (hitcnt=5) 0x441d98d1
The Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) appliances and service modules can be used to provide threat detection and prevention for attempts to exploit the Account Group Privilege Escalation vulnerability described in this document.
Beginning with signature update S280, IPS signature 5851/0 (Signature Name: WCS Administrative Directory Access) will trigger a low-severity alarm on potential attempts to exploit the Account Group Privilege Escalation vulnerability or the Information Disclosure to Unauthenticated Users vulnerability, which may indicate an attempt to gain control of the WCS. Because this signature triggers a low-severity event, customers may not see this event on the IPS monitoring consoles. The following low-severity event was triggered on a Cisco IPS Sensor deployed in promiscuous mode.
R4-IPS4240a#show events alert evIdsAlert: eventId=1166761098236260780 severity=low vendor=Cisco originator: hostId: R4-IPS4240a appName: sensorApp appInstanceId: 380 time: 2007/04/13 00:04:31 2007/04/12 19:04:31 CDT signature: description=WCS Administrative Directory Access id=5851 version=S280 subsigId: 0 sigDetails: WCS Administrative Directory Access marsCategory: Info/Misc/Web marsCategory: Penetrate/ViewFiles/HTTPSource interfaceGroup: vs1 vlan: 0 participants: attacker: addr: locality=OUT 192.168.204.148 port: 1871 target: addr: locality=OUT 192.168.130.69 port: 80 os: idSource=unknown relevance=relevant type=unknown context: fromAttacker: !-- Output suppressed triggerPacket: !-- Output suppressed riskRatingValue: attackRelevanceRating=relevant targetValueRating=medium 37 threatRatingValue: 37 interface: ge0_1 protocol: tcp
Identification: CS MARS Keyword Query
The Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System (Cisco Security MARS) console can be monitored for attempts to exploit one of the vulnerabilities described in this document. The following query on the MARS appliance will display events triggered by signature 5851/0.
Note: This query has a Result Format containing All Matching Event Raw Messages and Keyword equal to NR-5851/0.
The following display is the result of the previous query for IPS events triggered by signature 5851/0:
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Added device-specific information for Cisco Intrusion Prevention System and Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis, and Response System.
Initial public release.
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