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Cisco Applied Mitigation Bulletin: Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers

Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers

Advisory ID: cisco-amb-20120229-wlc

http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20120229-wlc

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2012 February 29 16:00  UTC (GMT)

Related Resources:

View related Security Advisory

Contents

Cisco Response
Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification
Additional Information
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
Related Information

Cisco Response

This Applied Mitigation Bulletin is a companion document to the PSIRT Security Advisory Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers and provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

This document provides identification and mitigation techniques that administrators can deploy on Cisco network devices.

Vulnerability Characteristics

There are multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers (WLC), Cisco Wireless Services Modules (WiSM), Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Modules (WLCM), and Cisco Catalyst 3750G Integrated WLC. The following subsections summarize these vulnerabilities:

Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers HTTP Denial of Service Vulnerability: This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause the affected device to crash. Repeated attempts to exploit this vulnerability could result in a sustained denial of service (DoS) condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through HTTP packets using TCP port 80 or HTTPS packets using TCP port 443.

This vulnerability has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2012-0368.

Cisco Wireless LAN Controllers Unauthorized Access Vulnerability: This vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication and without end-user interaction. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause the affected device to crash. Repeated attempts to exploit this vulnerability could result in a sustained DoS condition. The attack vector for exploitation is through packets using TCP port 1023. 

This vulnerability has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2012-0371.

Vulnerability Overview

Information about vulnerable, unaffected, and fixed software is available in the Cisco Security Advisory, which is available at the following link: http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20120229-wlc.

Mitigation Technique Overview

Cisco devices provide several countermeasures for these vulnerabilities. Administrators are advised to consider these protection methods to be general security best practices for infrastructure devices and the traffic that transits the network. This section of the document provides an overview of these techniques.

Cisco IOS Software can provide effective means of exploit prevention using infrastructure access control lists (iACLs).

Effective exploit prevention can also be provided by the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance, Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module (ASASM), and the Firewall Services Module (FWSM) for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers using transit access control lists (tACLs).

These protection mechanisms filter and drop packets that are attempting to exploit these vulnerabilities.

Cisco IOS NetFlow records can provide visibility into network-based exploitation attempts. 

Cisco IOS Software, Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, Cisco FWSM firewalls, and Cisco ACE Application Control Engine Appliance and Module can provide visibility through syslog messages and counter values displayed in the output from show commands.

The Cisco Security Manager can also provide visibility through incidents, queries, and event reporting.

Risk Management

Organizations are advised to follow their standard risk evaluation and mitigation processes to determine the potential impact of these vulnerabilities. Triage refers to sorting projects and prioritizing efforts that are most likely to be successful. Cisco has provided documents that can help organizations develop a risk-based triage capability for their information security teams. Risk Triage for Security Vulnerability Announcements and Risk Triage and Prototyping can help organizations develop repeatable security evaluation and response processes.

Device-Specific Mitigation and Identification

Caution: The effectiveness of any mitigation technique depends on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. As with any configuration change, evaluate the impact of this configuration prior to applying the change.

Specific information about mitigation and identification is available for these devices:

Cisco IOS Routers and Switches

Mitigation: Infrastructure Access Control Lists

To protect infrastructure devices and minimize the risk, impact, and effectiveness of direct infrastructure attacks, administrators are advised to deploy infrastructure access control lists (iACLs) to perform policy enforcement of traffic sent to infrastructure equipment. Administrators can construct an iACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic sent to infrastructure devices in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. For the maximum protection of infrastructure devices, deployed iACLs should be applied in the ingress direction on all interfaces to which an IP address has been configured. An iACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The iACL policy denies unauthorized HTTP and HTTPS packets on TCP ports 80 and 443 respectively, in addition to packets on TCP 1023 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 represents the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic. Whenever possible, infrastructure address space should be distinct from the address space used for user and services segments. Using this addressing methodology will assist with the construction and deployment of iACLs.

Additional information about iACLs is in Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists.

 ip access-list extended Infrastructure-ACL-Policy 
!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!

permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80
permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443
permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 1023
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!


deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80
deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443
deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 1023
!
!-- Explicit deny ACE for traffic sent to addresses configured within
!-- the infrastructure address space
!

deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!
-- Apply iACL to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
interface GigabitEthernet 0/0
ip access-group
Infrastructure-ACL-Policy in
!

Note that filtering with an interface access list will elicit the transmission of ICMP unreachable messages back to the source of the filtered traffic. Generating these messages could have the undesired effect of increasing CPU utilization on the device. In Cisco IOS Software, ICMP unreachable generation is limited to one packet every 500 milliseconds by default. ICMP unreachable message generation can be disabled using the interface configuration command no ip unreachables. ICMP unreachable rate limiting can be changed from the default using the global configuration command ip icmp rate-limit unreachable interval-in-ms.

Identification: Infrastructure Access Control Lists

After the administrator applies the iACL to an interface, the show ip access-lists command will identify the number of HTTP and HTTPS packets on TCP ports 80 and 443 respectively, in addition to packets on TCP port 1023 that have been filtered on interfaces on which the iACL is applied. Administrators should investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy follows:

router#show ip access-lists Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
Extended IP access list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy
10 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq www (60 matches)
20 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443 (41 matches)
30 permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 1023 (31 matches)
40 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq www (9 matches)
50 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443 (18 matches)
60 deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 eq 1023 (10 matches)
70 deny ip any 192.168.60.0 0.0.0.255 (17 matches)
router#

In the preceding example, access list Infrastructure-ACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 9 HTTP packets on TCP port 80 for ACE line 40
  • 18 HTTPS packets on TCP port 443 for ACE line 50
  • 10 packets on TCP port 1023 for ACE line 60

For additional information about investigating incidents using ACE counters and syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.

Administrators can use Cisco IOS Embedded Event Manager to provide instrumentation when specific conditions are met, such as ACE counter hits. The Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper Embedded Event Manager in a Security Context provides additional details about how to use this feature.

Identification: Access List Logging

The log and log-input access control list (ACL) option will cause packets that match specific ACEs to be logged. The log-input option enables logging of the ingress interface in addition to the packet source and destination IP addresses and ports.

Caution: Access control list logging can be very CPU intensive and must be used with extreme caution. Factors that drive the CPU impact of ACL logging are log generation, log transmission, and process switching to forward packets that match log-enabled ACEs.

For Cisco IOS Software, the ip access-list logging interval interval-in-ms command can limit the effects of process switching induced by IPv4 ACL logging. The logging rate-limit rate-per-second [except loglevel] command limits the impact of log generation and transmission.

The CPU impact from ACL logging can be addressed in hardware on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers with Supervisor Engine 720 or Supervisor Engine 32 using optimized ACL logging.

For additional information about the configuration and use of ACL logging, reference the Understanding Access Control List Logging Cisco Security white paper.

Cisco IOS NetFlow and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco IOS NetFlow

Administrators can configure Cisco IOS NetFlow on Cisco IOS routers and switches to aid in the identification of IPv4 traffic flows that may be attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Administrators are advised to investigate flows to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities or whether they are legitimate traffic flows.

router#show ip cache flow
IP packet size distribution (90784136 total packets):
1-32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320 352 384 416 448 480
.000 .698 .011 .001 .004 .005 .000 .004 .000 .000 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000

512 544 576 1024 1536 2048 2560 3072 3584 4096 4608
.000 .001 .256 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

IP Flow Switching Cache, 4456704 bytes
1885 active, 63651 inactive, 59960004 added
129803821 ager polls, 0 flow alloc failures
Active flows timeout in 30 minutes
Inactive flows timeout in 15 seconds
IP Sub Flow Cache, 402056 bytes
0 active, 16384 inactive, 0 added, 0 added to flow
0 alloc failures, 0 force free
1 chunk, 1 chunk added
last clearing of statistics never
Protocol Total Flows Packets Bytes Packets Active(Sec) Idle(Sec)
-------- Flows /Sec /Flow /Pkt /Sec /Flow /Flow
TCP-Telnet 11393421 2.8 1 48 3.1 0.0 1.4
TCP-FTP 236 0.0 12 66 0.0 1.8 4.8
TCP-FTPD 21 0.0 13726 1294 0.0 18.4 4.1
TCP-WWW 22282 0.0 21 1020 0.1 4.1 7.3
TCP-X 719 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 1.3
TCP-BGP 1 0.0 1 40 0.0 0.0 15.0
TCP-Frag 70399 0.0 1 688 0.0 0.0 22.7
TCP-other 47861004 11.8 1 211 18.9 0.0 1.3
UDP-DNS 582 0.0 4 73 0.0 3.4 15.4
UDP-NTP 287252 0.0 1 76 0.0 0.0 15.5
UDP-other 310347 0.0 2 230 0.1 0.6 15.9
ICMP 11674 0.0 3 61 0.0 19.8 15.5
IPv6INIP 15 0.0 1 1132 0.0 0.0 15.4
GRE 4 0.0 1 48 0.0 0.0 15.3
Total: 59957957 14.8 1 196 22.5 0.0 1.5

SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts
Gi0/0 192.168.10.201 Gi0/1 192.168.60.102 11 0984 00A1 1
Gi0/0 192.168.11.54 Gi0/1 192.168.60.158 11 0911 00A1 3
Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 06 0016 0050 1
Gi0/0 192.168.13.97 Gi0/1 192.168.60.28 11 0B3E 00A1 5
Gi0/0 192.168.10.17 Gi0/1 192.168.60.97 06 0B89 03FF 1
Gi0/0 10.88.226.1 Gi0/1 192.168.202.22 11 007B 007B 1
Gi0/0 192.168.12.185 Gi0/1 192.168.60.239 06 0BD7 01BB 1
Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 Gi0/1 192.168.60.150 06 12CA 0050 1

router#

In the preceding example, there are multiple flows for HTTP on TCP port 80 (hex value 0050)HTTPS on TCP port 443 (hex value 01BB),and TCP packets on port 1023 (hex value 03FF).

As shown in the following example, to view only the HTTP packets on TCP port 80 (hex value 0050), HTTPS packets on TCP on  port 443 (hex value 01BB), and TCP packets on  port 1023 (hex value 03FF), use the show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(0050|01BB|03FF)_  command to display the related Cisco NetFlow records:

TCP Flows
router#show ip cache flow | include SrcIf|_06_.*(0050|01BB|03FF)_
SrcIf SrcIPaddress DstIf DstIPaddress Pr SrcP DstP Pkts Gi0/1 192.168.150.60 Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 06 0016 0050 1
Gi0/0 192.168.10.17 Gi0/1 192.168.60.97
06 0B89 03FF 1
Gi0/0 192.168.12.185 Gi0/1 192.168.60.239 06
0BD7 01BB 1
Gi0/0 10.89.16.226 Gi0/1 192.168.60.150 06
12CA 0050 1
router#

Identification: IPv4 Traffic Flow Identification Using Cisco Flexible NetFlow

Introduced in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.2(31)SB2 and 12.4(9)T, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow improves original Cisco NetFlow by adding the capability to customize the traffic analysis parameters for the administrator's specific requirements. Original Cisco NetFlow uses a fixed seven tuples of IP information to identify a flow, whereas Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow allows the flow to be user defined. It facilitates the creation of more complex configurations for traffic analysis and data export by using reusable configuration components.

The following example output is from a Cisco IOS device that is running a version of Cisco IOS Software in the 15.1T train. Although the syntax will be almost identical for the 12.4T and 15.0 trains, it may vary slightly depending on the actual Cisco IOS release being used. In the following configuration, Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will collect information on interface GigabitEthernet0/0 for incoming IPv4 flows based on source IPv4 address, as defined by the match ipv4 source address key field statement. Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow will also include nonkey field information about source and destination IPv4 addresses, protocol, ports (if present), ingress and egress interfaces, and packets per flow.

!
!-- Configure key and nonkey fields
!-- in the user-defined flow record
!

flow record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
match ipv4 source address
collect ipv4 protocol
collect ipv4 destination address
collect transport source-port
collect transport destination-port
collect interface input
collect interface output
collect counter packets
!
!-- Configure the flow monitor to
!-- reference the user-defined flow
!-- record
!

flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4
record FLOW-RECORD-ipv4
!
!-- Apply the flow monitor to the interface
!-- in the ingress direction
!

interface GigabitEthernet0/0
ip flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 input

The Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow flow output is as follows:

router#show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table
Cache type: Normal
Cache size: 4096
Current entries: 6
High Watermark: 1

Flows added: 9181
Flows aged: 9175
- Active timeout ( 1800 secs) 9000
- Inactive timeout ( 15 secs) 175
- Event aged 0
- Watermark aged 0
- Emergency aged 0

IPV4 SRC ADDR ipv4 dst addr trns src port trns dst port intf input intf output pkts ip prot
=============== =============== ============= ============= ============= ============== ======= =======
192.168.10.17 192.168.60.97 1456 80 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 1128 6
192.168.11.54 192.168.60.158 123 123 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 2212 17
192.168.12.185 192.168.60.239 2567 443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 13 6
192.168.13.97 192.168.60.28 3451 1023 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 1 6
192.168.10.17 192.168.60.97 4231 5060 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 146 17
10.88.226.1 192.168.202.22 2678 443 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 10567 6
10.89.16.226 192.168.150.60 3562 80 Gi0/0 Gi0/1 30012 6

To only view the HTTP, HTTPS, and TCP packets for TCP ports 80, 443, and 1023 traffic use the show flow monitor FLOW-MONITOR-ipv4 cache format table | include IPV4 DST ADDR |_(80|443|1023)_.*_6_ command to display the related NetFlow records.

For more information about Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow, refer to Flexible Netflow Configuration Guide, Cisco IOS Release 15.1M&T and Cisco IOS Flexible NetFlow Configuration Guide, Release 12.4T.

Cisco ASA, Cisco ASASM, and Cisco FWSM Firewalls

Mitigation: Transit Access Control Lists

To protect the network from traffic that enters the network at ingress access points, which may include Internet connection points, partner and supplier connection points, or VPN connection points, administrators are advised to deploy tACLs to perform policy enforcement. Administrators can construct a tACL by explicitly permitting only authorized traffic to enter the network at ingress access points or permitting authorized traffic to transit the network in accordance with existing security policies and configurations. A tACL workaround cannot provide complete protection against these vulnerabilities when the attack originates from a trusted source address.

The tACL policy denies unauthorized HTTP and HTTPS packets on TCP ports 80 and 443 respectively, in addition to packets on TCP 1023 that are sent to affected devices. In the following example, 192.168.60.0/24 represents the IP address space that is used by the affected devices, and the host at 192.168.100.1 is considered a trusted source that requires access to the affected devices. Care should be taken to allow required traffic for routing and administrative access prior to denying all unauthorized traffic.

Additional information about tACLs is in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge.

!
!-- Include explicit permit statements for trusted sources
!-- that require access on the vulnerable protocols and ports
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
     192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
     192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 443
access-list tACL-Policy extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
     192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 1023
!
!-- The following vulnerability-specific access control entries
!-- (ACEs) can aid in identification of attacks
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 80
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 443
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 1023
!
!-- Permit or deny all other Layer 3 and Layer 4 traffic in accordance
!-- with existing security policies and configurations
!
!-- Explicit deny for all other IP traffic
!
access-list tACL-Policy extended deny ip any any
!
!--  Apply tACL to interfaces in the ingress direction
!
access-group tACL-Policy in interface outside

Identification: Transit Access Control Lists

After the tACL has been applied to an interface, administrators can use the show access-list command to identify the number of HTTP and HTTPS packets on TCP ports 80 and 443 respectively, in addition to packets on TCP 1023 that have been filtered. Administrators are advised to investigate filtered packets to determine whether they are attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Example output for show access-list tACL-Policy follows:

firewall#show access-list tACL-Policy
access-list tACL-Policy; 7 elements; name hash: 0x3452703d
access-list tACL-Policy line 1 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
     192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq www (hitcnt=31)
access-list tACL-Policy line 2 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
     192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq https (hitcnt=61)
access-list tACL-Policy line 3 extended permit tcp host 192.168.100.1 
     192.168.60.0 255.255.255.0 eq 1023 (hitcnt=131)
access-list tACL-Policy line 4 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 
     255.255.255.0 eq www (hitcnt=8)
access-list tACL-Policy line 5 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 
     255.255.255.0 eq https (hitcnt=14)
access-list tACL-Policy line 6 extended deny tcp any 192.168.60.0 
     255.255.255.0 eq 1023 (hitcnt=30)
access-list tACL-Policy line 7 extended deny ip any any (hitcnt=8)

In the preceding example, access list tACL-Policy has dropped the following packets received from an untrusted host or network:

  • 8 HTTP packets on TCP port 80 for ACE line 4
  • 14 HTTPS packets on TCP port 443 for ACE line 5
  • 30 TCP packets on port 1023 for ACE line 6

In addition, syslog message 106023 can provide valuable information, which includes the source and destination IP address, the source and destination port numbers, and the IP protocol for the denied packet.

Identification: Firewall Access List Syslog Messages

Firewall syslog message 106023 will be generated for packets denied by an access control entry (ACE) that does not have the log keyword present. Additional information about this syslog message is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Message, 8.2 - 106023.

Information about configuring syslog for the Cisco ASA 5500 Series Adaptive Security Appliance is in Monitoring - Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on the Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in Configuring Logging. Information about configuring syslog on Cisco FWSM for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series Switches and Cisco 7600 Series Routers is in Monitoring the Firewall Services Module.

In the following example, the show logging | grep regex command extracts syslog messages from the logging buffer on the firewall. These messages provide additional information about denied packets that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. It is possible to use different regular expressions with the grep keyword to search for specific data in the logged messages.

Additional information about regular expression syntax is in Creating a Regular Expression.

firewall#show logging | grep 106023
  Feb 29 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.18/2944 
         dst inside:192.168.60.191/80 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
  Feb 29 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.200/2945 
         dst inside:192.168.60.33/80 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
  Feb 29 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.99/2946 
         dst inside:192.168.60.240/443 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
  Feb 29 2012 00:15:13: %ASA-4-106023: Deny tcp src outside:192.0.2.100/2947 
         dst inside:192.168.60.115/1023 by access-group "tACL-Policy"
firewall#

In the preceding example, the messages logged for the tACL tACL-Policy show HTTP packets for TCP port 80, HTTPS packets for TCP port 443, and TCP packets for port 1023 sent to the address block assigned to affected devices.

Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco ASA Series Adaptive Security Appliances is in Cisco ASA 5500 Series System Log Messages, 8.2. Additional information about syslog messages for Cisco Catalyst 6500 Series ASA Services Module is in the Analyzing Syslog Messages section of the Cisco ASASM CLI Configuration Guide. Additional information about syslog messages for the Cisco FWSM is in Catalyst 6500 Series Switch and Cisco 7600 Series Router Firewall Services Module Logging System Log Messages.

For additional information about investigating incidents using syslog events, reference the Identifying Incidents Using Firewall and IOS Router Syslog Events Cisco Security Intelligence Operations white paper.

Cisco Security Manager

Identification: Cisco Security Manager

Cisco Security Manager Report Manager

Beginning in software version 4.0, Cisco Security Manager can collect syslogs from Cisco firewalls and Cisco IPS devices and provides the Event Viewer, which can query for events that are related to the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

Using the following filters in the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer provides all captured Cisco firewall access list deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document.

  • Use the Destination event filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24)
  • Use the Destination Service event filter to filter objects that contain TCP ports 80, 443, and 1023

An Event Type ID filter can be used with the Firewall Denied Events predefined view in the Event Viewer to filter the syslog IDs shown in the following list to provide all captured Cisco firewall deny syslog messages that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:

  • ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny)

For more information about Cisco Security Manager Events, refer to the Filtering and Querying Events section of the Cisco Security Manager User Guide.

Cisco Security Manager Report Manager

Beginning in software version 4.1, Cisco Security Manager supports the Report Manager, the Cisco IPS event reporting feature. This feature allows an administrator to define reports based on Cisco IPS events of interest. Reports can be scheduled or users can run ad hoc reports as required.

Also in the Report Manager, the Top Services report can be used with the following configuration to generate a report of events that indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document:

  • Use the Destination IP network filter to filter network objects that contain the IP address space that is used by the affected devices (for example, IPv4 address range 192.168.60.0/24)
  • Set an action of Deny on the Criteria settings page

Identification: Event Management System Partner Events

Cisco works with industry-leading Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) companies through the Cisco Developer Network. This partnership helps Cisco deliver validated and pretested SIEM systems that address business concerns such as long-term log archiving and forensics, heterogeneous event correlation, and advanced compliance reporting. Security Information and Event Management partner products can be leveraged to collect events from Cisco devices and then query the collected events for the incidents created by a Cisco IPS signature or deny syslog messages from firewalls that could indicate potential attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities that are described in this document. The queries can be made by Sig ID and Syslog ID as shown in the following list:

  • ASA-4-106023 (ACL deny)

For more information about SIEM partners, refer to the Security Management System website.

Additional Information

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Revision History

Revision 1.0 2012-February-29 Initial public release

Cisco Security Procedures

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/psirt/security_vulnerability_policy.html. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

Related Information